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ABSTRACT
This is a study on the puzzling case of neoliberal pro-market states enacting policies that
attempt to curb the competitive and profitable businesses of urban street vendors. Ac-
cordingly this project asks a simple question: if neoliberal governance of the economy
prescribes a positive disposition towards the market system driven by selfish pecuniary
gain, then why are informal street vendors regularly evicted and harassed by neoliberal
states in cities around the world? To answer this, I analyze the literature on neoliberalism
and the informal economy, and provide new theoretical insight into the internal contra-
diction of neoliberal principles in the context of the informal economy of selling. I argue
that the conflict with informal street vendors and the states is a manifestation of this con-
tradiction. Through my field research on informal street vendors (or hawkers) of Kolkata
I demonstrate this contradiction by analyzing the political economy of street vending.
Specifically I study the social movement of hawkers and show how the right to sell in the
city of Kolkata is negotiated and configured in the neoliberal era. I argue that this case
of Kolkata hawkers is a symptom of a larger struggle over spaces of selling in the neolib-
eral era which has been overlooked in my discipline. Thus, I hope this project will provide
fresh avenues of future research on the political economy of selling through studies of the
struggle between the forces of formalization and informalization of retail spaces.
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Chapter 1
A Puzzle
1.1 Introduction
There is wide consensus among scholars of political economy that we live in the age of
neoliberalism.1 There is also a consensus that the set of ideas that neoliberalism signi-
fies, remained dormant within a transatlantic academic milieu emanating mainly from
the Economists of the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), the University of Chicago and the
London School Economics (LSE).2 This set of ideas found its popular expression through
the policies of Deregulation, Liberalization, and Privatization (DLP) starting under the
Reagan and Thatcher administrations in UK and US during the 1980s, and before that,
1We can point to several dictionary definitions here. The 2010 edition of Oxford English Dictionary
does not include the word neoliberal or neoliberalism. The definition for the word liberal “In a political
context,” is given as “favouring individual liberty, free trade, and moderate political and social reform.”
See (Stevenson 2010). The web version of the Oxford franchise called Oxford Living Dictionaries how-
ever defines the word ‘neo-liberalism’ as “a modified form of liberalism tending to favour free-market cap-
italism.” (Oxford-Living-Dictionary 2018). Merriam Webster’s internet edition defines ‘neoliberal’ as “a
liberal who de-emphasizes traditional liberal doctrines in order to seek progress by more pragmatic meth-
ods.” See (Merriam-Webster 2018).
2Dormant in the sense that doctrines of economic liberalism became secluded within a corner of the
academia, not gaining much purchase in the mainstream academic or popular imaginary, which, since
the late 1930s, remained dominated by the towering influence of Keynes and his theories of governmen-
tal (fiscal) intervention in managing the economic life and living standards of citizens. See for example
(Burgin 2012) and (Rivot 2013).
1
in Pinochet’s Chile since 1972. Less than two decades after the dissolution of the USSR,
(Harvey 2007, p.3) claims “neoliberalism has become hegemonic as a mode of discourse.”
Neoliberalism has “hijacked our vocabulary,” popular sources seemed to concur.3 In the
context of Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) recreation of the Iraqi state in 2003,
Harvey goes on to say, “the assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by the
freedom of the market and of trade is the cardinal feature of neoliberal thinking.” This
kind of market fundamentalist thinking that is ingrained in neoliberalism, (Harvey 2007,
p.7-9) argues, constructs a neoliberal state: “a state apparatus whose fundamental mission
was to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation, on the part of both domes-
tic and foreign capital.”
In many ways David Harvey’s understanding of the core assumptions of neoliberal-
ism and the reason for existence of the neoliberal state is representative of thousands of
articles and reviews that have been written on neoliberalism, especially by its critics.4
Here the critics seem to be, in essence, agreeing with the claims of an ‘unabashed vic-
tory’ on behalf of “Western Liberalism” or “economic and political liberalism” that Fran-
cis Fukuyama claimed a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall.5 Without using the
term neoliberalism even once, Fukuyama reaffirmed in a 2014 Wall Street Journal essay,
that “History appeared to culminate in liberty: elected governments, individual rights, an
economic system in which capital and labor circulated with relatively modest state over-
sight.”6
In short, neoliberalism, (or western liberal democratic capitalism) was established as a
globally dominant idea in terms of the governments’ role in managing the economic life of
3See (Massey 2013).
4It is important to note here that neoliberalism is a contested term, and is used in an asymmetric
manner. The proponents of policies which the critics call neoliberal do not use the word neoliberal. In
the literature from the past decade we do not find “self-proclaimed neoliberals.” I return to this issue later
during my survey of relevant literature.
5See (Fukuyama 1989).
6See (Fukuyama 2014).
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people. We can also gather from this rudimentary analysis, that according to this mode of
thought, governments are in favor of the ‘market system’.7
1.1.1 Introducing the Puzzle
Interesting contradictions between idea and practice arise when we observe market ex-
change in the presence of real markets. All around the world we see state led control and
repression of actual profit generating activities of selling that are fundamentally dependent
on market exchange. If neoliberalism is hegemonic and in favor of market based profit
making exchanges by rational utility maximizing individuals, and if the neoliberal state
is supposed to create conditions amenable to market based profit generating activities,
then why do we observe neoliberal states constantly and increasingly trying to repress
and thwart fundamental market forces of private exchange? If the buying and selling in
markets for profit is a fundamental economic freedom, which in turn guarantees individ-
ual freedom, (central assumptions shared both by critics and proponents of neoliberal-
ism) then why are profit seeking people (call them “entrepreneurs”) who sell things on
city streets, regularly evicted, harassed, and controlled in diverse locations around the
world? We have widespread evidence about this, from cities like Bangkok,8 Kolkata,9 Ki-
7I use Robert Heilbroner’s interpretation of the term ‘market system’ born in the ‘long drawn out’
‘economic revolution’ of the long 18th century in Europe as “not just a means of exchanging goods; it is a
mechanism for sustaining and maintaining an entire society.” where “Land, labor, and capital are agents
of production, as impersonal, dehumanized economic entities.” Thus the arrangement was called the “mar-
ket system,” and ”the rule was deceptively simple: each should do what was to his best monetary advan-
tage. In the market system the lure of gain, not the pull of tradition or the whip of authority, steered the
great majority to his (or her) task. And yet, although each was free to go wherever his acquisitive nose
directed him, the interplay of one person against another resulted in the necessary tasks of society getting
done.”See (Heilbroner 2011, p.27-32).
8“In an attempt to impose some order on the capital’s famed tourist road, the Thai authorities or-
dered all street vendors selling food, clothes and trinkets to clear off the pavements during the day. The
edict caused an outcry from locals and tourists alike. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA),
a form of city police, has been accused of trying to sanitise the atmosphere that makes this stretch such
a draw for millions each year – and at the expense of the street’s 200 vendors, who already have meagre
earnings.” See (Ellis-Peterson 2018).
9“The hawker eviction drive at Gariahat turned violent on Tuesday night with hawkers attacking
policemen, smashing a police jeep and injuring the driver. Police, who were present in strength, man-
3
gali,10 Los Angeles,11 Mexico City,12 Bengaluru,13 New York City,14 Buenos Aires,15 Kam-
aged to chase away the 150-odd hawkers and carried on demolishing hundreds of makeshift stalls.” See
(India 2009).
10“I have been in Gikondo transit center many times, I can’t even count the number of times,” Marie, a
street vendor in the Nyabugogo bus station in Kigali, told Human Rights Watch in April. “I was arrested
for selling water and juice on the streets. I have to do it to make sure my children survive.” She went on
to explain that police took her to Gikondo transit center, beat her there and only released her after almost
two weeks, following a plea from a soldier she knew.” See (Tertsakian 2016).
11“Despite the fact that street vendors are practically everywhere in L.A., hawking hot dogs, fresh fruit,
toys and even toilet paper to willing buyers, they are illegal under city law. That law is widely ignored by
both the vendors and law enforcement — until it’s not. Police and city inspectors occasionally crack down,
ticketing or arresting people and often confiscating their carts and merchandise. But the street commerce
quickly resumes. The lack of consistent enforcement means that vendors can clutter the sidewalk with
carts and trash.” See (Los Angeles Times 2016).
12“The authorities have always wanted to remove us from the streets. They have accused us of selling
illegal products, drugs and weapons. But they have never found anything. We are poor people, and we do
sometimes sell pirated goods, but nothing more. If you ask me, is there any place that sells drugs on the
street? I could not answer. But not here, because we know that if we only give them one pretext they will
take us away. It is so much so that we ourselves help keep our streets in order. Imagine, if for earning a
few extra pesos, we would leave thousands of families without resources.” See (Reyes 2013).
13“Govindaraj from the Shivajinagar Street Vendors’ Union alleged that the police were harassing
them, by seizing and damaging their goods, besides abusing them verbally. ‘We are not breaking any
law. . . we are only asking for protection of our rights and dignity,’ he said.” See (Hindu 2015).
14“In recent years, vendors have been victims of New York’s aggressive ‘quality of life’ crackdown.
They have been denied access to vending licenses. Many streets have been closed to them at the urg-
ing of powerful business groups. They receive exorbitant tickets for minor violations like vending too
close to a crosswalk — more than any big businesses are required to pay for similar violations.” See:
http://streetvendor.org/
15“The cities of Buenos Aires and La Plata, 55 km away, have seen disproportionate police operations
in recent months to pursue street vendors, mainly of Senegalese nationality, violent and unjustified raids,
constant intimidation, harassment and repeated episodes of physical and verbal violence against Senegalese
workers,” said the human rights organisations in a statement.” See (Gutman 2018).
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pala,16 Paris,17 Tokyo,18 Tehran,19 Lagos,20 Vancouver,21 Luanda,22 Hong Kong, 23 and
Dhaka,24 to only name a few. Some of these efforts of control have backfired and spawned
social movements: Eric Garner selling loose cigarettes was choked to death by the police in
16“Running away is part of life, explains Meddy Sserwadda, eyeing the road. Each morning he buys
belts from a market in central Kampala, the capital of Uganda, selling them on a downtown street for a
small profit. He works without a licence—the city government has stopped issuing them—and flees when
enforcement officers approach. “They don’t want us to make the city dirty,” he says, crouched beside some
fugitive mango-sellers. Officials have twice confiscated his goods. His cousin, who is also a street vendor,
has spent time in prison.” See (Economist 2017).
17“Police moved in to evict the salesmen from beneath the monument on Sunday. Three police were
hurt when scuffles erupted and vendors started throwing stones and bottles. About 10 people were ar-
rested. A senior police official, Jean-Louis Fiamenghi, said: ”All street vendors will now be systematically
arrested and we will not tolerate these sales.” See (BBC 2011).
18“A recurring problem for street performers and vendors; most are in effect, breaking the law. While
it’s possible to purchase a permit in most major international cities, similar licenses are unavailable in
Japan.” See (Stoikopoulos & Mizukwa 2010).
19“The situation took a turn for the worse last month, when Tehran city officers tasked with alleviating
“street congestion” brutally assaulted 41-year-old street seller Ali Cheraghi. A few days later, Cheraghi
died of his wounds. A former petty tailor and mender, at the time of his killing Cheraghi salvaged trinkets
from the the trash heap to make a living, gathering them from dumpsters and loading them into the back
of a truck with the help of his 14-year-old son Abolfazl. Ali died on 14 August at Nurafshar hospital in
Niavaran, north Tehran.” See (Guardian 2014).
20“The trading and illegal market law has banned street selling since 2003, but has been only fleetingly
policed. In late June this year, however, a street hawker in Lagos was killed by a car while trying to avoid
being apprehended by road officials. Incensed at the death, groups of fellow street hawkers became violent,
destroying 14 buses and vehicles.” See (Akinwotu 2016).
21“For years, vendors on Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside have sold their goods from sidewalks that
line the north side of East Hastings Street between Carrall and Columbia streets. But earlier this week,
the City of Vancouver cracked down on those illegal street sellers, instructing police to relocate them to
sanctioned markets. The edict has increased tensions between vendors — many of whom are homeless or
on welfare — and police.” See (CBC 2015).
22“In October 2012 the provincial governor of Luanda, Bento Sebastião Bento, announced measures to
end informal street trading in Angola’s capital. This included removing vendors from the street, register-
ing them, and transferring them to formal markets that the authorities said were being renovated or con-
structed. Since then, the police and government inspectors (known as fiscais) have increasingly conducted
joint operations against street traders throughout Luanda, frequently beating street traders, including
pregnant women and women with babies on their back. Police also routinely seize goods, extort bribes,
threaten to detain, and in some cases arrest street vendors during the roundups.” See (Coque 2013).
23“Violence erupted overnight as police cleared illegal food stalls set up on a busy junction for Lunar
New Year celebrations. Angry protesters threw bricks and bottles at police, while police used batons and
pepper spray and fired two warning shots into the air. Police said dozens of officers and four journalists
were among those hurt.” See (BBC 2016).
24“Newly elected Mayor of the Dhaka City South Corporation threaten to uproot thousands of street
vendors who earn a living by selling clothes made by local garment owners, toys, fruits and other essential
knick-knacks. Today, they arrived with the armed police, bull dozer, bull horn and hammer to remove the
street vendors’ stalls or hawkers as they are commonly referred to in South Asia from the street in the
name of beautification of the city. If they don’t move, the officials were prepared and in some instances
did demolish stalls.” See (Huq 2015).
5
New York City; Anton Sterling was also shot to death by the police while selling DVDs in
front of a store in Baton Rouge, Los Angeles; Mohamed Bouazizi a vegetable seller, immo-
lated himself to protest against the unending and escalating violence by the police in Sidi
Bouzid, Tunisia. In fact, a web-search using the words “hawkers” (or “street vendors”) fol-
lowed by the name of a city turns up hundreds of news articles on such incidents. These
exclusionary techniques of states and their puzzling willingness to suppress actual market
forces have been well documented.25 What is interesting is that these activities do not in-
volve selling contraband goods, but cheap domestic and foreign products, cooked and fresh
foods, beverages, and services ranging from haircuts to horoscope readings. Such activi-
ties are considered a part of a “shadow economy” or the “informal economy,”-unregistered
activities that contribute to the GDP of a state, but are not included in its official estima-
tion.26 In fact recent research has shown that employment in the informal economy has
grown and is the major source of non-agricultural employment in most developing coun-
tries.27 All ethnographic evidence show that urban street vendors operate within the in-
25“There is a particularly rich literature on street vending as it relates to urban policies and local gov-
ernment practices. In addition to monitoring this literature, WIEGO has systematically gathered news
coverage on street vending worldwide in four languages since October 2012. Together, the literature and
the media coverage provide a strong evidence base on global policy and practice. On balance, this evi-
dence base suggests that exclusionary policies, laws and practices are common, while more inclusionary
practices, where they exist, are infrequently documented. On the exclusionary side, the evidence suggests
three dominant practices. At one extreme are large-scale, violent evictions where street vendors are sim-
ply removed from public space. In less severe cases, some or all vendors are relocated, but often to more
marginal locations with low pedestrian footfall and/or inadequate facilities. Finally, there is lower-level,
ongoing harassment of vendors by predatory state officials, often facilitated by legislation.” See (Roever &
Skinner 2016, p.362).
26(Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro 2010a, p.444) defines the shadow economy as, “all market-based
legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid
payment of income, value added or other taxes; to avoid payment of social security contributions; having
to meet certain legal labour market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety
standards etc; and complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical ques-
tionnaires or administrative forms.” Also see (Dreher & Schneider 2010).
27A recent Weigo Working Paper states “Informal employment comprises more than one-half of non-
agricultural employment in most regions of the developing world – specifically 82 per cent in South Asia,
66 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 65 per cent in East and Southeast Asia and 51 per cent in Latin
America.” (Vanek, Chen, Carré, Heintz & Hussmanns 2014, p.8) Also see, (Chambwera, MacGregor &
Baker 2011, p.4).
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stitution of markets (structured by the socially organized forces of supply and demand
and motivations of profit) that are as localized in their occurrence, but simultaneously
as integral a part of contemporary global capitalism as a trader in a stock exchange. The
cigarette seller I interviewed, who happened to have obtained a rudimentary electric con-
nection for his thatched stall by the side of an apartment complex was offering the ser-
vice of charging what he called “dead Nokias” (cellular phones) for 2 Indian Rupees (INR)
and claimed to be able to unlock any ”foreign made” or ”local made” phone available the
market. He also told me that he is trying to get into the business of selling “English and
Hindi movies.”28 This is not just an ad hoc example to fit the argument of this global-local
nexus of informal markets. But we will see it is more of a norm in contemporary global
capitalism. In urban centers around the world, after years of hostile state policies that in-
cludes criminalization of the act of informal selling itself, the sellers simply refuse to go
away. These glaring examples from around the world seem to stand in exact opposition to
the central pro market claims of the neoliberal discourse. Real market exchanges seem to
constantly frustrate the neoliberal states that try to control and marginalize its existence.
Given this initial analysis it is puzzling that in the era of worldwide neoliberal hegemony,
(where, after cold war, history has ended in the triumph of western liberal democratic cap-
italism and the so called neoliberal states are increasingly seen to champion and promote
profitable market based exchange), we widely observe the exact opposite in the case of ac-
tual market exchange between individuals. This is the central theme I intend to theorize
and empirically examine in this work.
1.1.2 Old Skin in New Ceremony?
The manifestation of this anxiety of informal markets in terms of repressive state policies
is a part of the everyday urban socio-economic life around the world. It is crucial to note
28Interview with street vendor in Kolkata by author, September 23, 2009
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that this contradiction is not new or unique to the contemporary form of global capital-
ism. States have always tried to intervene in the business of buying and selling of finished
goods. Even in the golden age of global capitalism in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
tury, when economic liberalism was the dominant philosophy in the transatlantic academic
and political circles, states often devised policies to control and marginalize the means of
livelihood of sellers in urban spaces around the world. Selling goods and services in urban
spaces, a completely normal part of economic life that has continued for centuries came
to be constructed in opposition to the ‘proper’ order of markets and hence, at best, in the
need of reconfiguration and management, and at worst, to be outright criminalized. There
was also an increased need to create market places under the control of state and munic-
ipal authorities. The colonial state, both in the core and periphery, became increasingly
entangled in the business of regulating and creating markets. If this period is understood
as an era of expanding global capitalism, then the control, criminalization, and repression
of sellers seem contradictory.29
Although one might draw such similarities between then and now, global capitalism
has changed in the fundamental ways. First, the idea of the economy has undergone a cru-
cial shift from that of those that prevailed in between the societies of the colonizer and the
colonized in the 19th century. Practices that constituted the economy were organized at
an imperial scale rather than a national scale. For example, in the context of the intellec-
tual histories regarding development in India, Benjamin Zachariah notes that the Indian
leaders and politicians “were allowed to smell political power, but not exert it” because
debates about the development and the institutional apparatus within which they were
carried out were largely structured by the imperium.30 It is reasonable to argue that con-
29From (Goode [1916] 1986) compilation of Calcutta municipal papers we find the detailed account
of the tussle between the pre-existing private marketplaces owned by natives and the state created mar-
ketplaces which were to be administered under colonial control. So interestingly, in the heydays of free
market capitalism, states were deeply invested in the work of not only controlling marketplace but even
creating them.
30This is clearly expressed in (Zachariah 2005, p. 33) as the “Imperial preference: a form of protection
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ception of the economy in its global and universal contemporary usage, as an object co-
inciding with the boundary of the nation-state, is indeed a mid 20th century phenomena.
Timothy Mitchell pointed out,
“Between 1930s and 1950s economists, sociologists, national statistical agencies, in-
ternational and corporate organizations and government programs formulated the
concept of the economy. The economy came into being as a self-contained, internally
dynamic and statistically measurable sphere of social action, scientific analysis and
political regulation.”31
There are disagreements within this strand of research regarding the historical ad-
vent of the ideas of the economy as an objectifiable totality. For example, writing on the
political economy of nationhood in India, Manu Goswami mentions that concepts of the
economy expressed in (Mitchell 1998) and (Mitchell 2002) as the “totality of monetized re-
lations within a defined space” coeval with the advent of Keynesian macroeconomics dur-
ing the inter war and the post second world war period, “ignores, of course, the concept
of the national economy developed within the German historical school.” Alluding to the
work of Friedrich List, (Goswami 2004, p. 335) argues that Timothy Mitchell’s analysis
by which the Empire and Dominions would become a single economic unit.” Moreover, (Birla 2009) shows
how the colonial government in late 19th century marginalized and criminalized the kinship networks of
finance and trade of indigenous/vernacular capitalists called Marwaris. For example “Lingering concerns
over the slipperiness of indigenous market practice informed a rapidly growing surveillance of what was
labeled gambling and disorder in the bazaar, especially in the major commercial centers of Bombay and
Calcutta, and in the market towns and entrepôts of the United Provinces and the Punjab. In the period
from 1895 to 1914, when brute imperialism and sophisticated finance heralded a new global staging of cap-
ital, criminal law directed itself at vernacular forms of hedging and speculation. Associated for the first
time with the dangerous habit of gambling, these practices had until this time been free of regulation, civil
or criminal. According to government officials and social reformists, burgeoning informal futures markets
were driven by irrational habits and offered evidence of a commercial ethics gone awry. Indeed, among
certain commercial groups, risk taking betrayed a troubling sort of genetic predisposition that threatened
to destabilize the natural forces of supply and demand.” See (Birla 2009, p. 144) That the sovereignty
of the empire was the primary source of political order becomes quite evident from Romesh Dutta’s, The
economic history of India. from 1904, where, even while disagreeing with the British Imperial policies, he
writes: “It is said of Louis XI, King of France, that on one occasion he had decided to hang his soothe-
sayer, but that he changed his mind on being told that his own life depended on the soothsayer. It is cer-
tainly true, in a far higher sense, that England’s density hangs on the destiny of India. A prosperous India
will help England’s trade, and a constitutional India will strengthen England’s Empire. Impoverished In-
dia starves England’s trade, and a despotic form of Government in India spells England’s decline.” See
(Dutt 1903, p. 451).
31See (Mitchell 1998, p. 91).
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“more crucially, conflates the notion of totality with the formalistic models of neoclassical
and Keynesian macroeconomics.” 32 But as (Mitchell 1998) has shown, to the extent that
birth of economics has “a colonial genealogy,” it was for example, impossible to conceptu-
alize the national economy, in its present disembedded and sovereign form. Thus, we have
entered a form of capitalism where nation-states, rather than empires, are sovereign. The
Nation-states are also seen to be the legitimate drivers of their economies, bringing forth
a Nation-State-Economy (NSE) system (forged and supported by international institu-
tions) rather than a system of imperial economies. Second, after the long duree of politi-
cal history that marked the source of sovereignty by “thinking of public power in personal
terms,” 33 political modernity arrives with its universally enfranchised civil society facing
a radical problem regarding the legitimacy of power, which (Lefort 1988, p. 19) explains
as “democracy. . . instituted and sustained by the dissolutions of the markers of certainty.”
The disappearance of the legitimacy of power, previously embodied within the prince by
sacral/divine order, or up until the 1960s in the imperial control over colonies, leads to
the diffusion of the location of power and renders it empty, in the sense that legitimacy of
power is now embodied within and derived from the abstract category of the sovereignty
of the people which is not transcendent but rather fragmented and contested. To the ex-
tent in democratic politics ‘the people’ is sovereign, it becomes impossible for power to
become legitimate in an absolute sense. This indeterminacy leads to an ever-increasing
imperative to create and enact new strategies of legitimation, new strategies of governing
the nation, its people and its economy.34 (Hansen 1999, p. 21)(in the context of the rise of
32“It also brackets a long tradition of Marxian engagement with the historicity of the conceptions of the
economy as an objective, bounded and external realm,” (Goswami 2004, p. 335) claims.
33See (Skinner 2002, p. 368).
34It is important to note that for Thomas Hobbes popular sovereignty and absolutism can coexist. But
it is the fear of death that necessitates the people to construct the Leviathan. In other words, the legiti-
macy of the state is derived from that morbid fear. However, following Claude Lefort and Thomas Bloma
Hansen, I argue that in modern democratic politics (especially within a capitalist system of production)
the source of legitimacy is contested, and has to depend on a plethora of discourses which are in constant
competition. Hence the “dissolution of the markers of certainty.”
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Hindu nationalism in the 1990s), argues “Modern political strategies and discourses may
all be seen as attempts to bridge this gap between legitimacy and power by invoking dis-
courses on order, security, justice, freedom, and equality.” I extend this insight to argue
that in modern democratic politics, “the economy”35 has emerged as the conceptual and
common-sense entity that closes this gap between legitimacy and power. It is solidified in
popular prejudice that the most legitimate form of democratic governance is the one that
fosters a good economy. The legitimacy of state power of a nation, or to put it simply, le-
gitimacy of a government to rule, is derived from the conditions of its economy (in a world
which is mostly urban, and where time-space is significantly more compressed due to the
new industrial revolution in communication and computing). Lastly, the post-1989 victory
of economic liberalism and market capitalism has ushered in new ideas about the role of
the state in governing the economy, and hence have created new social formations and po-
litical struggles around the issues of selling.
Thus, although the pro-market states’ anxiety towards actual markets and market
oriented activities is not something novel, studying its manifestation in the neoliberal era
provides new insight into the contemporary politics of governing the economy in general
and the political economy of selling, in particular.
This dissertation thus argues that (a) neoliberal management of the economy entails
internal contradictions, (b) due to these contradictions contemporary neoliberal policies
towards management of spaces of selling have the unintended (perhaps emancipatory) po-
tential of mobilizing urban street vendors into a consciousness about itself as a politically
salient force, and (c) through the ensuing political-economic struggle over places of sell-
ing, a distinctive rights discourses emerges as a resolution which is already accompanied
by a forced rightlessness imposed by the state. The central claim of this dissertations is
35Described above as one of the main components of the NSE that emerges in the decolonized half of
the 20th century.
11
that contemporary neoliberal management of the economy will result in long and unending
conflicts primarily over spaces of selling, (which are not formalized in much of the world).
These conflicts will time and again lay bare the hypocritical stance that states will have to
take in being simultaneously pro-market and anti market. This challenge to the neoliberal
policies will tend to be resolved through a discourse of rights that controls and eliminates
informal spaces of selling more than it emancipates. This opens up new possibilities of ex-
citing future research in political economy of urban retail.
1.2 Analyzing the Puzzle
To analyze the puzzle above I ask three broad questions. I pose and contextualize these
questions below.
1.2.1 Question One
(Q1) Why do we observe this contradiction in the pro-market claims of so called ne-
oliberal states and the anti-market policies enacted by the same?
The second chapter is devoted to answering this question. Through a review of the
relevant literature, I delve into the definitional problems of neoliberalism and the issues
with the asymmetric usages of the term neoliberal. I propose that to circumvent these
problems and make theoretical progress on those lines we need to combine ideational and
policy aspects of neoliberalism in order to arrive at an accurate and robust understanding
of the concept. I deduce some core principles of neoliberalism which its critics and pro-
ponents can accept. Theorizing with the help of this minimum common denominator of
neoliberalism I show that, in the context of the political economy of selling goods and ser-
vices, where longstanding, dispersed, situated, and messy markets are populated with buy-
ers and sellers, neoliberalism suffers a contradiction. Pro-market states acting decidedly
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against everyday market forces and market exchange is the manifestation of this contra-
diction. Studying the locus of this struggle between market agents and so called neoliberal
states reveals a broader problem with the dominant ideas of managing the national econ-
omy in the post cold war world order: that all core principles of neoliberalism cannot hold
true simultaneously and a theoretical impossibility is inevitable. The practical implica-
tions of this theoretical impossibility are starkly enacted in urban spaces around the world.
The visible hands, strangely, seem to be at odds with the states’ vision of the inexorable,
benevolent, and expanding power of the ubiquitous invisible hand.
Incidentally a lot of the buying and selling of final goods and services (retail trade)
happen in the informal sector: a concept that indicates a space within the national econ-
omy that, by definition, remains outside the enumerative apparatus of the state in the
form of individual unincorporated enterprises. It is as free as “free markets” can be, and
especially in non-western countries, like India, the share of the informal sector in retail
is significantly larger than that of the formal sector.36 To explain the internal contradic-
tions of core neoliberal ideas in the context of selling stuff in urban spaces, I also focus on
the significant body of literature on the formal/informal divide within national economies.
Since the 1970s, scholars, journalists, social workers, local and international NGOs, and
international organizations, and states, have churned out a stupendous body of work in
comprehending the formal/informal divide within national economies of the developing
world. Through a reading of this literature I intend to theorize the relation between the
core principles of neoliberalism and the formal-informal dichotomy of the national econ-
omy. In doing so I highlight the contradiction that neoliberalism faces in the context of in-
formal markets devoted to selling finished commodities to end consumers i.e. retail. Prob-
36The estimates on this vary widely depending on the way one measures informality. However, the
common theme in most accounts is that a vast majority of retail (and wholesale) trade happens in the
informal sector. In the context of India for example, (Guruswamy, Sharma, Mohanty & Korah 2005)
claim that informal retail constitutes of 98% of all retail trade. (Kohli & Bhagwati 2011) show that in-
formal/unorganized retailing has actually increased between 2004 and 2009 from 47.75% to 55.86 percent.
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lems regarding the management of the informal and formal divide of the economy within
the rubric of neoliberal ideals result in state policies which contradict those ideals.
Thus, by bringing together the literature on neoliberalism and that of the informal
economy in a dialogue, I hope to provide new insights into understanding neoliberalism
and the politics of informal markets. Here, I intend to provide a theoretical foundation for
explaining the puzzling reality where neoliberal states champion markets and simultane-
ously suffer from the anxiety of markets: a symptom that I claim is inevitable in its occur-
rence and global in its scope. Here, I show that neoliberal management of the NSE can
be theorized to follow several lowest common denominator principles or propositions. I ar-
gue further that, following these three principles creates an inherent tension for the state,
a syndrome we can call “can’t live with you, can’t live without you.” As a result the ac-
tual implementation of policies tailored to these principles suffers an impossibility problem
where all principles cannot be satisfied.
1.2.2 Question Two
(Q2) What effect (intended or otherwise) do these policies have on the socio-political
formations that engage in private economic exchange, and vice versa?
In the third chapter I study how the state policies that govern and manage urban
spaces are contested and constructed through the interaction with agents who carry out
profitable market exchange in the informal sector. Keeping in mind the puzzle I intend to
study, and for the sake of tractability, I mainly focus on informal retail trade, and more
precisely, the political economy of informal street vending in Kolkata, India between 1980
and 2010. Kolkata has centuries of rich political, economic, and social history of informal
retail and street vending. It also makes an excellent case for studying the political econ-
omy of street vending in our contemporary times, especially because of massive political
and social movements around the issue of selling commodities, that have spawned and
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gained new momentum in the last three decades. I have chosen this time frame because it
is widely held in popular and academic literature that during this period the Indian state
had taken a (neo)liberal turn in managing its national economy and its cities, which is in
sharp contrast to the affairs prior to the 1990s. Kolkata also lends itself to a natural ex-
periment, because one can study the relation between street vending and state policies,
before and after the neoliberal turn. I show that, compared to the previous order, the
policies towards governing the informal markets in Kolkata undergo a qualitative shift in
the 90s, and as a result new kinds of social movements around the issue of selling finished
goods, are created and fostered. I show how these movements recreate spaces of selling as
spaces of fierce political and economic contestation and in turn influence the policies of the
state at the federal and the national level. Drawing on a detailed ethnography of street
vendors in Kolkata, and activists and union leaders who claim to represent the hawkers,
I provide an analysis that is different from the dominant ideas within the scholarship on
urban transformations in the neoliberal era. While (Harvey 2003) and (Harvey 2006) idea
of “accumulation through dispossession,” where neoliberal policies of the state exclude the
urban poor through laws and bulldozers, is true. What is also true, is a continuous polit-
ical and economic struggle over urban space: an endless cycle of intense antagonisms be-
tween state and market agents followed by negotiations, which often leaves the state and
the corporate entities somewhat powerless and frustrated. Recent scholarship has not only
demonstrated how state policies aim to marginalize and criminalize the urban informal re-
tailers, but also the conditions under which workers engage in collective action with the
state, and often succeed in organizing and influencing policies towards selling, and other
informal economic activities. The glaring disparities between what the neoliberal city is
meant to be, and what the reality is, allows us to study conflict over urban spaces within
the context of everyday instability, contingencies, and resistance.37 As (Anjaria 2016, p.
37Also see for example: (Bhowmik 2012), (Bhowmik & Saha 2012), (Chun & Agarwala 2016),
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15) argues in the context of urban vending in Mumbai, “hawker or slum free city, is more
accurately the stuff of developers’ dream than reality.” I examine this terrain contestation
over the meaning and form of urban spaces in Kolkata among middle class oriented civil-
society groups, unions of street vendors, and elected and un elected representatives of the
state. In particular, I focus on the city-wide hawker eviction called Operation Sunshine
on the 24th of November 1996, a moment of conflagration that serves as the turning point
in the politics of selling in the city, especially in terms of policy and collective bargaining.
Through the analysis of this case of violent conflict and the protracted negotiations and
contestations that ensued, I show that, between the late 1990s and the turn of this century
(the neoliberal moment in India), we can mark a structural shift in the regulatory regime
that oversaw urban market transactions. The shift operates at the level of intellectual dis-
course concerned with the meaning of hawker and the legitimate rights to urban spaces.
this shift also happens at the level of everyday state practices which seek to regulate in-
formal markets and livelihood of urban informal retailers. I also show a concomitant shift
in the organizational formations of street vendors in terms of their involvement in the col-
lective bargaining process for the provision of urban spaces to eke out one’s livelihood. I
analyze how both policy and forms of resistance mutually influence each other to trans-
form the ways in which the formal/informal divide is managed, and more particularly the
ways in which urban street vending gains new momentum in the opening decade of the
21st century. Although this work focuses on the political economy of urban street vend-
ing in Kolkata in the post liberalization period, I argue that it is just an instance of sim-
ilar formations visible in many urban centers in India and around the world. I highlight
this case of state intervention in urban street markets (to realign the contours of formality
(Agarwala 2013),(Goldstein 2016), (Hummel 2017). The view that emerges from this scholarship is not
of a hapless monolithic mass of urban poor waiting to be squeezed out by the neoliberal state, but a con-
glomeration of various types of social groups with their own inter-group struggles and rivalries, that com-
promise, resist, and organize against policies detrimental to their livelihood, often relying on claims of
equal citizenship.
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and informality within spaces of selling), as an example of a larger global trend which is
symptomatic of the neoliberal era, especially manifested in the context of postcolonial ur-
ban spaces where selling final goods are mostly a part of the informal sector of the domes-
tic economy. In short, here I show how neoliberal management of urbanity is a constant
struggle. Keeping in mind the impossibility problem inherent to neoliberalism, neoliberal
policies spawn protracted, messy, and violent conflicts over spaces of selling. A result of
these conflicts is the widespread hawkers movements at local, national, and international
levels.
1.2.3 Question Three
(Q3) How are the rights to sell managed, negotiated and policed in urban spaces?
Who then has the right to sell in urban spaces?
On February 5, 2010 the long queues winding towards the admissions counters in
front of the 34th International Kolkata Book fair were kicking up dust in the winter air.
Nineteen years old Mitun38 was selling tea and coffee to the people waiting to buy tick-
ets and get in, and the business was brisk. After buying a chaffee (half instant coffee and
half tea, concoctions you can only savor on the streets,) I started talking to him about
the business. “It’s really good,” he said, “I had to restock my supplies thrice yesterday
because people like my tea. I put cardamom.” He then spotted two uniformed Kolkata
police constables approaching from far. He slowly moved behind a wall and asked me to
slowly move stand in front of him. However, the police found him, and enquired about the
price of tea. “5 Rupees,” he replied. “You are swindling from the public” the police re-
torted, looking at me askance, “this is why we evict you.” Mitun replied with a smile “but
sir inside the fair the same tea”39 “is selling for five times my price” and promptly poured
38Mitun (tea seller), interview with Author February 5, 2010
39Mitun here is referring to organized vendors who are allowed to sell beverages inside the fare at a
much higher price of 10 to 15 Rupees
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out two cups for the constables. “Drink this sir, you would like it, I use cardamom.” The
constables accepted the tea and said “still you are swindling from the public” gave him
two rupees and said “move now, don’t hover around here.” So we started moving away
from the line, walking along the walled compounds of the fair towards the back, and a po-
lice van stood there, on the side of the road. A couple of policemen in their white trousers,
blue sweaters and sunglasses were sitting around talking. Mitun went up to them asking
if they want some tea. “Five teas,” said a policeman, “and how much” he asked, hoist-
ing out a 10 rupee note. “That will do,” Mitun said. After we moved away a little bit and
stood, I asked him if this is his sole occupation. He said he earns his livelihood by sell-
ing tea in football stadiums. The ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) has
given him a card to sell refreshment for large football games. Then he complained about
the regular harassment by the police who often accost him and traffic him out of the book-
fair area. It takes him half an hour by foot to get back to the book fair area, avoiding po-
liced routes: losing customers in the process. He asked me if I wanted to have another tea,
and poured me a cup, I took out a five rupee coin to pay him, but he refused to take it
and after repeated insistence gave me back three in change. As we kept talking, our con-
versations were interrupted by buyers, many with badges indicating personnel working
inside the fair, who were more than willing to pay five rupees, occasionally commenting
how the registered vendors inside are making a killing. The irony of those comments were
not lost on Mitun who looked at me with a mischievous smile. Over a couple of hours he
revealed that he lived in the town of Bongaon (about 80 Km north east of Kolkata, near
the border with Bangladesh)and travelled every day to the Kolkata. His family lived in
the rail colony bustee(low cost dwellings alongside railway tracks). His father buys sweets
from Naihati (a town famous for its small informal sweet production and retail businesses
55 km west of Bangaon) and vends it on foot in north Kolkata. Each day they travel for
about 4 to 6 hours, selling in the train, and on city streets. His mother works in house-
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holds as a maid. The entire family is dependent on the market forces selling labor for ser-
vices and selling commodities by laboring in the city streets and stadiums all through the
year. None of it is formal in the sense of wage labor in modern manufacturing factories,
or in the state’s ability to enumerate the family run business. Nevertheless, this informal
selling is an integral part of contemporary capitalism, since it constitutes a major portion
of the economy. But although it is the empirical reality of how markets function it is never
the norm because in academic and popular circles it is always the residual of the formal
economy; always in the need to be formalized. In a neoliberal India, Mitun finds it difficult
to use the market to his advantage, although, if one were to take his opinion seriously, he
was a big champion of the ability of market institutions to provide him with a good liv-
ing. He emphasized repeatedly that all he wants from the government is tell the police to
not harass people like him and his father. Given he can do his business peacefully, he was
confident save enough to buy land and open a small snack shack in Bongaon itself. His
mother won’t have to work as a housemaid then, and can make fresh snacks at his shop.
He had in fact applied for some jobs in the formal sector (he mentioned a sari store,) but
it demanded longer hours and less pay. Besides “I was rejected” he said, due to lack of
education and experience. The case of Mitun, is representative of how vast amounts of
finished commodities are sold to consumers in places like India by small enterprises who
operate within a legal apparatus that makes business difficult. Their right to sell is con-
stantly under question but never beyond negotiation. They are often portrayed as de-
viants of normal forms of capitalist enterprise but never ceases to exist. They keep com-
ing back to sell more and perpetuate the logic of capital through profit making enterprises,
but have to flirt and frustrate the repressive techniques of the state which sing the tune of
markets but fails to recognizes market participation as a fundamental human right. This
continues even in the advanced economies where most of the selling happens in the formal
sector. As mentioned aboce, Alton Sterling had to be confronted and eventually shot by
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the Baton Rouge Police while he was selling music and film discs in front of a convenient
store.40 News like Binod Bihari Sadhukhan, a newspaper hawker, beaten to death on the
premises of a railway station near Kolkata by a constable of the Railway Police, is not an
anomaly.41 In Mumbai, a 22 year old hawker selling tea and bottled water, in long distant
trains were beaten up brutally by the constable of the Railway Protection Force for the
failure to pay bribes.42 Due to the overwhelming presence and visibility of informal retail-
ers in places like India, or perhaps because of it, the attack on market agents is normalized
by the so called pro-market state. In fact, one can type “harassment of hawkers” in an on-
line search engine and find thousands of reports of such incidents around the world. Thus,
such incidents are neither sporadic nor rare.
Even though both David Harvey and Francis Fukuyama, would agree that the idea of
free markets remains the corner stone of neoliberal thought or the victorious order emerg-
ing after the Cold War, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that all markets are not
created equal, and hence, all sellers don’t have equal rights to sell. The subject matter of
the Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 is: Who gets the rights to sell, when and how. I show that
through the interactions between state policies and the social movements surrounding the
issues of selling in urban spaces (which I analyze in chapter three), a language of rights
evolves. I show that although the policies aimed at control and management of informal
markets (that are informed by the rights approach,) aim to bring street vending under a
legal regulatory framework, it simultaneously seeks a long term systematic marginaliza-
tion of street vendors and workers in the informal sector. This new regime of right based
approach to buying and selling’ in urban spaces thus seeks to reduce and eliminate street
vending though it claims to provide financial security, legal protection, and dignified life
to sellers. I demonstrate the processes through which the radical language of the “right
40See (Balko 2016).
41See (Hindustan Times 2012).
42See (Nair 2017).
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to the city” is co-opted by the state-capital nexus to legally and actively curtail peoples’
rights to livelihood on an everyday basis. I show how the new mode of rights based state
control over selling makes the neoliberal state ever more deeply entangled in the function-
ing of markets, but more importantly, I also show how the new regime of legal regulatory
control normalizes a systematic rightlessness to the city through increased barriers to en-
try, everyday police brutality, and punitive micromanagement of vendors. A far cry from
free market capitalism, the evidence points more towards the conundrum of anti-market
capitalism.
1.3 The Informal and the Formal
This section explains the significance of studying the political economy of selling (more
precisely urban street vending) in the context of contemporary global capitalism. Why is
the study of the politics of informal urban street vending a pertinent route to analyze and
understand the essence of contemporary global capitalism? The puzzle I analyze through-
out this work reveals significant discrepancies between the dominant understanding (schol-
arly and popular, leftist and rightist,) of neoliberalism, (and hence, the nature of the ne-
oliberal state) and the reality of actual market interactions. This allows for a newer un-
derstanding of neoliberal ideas and policies. The study of market based conflicts and ne-
gotiations between state and profit seeking agents highlight the broader problems faced by
the so-called neoliberal states like India, in the post Cold War period. In doing so I also
underscore the continuities and discontinuities in this anxiety about markets in histori-
cal perspective. I, in agreement with other scholars, have mentioned above that none of
this is novel. Such repressive policies towards selling in urban spaces were prevalent in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in the colonial and metropolitan urban spaces.
But studying the urban contestations over profit, spaces, and markets, in the late twen-
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tieth and early twenty first century (in a time of rapid and radical transformation in the
forces of production and the international political-economic reality of a decolonized world
populated by sovereign states) proves a shift/disjuncture from the previous order as the
new focus of industrialization is directed towards the spaces of selling.
1.3.1 Spaces of Selling and Selling of Spaces
The capitalist mode of production depends on furnishing worker-consumers with finished
commodities as much as it depends on the production of those commodities. Selling of fin-
ished goods is a service, in the sense of labor-time spent by a seller in providing conve-
nience to the buyer by reducing their labor-time in acquiring the goods. But production
is redundant if there is no finishing point of the supply chain. Only when the consumer
meets the final product or hires services from a seller, does capital complete its renewal.
The methods of selling, or the ways in which goods are sold back to the consumer-worker
(which is crucial for reproducing the social relations of production and the advancement
in the material forces of production) determines the accumulation process and the gen-
eral production of commodities. Keeping this focus on the distribution of finished goods
back to the end consumer it is helpful to conceptualize the capitalist mode of production
in terms of two somewhat distinct sets of socially organized processes that accumulation
of capital depends on: the first set includes the production processes geared towards cre-
ating final goods (let’s call it the first space of capital S1) and the second set is selling fin-
ished goods and services back to the consumer-workers (let’s call it the second space S2).43
These two distinctly identifiable sets of processes are always dependent on the other, or
one might argue is constituted by the other, i.e. processes that are geared towards produc-
tion of commodities would be redundant without the processes involved in selling those
43Selling of finished goods is also a service in the sense of labor-time spent by a seller in providing con-
venience to the buyer by reducing their labor-time in acquiring the goods. This purpose of labor is quali-
tatively different from that expended in the production of commodities.
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finished commodities back to consumers, as well as the other way around.
Although scholars have analyzed the political economy of capitalist production in
the context of the first space (the space of the factory and industrial workers), only re-
cently has attention been given towards political economy of the second space (the space
of streets corners, pavements, messy market places, or glossy hypermarkets). Products
don’t sell themselves. Without a detailed analysis of the political economy of how prod-
ucts churned out by capitalists and industrial workers are sold back to the end consumer,
we would only have a partial analysis of capitalism, which conflates the dynamic of S1 and
S2, and hence fails to notice the unique contestations over the means of production that
happens in S2 when the worker is at once an entrepreneur (in the sense he or she is not
tied to the strict wage relations prevalent S1). Several pertinent questions arise around
S2. Are hawkers (who work as long or short as they wish) the same as industrial workers
(who work legally fixed hours)? In the business of street vending who is the capitalist and
who is the worker? What does extraction of surplus value mean in the context of a tea
seller working on a street in Kolkata, or a used book seller in front of a government build-
ing, both of whom run their households by selling labor power and own some necessary
means of production (tea, equipment, fuel, used books etc.)? If in capitalism the prole-
tariat sell their labor to the owners of the means of production, how do we understand the
labor of millions of street vendors and sellers that populate the vast economic landscape of
informal retail trade?
If we are to view this topic in the framework of Marxist political economy, which I
think provides a particularly useful approach to S2, then we need to understand that a
street vendor who is operating within S2 is engaging in the “simplest form of circulation
of commodities.” Marx calls this a C − M − C type circulation (i.e. “the transformation
of commodities into money, and the change of the money back again into commodities; or
selling in order to buy.” “Selling to survive” is a dominant theme that rises from the pop-
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ular and academic literature on street vendors, although, as we will see in the context of
S2, this lends itself to a different interpretation. At the same time the vendor also initiates
a M − C − M ′ type circulation (i.e. “the transformation of money into commodities, and
the change of commodities back again into money; or buying in order to sell”). Marx ac-
knowledges: “Buying in order to sell, or, more accurately, buying in order to sell dearer,
M − C −M ′, appears certainly to be a form peculiar to one kind of capital alone, namely,
merchants’ capital.” M − C − M ′ to Marx “is therefore in reality the general formula of
capital as it appears prima facie within the sphere of circulation.”44 These people are also
active economic agents in the service of capital accumulation especially because retail is a
massively lucrative enterprise worldwide.45 By studying a) how the spaces and processes
of selling are formed controlled and transformed, b) how new forms of political struggles
for the right to means of production (in this case urban space) are formed and sustained
in S2, and c) how interaction between state and private economic agents in S2 produce
variety of capitalisms within the capital’s singular expansionary impetus, we can answer
the aforementioned questions in a new light and thus provide alternative interpretations
of concepts that are mainly developed to explain processes in S1. This would show that
the prominent locus of present and future political-economic conflict in contemporary cap-
italism would be in S2. Selling, spaces for selling, and selling of spaces of selling are in the
process of global transformation of tectonic proportions and this change would shape the
future of contemporary global capitalism. Especially in the context of the radical advance-
ments in the forces of production it is crucial to study the political economy of S2.46 Even
44See (Marx [1867] 2011, p.171-175).
45“Retail in developing countries has seen excellent growth. While the developing world population has
grown 21 percent to 6.2 billion, retail sales in those markets have increased more than 350 percent and
now represent half of total global sales.” (Kearney 2006).
46New forms of selling have developed especially because of the technological transformation. For exam-
ple (Benner 2017) shows interesting conflict between “American Hotel industry” and “the company, which
is based in San Francisco, was founded in 2008 as a way for people to easily list and rent out their spare
rooms or their homes online. Since then, about 150 million travelers have stayed in three million Airbnb
listings in more than 191 countries, according to the company.” Or consider this example “Guptaji, as he
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in the countries where majority of S2 is formal, there is an ongoing transformation (of tec-
tonic proportions) in ways people buy and sell final goods and services.47
1.3.2 Enterprise and Employment
Any study concerned with the political economy of selling would have to confront the fact
that in most urban spaces around the world, and especially in developing countries, much
of the selling happens beyond the purview of the state, in a semi regulatory environment
of the informal sector of the economy. Although I would analyze the concept of informal-
ity (and its attendant concepts like unorganized, or self-organized), in detail in the next
chapter, as a short hand we can say that S2 is overwhelmingly populated by unincorpo-
rated private enterprises that often do not have a legal standing distinct from the owner
function within the market system, in the sense that some of the goods and services pro-
duced are for sale and barter. In terms of informality of employment, the short hand for
now can be those forms of employment that do not provide social security and related
benefits, or do not resemble the strict wage relation that exists between the factory worker
is popularly called by his customers, has been selling vegetables from his cart in New Delhi’s Bihari Mandi
for 15 years. However, in the last one year many of his customers shifted to buying vegetables online and
this was affecting his sales. That was when an acquaintance told Guptaji about BigZop.com, an online
grocery store. It is the latest entrant in the world of hyper local players, who are helping small vendors
and neighbourhood kirana stores to compete with their bigger offline and virtual peers. A month after
the tie-up with BigZop.com, Guptaji got back his old customers and the sales increased two-fold. “Ini-
tially it was difficult to convince him to get him on our platform but now it has finally turned out to be
a success story for both him and us,” says Aaditya Goyal, an Indian Institution Technology, Kharagpur
alumni and founder of BigZop. “We hope to reach 100 orders per day with his support in no time. Our
experience with Guptaji is helping us develop a platform that can be used by people across the country
whether they are from cities or villages,” adds Goyal. BigZop.com, which was founded in Gurgaon early
this year, started its services by delivering hand-picked fresh fruits and vegetables to consumers’ doorstep
at their chosen time within two hours. In four months, the start-up has build technology for hyper local
e-commerce and is expanding its services to edibles and household products. See (Pani 2015).
47(Uberti 2014) reports “dying shopping malls are speckled across the United States, often in middle-
class suburbs wrestling with socioeconomic shifts. Some, like Rolling Acres, have already succumbed. Es-
timates on the share that might close or be re-purposed in coming decades range from 15 to 50%. Amer-
icans are returning downtown; online shopping is taking a 6% bite out of brick-and-mortar sales; and to
many iPhone-clutching, city-dwelling and frequently jobless young people, the culture that spawned satire
like Mallrats seems increasingly dated, even cartoonish.”
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and the owner.48 According to some estimate informal workers constitute half the global
workforce.49 Most of the entities and economic transactions within S2 are not recorded or
regularly monitored and/or directly taxed by the state.
To gauge the extent of this lack of visibility of economic transactions, for example, let
us consider “the fifth largest global destination in retail space,” India, where “Organized
retail penetration (ORP) is low (8% in 2015 compared 85% in the United States”).50 In
India the business of selling, or the retailing industry, is the second largest employer after
agriculture. It is also the largest industry with the highest retail density in the world: 15
million outlets as compared to 0.9 in the US.” With a compounded annual growth rate of
7.46% since 2000, contributing 10% of the GDP and 8% of employment it seems the mar-
kets are profitable and growing rapidly.51 This means that much of the business of selling
in India remains overwhelmingly within the unorganized sector. In a widely referred study
(Sengupta, Kannan, Srivastava, Malhotra & Papola 2007, p.7) defines the unorganized sec-
tor as
All unincorporated private enterprises owned by individuals or households engaged in
the sale and production of goods and services operated on a proprietary or partner-
ship basis and with less than ten total workers.” According to this definition, these
unorganized enterprises “have no legal personality of its own (other than the person
who owns it); it is small in employment size and, more often than not, associated
with low capital intensity and labour productivity. The diverse nature of these enter-
prises is often a response to the demand for a variety of low-price goods and services
produced in different modes of self-employment, unpaid family labour and wage work
(often concealed as self-employment).
Similarly (Guruswamy et al. 2005, p.619) understands “Unorganised retailing” to be
comprised of “traditional formats of low cost retailing, for example, local ‘kirana’ shops,
48See (Bhalla et al. 2009, p.7).
49(Neuwirth 2012, p.18) argues that 1.8 billion people, almost half the global workforce are involved
in the informal economy that is “neither registered nor regulated, getting paid in cash, and, most often,
avoiding income taxes.”
50See (IBEF 2018).
51According to 2018 industry estimates, about 70% of retail revenues are from the sale of food and gro-
cery. Followed by apparel (8%) jewellery(6%) consumer durables and IT (6%). See (IBEF 2018).
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owner operated general stores, paan/bidi shops, convenience stores, handcart and pave-
ment vendors. . . is by far the prevalent form of trade in India.” Consider these conclusions
reached by (Kohli & Bhagwati 2011, p.6).
First, total retail sales increased by approximately 70% between 2004 and 2009, from
$294 billion to $496 billion. Second, sales grew over this period by about 43% for re-
tailers in the formal sector and about 97% for retailers in the informal sector. The
annual average rate of sales growth was about 11% for all retailing, 7.5% for orga-
nized retailing, and 14.5% for informal retailing. Thus, from 2004 to 2009, retail sales
grew almost twice as fast in the informal sector as in the formal sector and at a sub-
stantially faster rate than India’s GDP, which grew at about 8.5% over the period.
Third, in 2007, total retail sales in the informal sector surpassed those of the for-
mal sector. By 2009, the informal sector held about 56% of retail sales, 8% higher
than its 48% share in 2004. These data suggest that informal retailing is more than
surviving; it is flourishing. At present growth rates, the gap between formal and in-
formal retailing will continue to widen as family-owned stores and street vendors will
take a larger share of retail sales.
Not only is retail the highest employer in the service sector, the unorganized/informal
component of retail trade has increased over time. Large formal retail chains have started
to close in many places in India.52
1.4 Contemporary Capitalism and Informal Labor in
Retail
In the context of large scale industrial manufacturing (S1) (Marx [1867] 2011, p.703-710)
writes,
In the centres of modern industry — factories, manufactures, ironworks, mines, &c.
— the labourers are sometimes repelled, sometimes attracted again in greater masses,
the number of those employed increasing on the whole, although in a constantly de-
creasing proportion to the scale of production. Here the surplus population exists in
the floating form.
52See (Guruswamy et al. 2005). Digging through the news reports it seems large grocery stores have
announced that such retail outlet closures are a coordinated move to invest more in wholesale business.
See (Sarkar 2014).
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He goes on to categorize this floating form into the following types: a) an element
that entered “modern division of labor” as “large number of boys. . . employed up to the
age of maturity” and then “regularly discharged.” b) the surplus agricultural workers in
the face of mechanization “constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manu-
facturing proletariat c) “the stagnant. . . part of the active labour army, but with extremely
irregular employment. . . an inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labour power.” and d) the
sphere of pauperism. Exclusive of vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes, in a word, the “dan-
gerous” classes” e) “the light infantry of capital;” labor that is summoned “now to this
point, now to that.” These workers seem to be operating in the waiting room of capital-
ism, always on the outside of the normal industrial form of factory workers, a “relative
surplus” in the form of “the floating, the latent, the stagnant.” In the context of 19th cen-
tury expansion of industrial production in England, Marx’s assumption, that “industrial-
ization would draw workers into factory labor,” while simultaneously creating “a surplus
of unwanted labor” seems reasonable, especially when we account for the mechanization of
agriculture that frees up labor tied to the land, thus propitiating a mass urban migration
towards factory based wage labor. However, as scholars like Thomas Barnes have argued
(and as recent employment data from S2 show), we might not understand this population
of workers as a surplus to the modern industry, or in terms of attraction and repulsion,
but as a modern industry in and of itself, populated by sellers and buyers, who complete
the renewal of capital by reproducing the everyday consumption.53
Theories of economic development like (Lewis 1954), (Rostow 1960), (Harris & Todaro
1970), (Kuznets 1966), and (Kuznets & Murphy 1966) predicted that the vast numbers
of nonindustrial surplus workers would join the modern urban industrial sector, i.e. the
formal economy, thus leading to slow annihilation of the traditional/informal sector in de-
veloping economies. Within this strand of literature, the dominant understanding of the
53For a detailed treatment Marx and Informal labor see (Barnes 2014), (Barnes 2012).
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consequences of the modern capitalist development was that, economic growth led by the
modernized production processes would create a modern industrial workforce characterized
by formal employment (wage) relations that are overseen by the regulatory apparatus of
the state. Coincident to this transformation through modernization, the traditional econ-
omy (characterized by self-employment, lack of strict wage relations, and small unincorpo-
rated enterprises) that escapes state control and enumeration was supposed to vanish, if
not, have only a marginal contribution to the national output. Although India holds a 6th
place among the 10 largest manufacturing countries, informal employment accounted 92%
of total employment in 2004-05. Relevant to our focus on S2, 95.5% workers in sales were
unorganized. In the same time period, 71.2% of workers in manufacturing and 75.6% of
workers in the construction sectors were unorganized.54
The unorganized/informal sector, which was supposed to wither away with modern-
ization contributed to 56.7% of the Net Domestic Product (NDP) in 2005. Within the
first decade of liberalization the ratio of formal sector employment as a ratio of the to-
tal workforce has fallen significantly (a trend that defies the predictions of moderniza-
tion theories).55 Such macro level data suggests that a major portion of an industrial-
ized market economy of India remains outside the regulatory control of the state, and is
populated by small unincorporated enterprises, and at the same time growth of employ-
ment in the informal sector of the economy has been robust. At a micro level, many street
vendor and other informal sector workers within the service sector that I talked to did
not wish to work in a factory, (some of them had worked in the organized sector as wage
workers and had resented it for reasons we will explore in the third chapter. Through my
semi-structured interviews with hawkers in Kolkata, a consistent theme that emerged was:
street vending need to buy buy the necessities of running the household. For example,
54See (Sengupta et al. 2007) and (Hindustan Times 2016).
55Although it is not immediately relevant to our analysis, it is important to note that majority of man-
ufacturing (S1) also remains within the informal sector. See (Verma, Giri et al. 2017).
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let us consider excerpts from this letter written by a hawker to the general secretary of a
dominant Hawkers’ union in Kolkata:
I had already introduced myself as Bimal, a physically challenged (blind) hawker
with a family to support. My wife Rina (a graduate and incidentally, blind) and my
child Karishma. I have been performing my duties by vending different items at dif-
ferent places, from Railway Stations to Bus Stops, to run the House Hold!
However, as we read on we find the following narrative:
As you are quite aware that the present world is tougher day by day, we would like
to discuss with you some of our ideas in our quest to come to an effective solution to
these! In this connection, we would like to state that currently, we are in the process
of starting a small venture like attempting to manage a telephone booth at a railway
station or Bus Terminus, or to run a food stall along with it, at a stadium; and thus,
attempting to stand on our own feet! We would like to have your valuable comments
in this regard which may give this impoverished family, a fresh lease of life! We, in
this case, would like to know from you the following:
- whether you would consider helping us in this process, once we get the space we are
striving for, from the authorities or by suggesting different ventures: we would like to
be guided by you in this regard.
- While it is needless to state that our gratitude would always be there for you and
your esteemed organisation and that any positive act of you in this regard can never
be repaid, however, we would not like having everything from charity from you and
your organization.
The content of this letter56 is representative of numerous hawker narratives about
their conditions of existence. Along with the economy of survival another consistent theme
that emerges in my fieldwork is the willingness to seek out possibilities to improve upon
existing selling conditions. Instead of joining the organized private sector these people sim-
ply seek to sell without hindrance. New empirical studies on street vendors and the in-
formal sector show that industrial capitalist development and modernization creates and
sustains the vast army of workers who are tied to the monetized markets of exchange for
their livelihood, but unable or unwilling to enter a formal wage relation in the organized
sector.57 This overwhelming presence of informal retail could be rightly construed as a real
56Letter to Hawker Sangram committee dated 10/8/2005 available from author on request.
57For example, (Chen et al. 2005, p.5) shows that “Informal enterprises include not only survival activ-
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example of “free markets.” It constitutes a permanent fixture of global capitalism rather
than an aberration waiting to join the normal form of capital accumulation. As shown in
chapters two and three, these sellers are firmly entrenched within vastly differentiated, di-
verse networks of buying and selling and have national and international allies. The ven-
dors have been organizing, resisting, and collectively fighting back, against regulations and
controls which they construe as an aggression against markets and against legitimate and
necessary profitable enterprise.58 And yet there is a resistance to formalization. If we are
to study capitalism as a global process, where some areas of the world manufacture more
commodities than others, the consequence of global capitalist development is not a mod-
ern industrial proletariat fluctuating with the cycles of industrial demand in each nation,
but rather the sustained presence of labor across nation states that complete the cycle of
capital by selling to the end consumer, and although it is an industry in itself, most of it is
not in the formal sector (as an overwhelming majority of workers are not wage earners in
the strict sense described above, and enterprises are not legally separable from their own-
ers). I argue there is no normal and deviant form of capitalism differentiated by countries,
which is not to say that some countries are not more industrialized than others.59 The in-
formal economy contributes significant portions of the GDP in many countries, ranging
from 40.2% in Sub-Saharan Africa to 17.1 percent in High Income OECD countries.60
ities but also stable enterprises and dynamic growing businesses, and informal employment includes not
only self-employment but also wage employment.” Also see (Sethuraman 1981) and (Chen, Jhabvala &
Lund 2001).
58See (Agarwala 2013)and (Bhowmik 2012).
59Capitalism as a mode of production and distribution of commodities (goods and services) based on
individual property rights and market exchange is always a global phenomenon. To the extent that Euro-
pean industrial manufacturing in the 19th century was only possible through the provision of cheap raw
materials and food from the colonies, the colonies were also equally capitalist as that of the metropoles al-
though they might not be as advanced in terms of industrial manufacturing. Labor and capital has always
been and would be sourced from anywhere in the world. Hence my starting point is to dispense with the
notion that capitalism has a different logic in different places or that some countries are less capitalist that
others. The primary logic of capital, which is to create more capital from existing capital, is fundamen-
tally the same everywhere at all times, but the scale of accumulation, or industrialization would differ by
regions and time. Thus there is only one history of capital: the history of constant worldwide accumula-
tion and distribution (circulation) of capital.
60(Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro 2010b, p.459) calculates: “The shadow economy has reached a large
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1.5 Conclusion
Informality is as much a norm of global capitalism as formal industries are. Through this
work I show that it is important to not understand informality as national aberrations to
some normal form of capitalism, but the constitutive element of contemporary capitalism.
Quite obviously then, the political economy of selling is intricately associated with the pol-
itics of managing this formal/informal divide within the economy. To the extent that ne-
oliberalism is seen to be the dominant ideology of our times it is important to make the
connection between the core tenets of neoliberalism, (especially its positive disposition to-
wards markets) and the politics of managing the informal/formal divide. By studying the
political economy of selling in general, this thesis casts light on the politics of governing
the (in)formal economy in the neoliberal era.
size of a weighted (unweighted) average of 17.1% (33.0%) of official GDP over 162 countries over 1999
to 2007. However, equally important is the clear negative trend of the size of the shadow economy over
time.The unweighted average size of the shadow economies of all of these 162 countries (developing, East-
ern European and Central Asian and high income OECD countries) decreased from 34.0% of official GDP
in 1999 to 31.2% of official GDP in 2007.”
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Chapter 2
Theorizing Neoliberalism and
Informality
2.1 Introduction
A well circulated contemporary textbook of International Political Economy (IPE) intro-
duces the subject matter with a claim that “after nearly forty years of dormancy” and
“being virtually non existent as a field of study before 1970s” it has “undergone a remark-
able resurgence” in the last four decades.1 Curiously enough, during the same time period,
(i.e. since the 1970s) there has been a lot of academic work on neoliberalism and the in-
formal sector, yet the IPE scholarship on the respective topics talk past each other, and
have not studied the theoretical relation between these two. In fact, the aforementioned
textbook on IPE completely ignores these two topics altogether.
There is a consensus among scholars of neoliberalism that it signifies a great trans-
formation in the dominant ideas concerning the appropriate role of nation-states towards
(governing) their economies, and the concomitant shift in policies which reflect this intel-
1See (Frieden & Lake 2017, p.1).
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lectual change.2
The concept of the informal sector, invented during the early 1970s, came to be widely
circulated over the next couple of decades as an object of study. Imagined as a distinct
space (of market based transactions) within the economy, the informal economy became
worthy of discussion, measurement and intervention.3 The idea of formal/informal di-
chotomy in the context of labor and production has existed in texts before 1970. But in-
formality was never construed and treated as a measurable space called the informal sector
within the economy of a sovereign nation state. Nor was it a subject that NGOs, interna-
tional institutions (ILO, WTO, IMF, World Bank, UN), and scholars talk and write about
extensively. Policies and policy oriented discussions precisely directed towards the informal
sector is thus a recent phenomenon.4
These two global changes, as the previous exposition suggests, have happened both
in the intellectual and material domains: in thought and in policy. It is surprising that
2Locating its inception in US and UK during the 1970s and tracing its accelerated global proliferation
after the cold war, many scholars have commonly understood this transformation as the emergence and
eventual international dominance of the ideology of neoliberalism and its attendant (neoliberal) policies,
that came to replace, Keynesian ideas and policies of embedded liberalism in place since the second world
war. For example it is common in the academic world to encounter statements like “we live in an age of
neoliberalism”.See (Palley 2005).
3Although I will get into the particulars of this concept and its intellectual history, for now we can
think of informal economy as a space of profit generating productive activities that the state cannot, or
finds it difficult to, record and govern, although a vast range of these activities happen without secrecy,
and are not involving the production and distribution of illegal commodities. It conventionally imagined
to be a space of market oriented economic transactions within the nation-state-economy which the states
can’t (easily) ‘see’ from its conventional record keeping methods that are geared towards registering the
formal activities. See for example (Paul et al. 2000).
4Early work on the expanding nature of the informal sector in global capitalism by (Gershuny 1979)
suggests “Governments have three options: they can ignore the informal economy, suppress it, or exploit
it. The last appears preferable, but would require some initiatives from the state.” In 2008 we find, a
USDA report by the name “Incorporating Understanding of Informal Economic Activity in Natural Re-
source and Economic Development Policy.” (Gershuny 1979) predicts ”Informal economic activity is ex-
panding in the United States and is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.” We can also refer to one
of the promises made in the National Common Minimum Programme (and fulfilled) by the United Pro-
gressive Alliance (UPA) government after it came to power in the 14th Lok Sabha Elections in 2004. “The
UPA government will establish a National Commission to examine the problems facing enterprises in the
unorganized, informal sector. The Commission will be asked to make appropriate recommendations to
provide technical, marketing and credit support to these enterprises. A National Fund will be created for
this purpose.” See (Hindu 2004).
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the interrelation between neoliberalism and informality has eluded rigorous study, simply
because the politics of governing the economy which is the subject of neoliberal ideas, is
logically and simultaneously also a politics of delineating the formal/informal divide within
that economy.
In this chapter I concentrate on analyzing neoliberalism with a focus on explaining
the contradictory reality where the so called neoliberal states systematically seek to sup-
press marketable informal enterprise. Through a close reading of the relevant literature I
argue that the core principles of neoliberalism cannot be simultaneously satisfied in pol-
icy. This theoretical impossibility is manifested, in the politics of policing the formal and
informal divide within the economy, often violently, as in my case of informal urban retail.
I intend to demonstrate ways in which informality have informed, complicated, and con-
tested the neoliberal ideas of governing the economy. This chapter lays out the theoretical
groundwork for understanding neoliberal politics in its relation to the informal economy.
2.2 Conceptual problems
Studying the politics of governing the (in)formal economy in the neoliberal era entails pro-
fessional hazards, especially if we were to closely evaluate the meaning of the terms ‘ne-
oliberalism’ and ‘informal economy’. One might expect that, ever since their purported
birth five decades ago, a cornucopia of material generated by state, non-state, academic,
and media actors should have led to, if not an agreement, at least some amelioration in
the general confusion regarding the fundamentals of these concepts. However, in reality,
that is far from the truth. One can easily demonstrate the contested nature of these ideas,
and show that they have all the trappings of being empty signifiers due to the lack of pre-
cision and widespread disagreement regarding their conceptualization (in terms of defi-
nitions) at the intellectual level, and their observation of empirical referents (in terms of
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measurement and usage) at the material level.
2.2.1 Conceptual Problems with Neoliberalism
The term neoliberalism has systematically escaped critical evaluation of its “definition and
usage” while there has been explosion in its academic circulation since the 1990s, with
very sparse mentions in the 1980s.5 Scholars use the word neoliberal to designate certain
types of state policies that attempt to reverse social and economic policies put in place
in the US and Great Britain after the Second World War.6 Some stress that these policy
shifts are a manifestation of a larger and more robust underlying thought process, that
comes to dominate the philosophical understanding of how states should or do govern the
economy after the Cold War. The policy implication of this thought is to dis-embed and
liquidate “embedded liberalism,” which had, as the argument goes, come to guide social
and economic policies in Europe, England, and North America since the late 1930s.7 Ne-
oliberalism as a discourse is also seen to have normalized a particular way of being in,
thinking, and talking about the economy of the nation-state. According to this observa-
tion neoliberalism has extended its tentacles into the minds and altered the behavior of
rulers and citizens. Neoliberalism has “hijacked our vocabulary” argues (Massey 2013), as
many of us have come to “embody it” writes (Guthman & DuPuis 2006). Yet with all this
enormity in its force, the concept itself remains imprecise. As (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009,
p.143) puts it “If there were a scholarly consensus regarding the meaning of neoliberalism,
the lack of explicit definitions might not be so problematic. However, scholars’ use of the
term does not evidence any such agreement as to what it actually means.”
5See (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009).
6See (Piven 2007).
7“On both the domestic and the international level, neoliberalism has undertaken the destruction of
this social order and has restored the strictest rules of capitalism.” writes (Duménil & Lévy 2011, p.1).
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2.2.2 Neoliberalism and Asymmetry of Usage
It seems obvious to many that by the first decade of the 21st century an idea called ne-
oliberalism has become dominant throughout the world ever since its inception and in-
exorable expansion during the last third of the twentieth century. For example, a criti-
cal reader on the subject begins by proclaiming “in less than one generation” it has be-
come so “widespread and influential,” in such diverse areas as “economics, politics, inter-
national relations, ideology, and culture,” that “we live in the age of neoliberalism.”8 As
mentioned in the introduction, David Harvey’s historical study of neoliberalism emphasizes
its “hegemony” “as a mode of discourse” to be so profound in its global seduction and mo-
mentum that “it has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it becomes
incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the
world.”9 He locates neoliberalism in the activist political takeover of the economic elite,
a backlash from the global capitalist class over Keynesian era pro labor policies. Without
using the term neoliberalism even once, Francis Fukayama reiterated his “end of history”
claim in a Wall Street Journal essay, in 2014.10 He championed, western democratic capi-
talism instead. Fukuyama and Harvey’s work are just a glaring instance of this asymmetry
in usage, in the sense that, the term neoliberal is mostly used by scholars who are against
the principles that neoliberalism espouses, or against the state policies which seek to op-
erationalize these principles. It is important to briefly address the problem of asymmetric
usage of neoliberalism. Critics of neoliberalism associate it with a “more market”11 philos-
ophy that champions “private enterprise and consumer choice, rewards personal responsi-
bility, and entrepreneurial initiative” but decries “the dead hand of the incompetent, bu-
reaucratic and parasitic government that can never do good even if well intended.”12 This
8See (Saad-Filho & Johnston 2005, p.1).
9See (Harvey 2007, p.30).
10See Chapter 1
11See (Larner 2000).
12See (Chomsky 1999, p.7).
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way of thinking resulted in a radical and unprecedented transformation in state policies
on governing the economy “whereby a relative handful of private interests are permitted
to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximize their personal profit.”13-
thus dismantling previous forms embedded liberalism. However, texts that advocate the
ideas of governing the economy which are thought to be neoliberal by their critics, never
use the term neoliberal. “One compelling indicator of the term’s negative connotation is
that virtually no one self-identifies as a neoliberal, even though scholars frequently asso-
ciate others—politicians, economic advisors, and even fellow academics with this term.”14
The popular press reports “debates have turned uglier, the word has become a rhetorical
weapon, a way for anyone left of centre to incriminate those even an inch to their right.
(No wonder centrists say it’s a meaningless insult: they’re the ones most meaningfully in-
sulted by it.)”15 In 2016 however, the IMF, a much reviled institution among the critics of
neoliberalism, startled the intellectual and academic community by publishing an article
titled “Neoliberalism: Oversold?”, where (Ostry, Loungani & Furceri 2016, p.38) claimed:
“Instead of delivering growth, some neoliberal policies have increased inequality, in turn
jeopardizing durable expansion.”
2.2.3 Conceptual Problems with Informal Sector
Conceptual problems plague the scholarship on informal economy as well. The informal
economy operates below the radar of the state and its presence is overwhelming. In many
countries informal sector far exceeds that of formal sector, where the the norm is infor-
mal, and not formal, employment.16 Although an overwhelming number of studies concen-
trate on countries outside Europe and North America (excluding Mexico), recent studies
13ibid
14See (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009, p.140).
15See (Metcalf 2017).
16See (ILO 2011), (Charmes 2012), and (Bacchetta, Ernst, Bustamante et al. 2009).
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have also started to examine informal aspects of the economy in the context of Europe
and US as well.17 Thus informal economy (like neoliberalism) is understood as a ‘global
phenomenon’18 which according to the ILO, “comprises half to three-quarters of all non-
agricultural employment in developing countries.”19 It is quite common to introduce the
topic of the informal economy by claiming that “Most jobs in developing countries are
found in the informal economy which presents a predominant role within the economy.”20
It is also common to proclaim that “the concept of the informal economy remains in-
adequate to explain the dynamism of the informal economy in developing countries from
its origin, causes and persistence.”21 Not only are the definitions of informal sector sus-
ceptible to cross national variations,22 scholars have also fiercely disagreed about its role
in overall economic wellbeing of nation-states. While some view informal economic activ-
ity somewhat positively23 others view this to have a negative effect and advocates against
it’s expansion.24 and (Farrell 2004) Some studies, following the Arthur Lewis’ Nobel prize
winning “dual economy” approach conceptualize the informal economy as a residual of
the formal which is, and should be, on its path to extinction. According to this argument
a gradual formalization of economic activities, which is in turn an automatic byproduct
of modernization and development, will eventually squeeze out informal productive ac-
tivities.25 Other studies hold a diametrically opposing view and characterize the informal
economy to be persistent and increasing.26 As (Kucera & Roncolato 2008, p.321) explains
17See (Venkattesh 2008), (Hazans 2011) For an account from the press see, (Surowiecki 2013).
18For quantitative approaches which stress informality to be a global phenomenon see,(Schniede 2006)
(Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro 2011). For qualitative approaches, see (Neuwirth 2012).
19See the ILO webpage on informal economy. (http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-
promotion/informal-economy/lang—en/index.htm.
20See (Cling, Lagrée, Razafindrakoto & Roubaud 2014, p.3).
21(Yusuff 2011, p.625).
22Since the informal sector manifests itself in different ways in different countries and hence national
definitions of the informal sector are not harmonised. See for example, (Hussmanns 2004).
23See (De et al. 1989).
24See (Levy 2010).
25See (La Porta & Shleifer 2014).
26(International Labor Organization 2002, p.1) find that “Contrary to earlier predictions, the informal
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humorously, “There are at least ten publications to date whose titles tell us that informal
employment is being “revisited.” With so many visits and revisits, one risks a worn out
welcome. Yet disaccord persists on such fundamental issues as the causes and quality of
informal employment.”
Given this murkiness one can, somewhat flippantly, analogize neoliberalism and infor-
mal economy with ghostly apparitions: they could be everywhere but most disagree about
their precise nature and presence. Anyone who uses essentially contested concepts is obli-
gated to clearly situate their understanding. The following two sections I theorize neoliber-
alism to unearth its inner core.
2.3 Questions of State and Commerce
It is a self-evident truth that the necessary condition for the very existence of territorial
sovereign power(TSP ), (for example, an emperor, a tribal leader, a prince, or our mod-
ern state) is the survival of subjects the TSP rules over. Irrespective of the consent of
the ruled or the lack thereof, it is impossible to imagine an entity with monopoly over
violence without anyone in the receiving end. The Leviathan must collapse without the
worldly configuration of bodies. We can combine this, with another axiom, that survival
of subjects is impossible without production, distribution, and consumption of commodi-
ties (agricultural and non-agricultural goods and services) or what I call commerce. So,
we must logically conclude from these two axioms that the very reason for the existence of
TSP is predicated on commerce, in so far as it entails the survival and reproduction of the
ruled. No matter what or who is the source of sovereignty, the TSP faces two existential
questions.
economy has been growing rapidly in almost every corner of the globe, including industrialized countries
– it can no longer be considered a temporary or residual phenomenon. The bulk of new employment in
recent years, particularly in developing and transition countries, has been in the informal economy.”
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Q(A) What is the appropriate role of sovereign power towards domestic and foreign com-
merce?
Q(B) What is the appropriate role of the sovereign power towards creation and distribu-
tion of wealth?
2.3.1 State, Commerce, and Wealth in the Longue Durée
In the longue duree of political history where rule by coercion rather than consent was of-
ten the rule, TSP , however localized or centralized it was, assumed a supreme role in gov-
erning commercial life. Production and distribution of commodities were micromanaged
with a minute calibration of weights, measures, money, taxes, and rate of profit. The ap-
propriate role of the sovereign power was to facilitate, thwart, and advocate every aspect
of commercial life till late 17th century.27 During the late 17th century, it was “impossi-
27This can be demonstrated accross time and space. I include some historical evidence here.
From around 275 BCE we find Kautilya’s advice “In the happiness of his subjects lies his happiness; in
their welfare his welfare; whatever pleases himself he shall not consider as good, but whatever pleases his
subjects he shall consider as good. Hence the king shall ever be active and discharge his duties; the root
of wealth is activity, and of evil its reverse. In the absence of activity acquisitions present and to come
will perish; by activity he can achieve both his desired ends and abundance of wealth. A wise king shall
observe that form of policy which, in his opinion, enables him to build forts, to construct buildings and
commercial roads, to open new plantations and villages, to exploit mines and timber and elephant forests,
and at the same time to harass similar works of his enemy.” See (Shamasastry 1956, p.53, 371).
In classical Greece “The involvement of the state in trade was relatively limited; however, a notable ex-
ception was grain. For example, so vital was it to feed Athens’ large population and especially valuable in
times of drought, trade in wheat was controlled and purchased by a special ‘grain buyer’ (sitones). From c.
470 BCE the obstruction of the import of grain was prohibited, as was the re-exportation of it; for offend-
ers the punishment was the death penalty. Market officials (agoranomoi) ensured the quality of goods on
sale in the markets and grain had its own supervisors, the sitophylakes, who regulated that prices and
quantities were correct. Besides taxes on the movement of goods (e.g.: road taxes or, at Chalkedon, a
10% transit charge on Black Sea traffic payable to Athens) and levies on imports and exports at ports,
there were also measures taken to protect trade. For example, Athens taxed those citizens who contracted
loans on grain cargo which did not deliver to Piraeus or those merchants who failed to unload a certain
percentage of their cargo. Special maritime courts were established to tempt traders to choose Athens as
their trading partner, and private banks could facilitate currency exchange and safeguard deposits. Similar
trading incentives existed on Thasos, a major trading-centre and large exporter of high quality wine.” See
(Cartwright 2012)
In the 16th century Machiavelli suggests that, “A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability,
and to honour the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his citizens to practise
their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one
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ble for any man, to bee a states-man, that doth not understand trade in some measure,”
and hence in terms of the interest of the state, William Cavendish advised the Prince of
Wales, to control trade, discouraging the ones that drain the treasury and encouraging the
ones that fill it. Francis Bacon counselled the Duke of Buckingham to discourage trade
in luxuries and encourage labor intensive trade that would employ the subjects.28 Com-
mercial life was embedded in the social and religious traditions and political command
wielded by TSP . Irfan Habib’s seminal work on Mughal India shows that the TSP was
deeply entrenched in expansion and deepening of commercial activities in South Asia.29 As
in South Asia, so in Europe. It appeared to Adam Smith, the primary reason for the ex-
should not be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or an-
other from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to
do these things and designs in any way to honour his city or state. Further, he ought to entertain the peo-
ple with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds
or into societies, he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show
himself an example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his rank, for
this he must never consent to abate in anything.” See (Machiavelli [1532] 2016, p.51)
(Heilbroner 2011, 22, 23) brings us the evidence of the states’ (micro?) management of commercial lives
separated by continents and centuries. Roughly around 1550 Germany we find a merchant, Andreas Ryff,
“troubled by the nuisances of the times; as he travels he is stopped approximately once every ten miles to
pay a customs toll; between Basle and Cologne he pays thirty-one levies.”More remarkably from 1639 Heil-
broner documents this incident where the profit motive itself is the source of serious public consternation.
A trial is in progress; one Robert Keayne, “an ancient professor of the gospel, a man
of eminent parts, wealthy and having but one child, and having come over for con-
science sake and for the advancement of the gospel,” is charged with a heinous crime:
he has made over sixpence profit on the shilling, an outrageous gain. The court is de-
bating whether to excommunicate him for his sin, but in view of his spotless past
it finally relents and dismisses him with a fine of two hundred pounds. But poor
Mr. Keayne is so upset that before the elders of the Church he does “with tears ac-
knowledge his covetous and corrupt heart.” The minister of Boston cannot resist this
golden opportunity to profit from the living example of a wayward sinner, and he
uses the example of Keayne’s avarice to thunder forth in his Sunday sermon on some
false principles of trade. Among them are these: I. That a man might sell as dear as
he can, and buy as cheap as he can. II. If a man lose by casualty of sea, etc., in some
of his commodities, he may raise the price of the rest. III. That he may sell as he
bought, though he paid too dear ... All false, false, false, cries the minister; to seek
riches for riches’ sake is to fall into the sin of avarice.
28See (Walter 2013, p.13).
29See (Habib 1969).
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istence of TSP in violently feudal medieval Europe was the protection and sustenance of
commerce and that political sovereignty was embedded in the social-commercial context.30
In fact, for Smith, protection of commerce is the crucial reason behind rise of new TSP s
(like towns, groups of traders) and consolidation of the power of existing TSP s (Kings).
Although commercial life was molded and managed through intricate rules and rituals em-
anating from the divine will of the TSP (or the mandate of heaven), the business of order-
ing business was an uncomfortable concoction to swallow. The TSP , as Robert Heilbroner
meticulously shows, was also caught up in a contradictory relation with commerce, where
the simultaneous need for projecting strength abroad through amassing bullion and a gen-
eral ethical disdain towards lust for pecuniary gain, often put the noble and the commer-
30“In the infancey of society, as has been often observed, government must be weak and feeble, and it
is long before it’s authority can protect the industry of individuals from the rapacity of their neighbours.
When people find themselves every moment in danger of being robbed of all they possess, they have no
motive to be industrious. There could be little accumulation of stock, because the indolent, which would
be the greatest number, would live upon the industrious, and spend whatever they produced. Nothing
can be more an obstacle to the progress of opulence.” (Adam Smith’s lecture notes on Jurisprudence) c.f
(Weingast 2016, p.4).
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cial class in a social relation best described as an acrimonious harmony.31
2.3.2 Modern Transformations
The advent of political modernity is often defined by a conceptual transformation in the
common sense that the legitimate source of TSP is not divine ordinance but public in-
terest or popular will, where the contours of “the public” itself goes through its own vio-
lent contestation, with canons and canine, slowly expanding towards universal franchise
de jure. But such a transformation cannot be understood separately from the slow and vi-
olently conflictual advent and consolidation of, what (Heilbroner 2011) calls, the market
31Two important extracts from (Heilbroner 2011, p.24-25,34) sum this up succinctly.
The idea of gain, the idea that each working person not only may, but should, con-
stantly strive to better his or her material lot, is an idea that was quite foreign to
the great lower and middle strata of Egyptian,Greek, Roman, and medieval cultures,
only scattered throughout Renaissance and Reformation times; and largely absent in
the majority of Eastern civilizations. As a ubiquitous characteristic of society, it is as
modern an invention as printing.
and
An aspect of the political change that was revolutionizing Europe was the encour-
agement of foreign adventure and exploration. In the thirteenth century, the broth-
ers Polo went as unprotected merchants on their daring journey into the land of the
great Khan; in the fifteenth century Columbus sailed for what he hoped would be
the same destination under the royal auspices of Isabella. The change from private
to national exploration was part and parcel of the change from private to national
life. And in turn the great national adventures of the English and Spanish and Por-
tuguese sailor capitalists brought a flood of treasure and treasure-consciousness back
to Europe. “He who has gold,” Christopher Columbus said, “makes and accom-
plishes whatever he wishes in the world and finally uses it to send souls into par-
adise.” The sentiments of Christopher Columbus were the sentiments of an age, and
hastened the advent of a society oriented toward gain and chance and activated by
the chase after money. Be it noted, in passing, that the treasures of the East were
truly fabulous. With the share received as a stockholder in Sir Francis Drake’s voy-
age of the Golden Hynd, Queen Elizabeth paid off all England’s foreign debts, bal-
anced its budget, and invested abroad a sum large enough, at compound interest, to
account for Britain’s entire overseas wealth in 1930!
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system: a society conceived upon “the idea of gain...so firmly rooted that men would soon
vigorously affirm that it was an eternal and omnipresent part of human nature.”32
Because of this twin transformation over the 17th and 18th centuries, the political
realm of TSP could now be conceptually separated from that of the commercial or the
economic.33 As the economic extricated itself from the socio-political context, and as po-
litical power was to be derived from societal rather than heavenly forces, our political-
economic modernity ushered a dissolution of the uneasy cohabitation of commercial gain
and political sovereignty of previous centuries. A widespread purchase of the idea that, in
terms of domestic or foreign commerce the TSP was to behave like a commercial enter-
prise itself and be entrenched in the business of doing business, became fixated in popu-
lar prejudice. That the TSP should be preoccupied with making a profit for itself (which
was to be distinguished from the personal profit of the prince,) was commonsense by the
17th century. For example, Ryan Walter shows an intellectual consensus within the Eu-
ropean genre of the Counsel to the Sovereign that generating economic wealth through
governing and directing domestic commerce and foreign trade was synonymous to mili-
tary strength and survival of European TSP s. TSP ’s supreme role in accumulating public
32It is impossible not to quote this pertinent passage if only to demonstrate the mass hysteria of pursu-
ing gain.
In the world of affairs a new fever of wealth and speculation had gripped Europe.
In France in 1718 a Scottish adventurer named John Law organized a wild blue-sky
venture known as the Mississippi Company, selling shares in an enterprise that would
mine the mountains of gold in America. Men and women fought in the streets for the
privilege of winning shares, murders were committed, fortunes made overnight. One
hotel waiter netted thirty million livres. When the company was about to topple
with frightful losses for all investors, the government sought to stave off disaster by
rounding up a thousand beggars, arming them with picks and shovels, and marching
them through the streets of Paris as a band of miners off for the Land of Eldorado.
Of course, the structure collapsed. But what a change from the timid capitalists of a
hundred years before to the get-rich-quick mobs jostling in the Rue de Quincampoix;
what a money-hungry public this must have been to swallow such a barefaced fraud!
(Heilbroner 2011, p.37-38)
33See (Heilbroner 2011, p.24).
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wealth created conditions and discourses on the projection of political power over other
TSP s. Above all, keeping peace and maintaining the survival of sovereign territory was
paramount. This need was reinforced my the impulse to incessantly frustrate and destroy
other sovereigns in search of control over lands and treasures, resources, subjects and hence
over commercial activity within those foreign territories.34
Sudipta Sen’s meticulous work on 18th century Indian market places reveals that con-
trol over the existing spaces and networks of commercial activity and passage remained
the primary focus of colonial power. outsourced as it was, to a joint stock company. The
reason for existence of the East India company was to gradually insert itself in the nodes
of commercial activity and assert (a conflictual and tentative) sovereignty over the space of
exchange. For the greater part of the 18th century, the British acquiesced to the idea, that
the ruling house of Timur, despite its state of utter disrepair, is ultimately the source of
visible, if not legitimate authority.”35 After all, as in Britain so in “Hindostan,” the com-
mercial enterprise of the Joint Stock Company could not ignore the supreme role of TSP
in commerce. Even though the market system was being thought and forged out of the so-
cially and politically embedded exchange networks based on rights and obligation dictated
and micromanaged by the TSP , and even though a new era, where economics and politics
34Hobbes argued in 1651 that circulation of gold and silver and hence commodities “make common
Wealths move, and stretch out their armes, when need is, to forraign countries and supply whole armies
with provisions.” The most telling examples comes from Thomas Mun who, in 1664, was encountering the
tension between the Prince’s personal wealth and wealth of the kingdom. The prince is advised to measure
the vault of treasures not just in terms of net revenues but by value of net exports “lest he impoverish the
policy.” Contrary to public opinion Mun argues exporting bullion could be exported if the goods and ser-
vices that were bought could be sold at a higher price, thus increasing the flow of treasure and in fact, a
wise prince would not simply store treasure but return it to his subjects in useful ways, by having ships of
war built and by creating stores of armament and ammunitions. The TSP should make the poor produce
luxury items as an import substitution and teach them fishing so that they become involved in long dis-
tance sea trade. The 1650 Act of English Parliament established Council on Trade to keep an account of
all imports and exports. Towards the end of that century we find proposals of creating another council of
trade that will parse the trade balance data to see what costly imports could be discouraged and banned,
so that “we might thereunto fit and Adapt Sumptuary Lawes, such as might prohibit at home the Use of
Commodities from those Country’s(sic) where We Loose in the Balance, and where Trade us hurtful to
us.” See (Walter 2013, p.29-32).
35See (Sen 2002, p.14).
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will be seen as different realms, was ushering in, commercial power, for eminent people like
Edmund Burke, had to be derived from or formally sanctioned by the TSP . International
commerce carried on by the company stood on two legs, which “were the charter endowed
by the crown and authorized by the act of parliament” and “the second derived from the
collective charters and grants bestowed on the company by the Moghul Emperor, partic-
ularly the great Charter by which they acquired the High Stewardship of the Kingdoms
of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa in 1765.”36 As classical political economy of the Smithian
form slowly started to draw the economic sphere in isolation from its socio-political and
religious context, the colonial imperative “to promote a self-regulated economy in a soci-
ety where market places and their patrons were a part of an extended social and political
landscape” fomented “conflict over marketplaces” between the company officials and the
existing TSP s.37
This was not simply a problem within the colonies, as Robert Heilbroner shows in the
European context, birth pangs of the market system was enormously disruptive as well.
What is important to note is that a product of that transformation was not the deprecia-
tion of TSP in favor of private commercial enterprise, but rather the realization that the
TSP should also behave like a commercial (profit making) entity, or more accurately the
supreme commercial entity, and learn the tricks of trade to increase its own revenue. Seen
36Even when the Moghul Emperor lost effective power, his sovereignty was in a way invoked in order
to validate the source of legitimacy of the Company. “For when the company acquired that office in India,
and English corporation became an integral part of the Moghul Empire.” See (Sen 2002, p.15).
37For “Precolonial rulers in India it was much more important for ruling houses to be able to display
rights over people and goods and thus partake in the creation of affluence.” The East India Company,
driven as it was by the need for profits coincidental to the mercantilist policies of the Georgian fiscal mil-
itary state, came in constant conflict with “these various overlapping authorities and obligations along
with the demand of the administrative and religious households, [that] constituted the world of exchange
characterized by multiple domains.” Thus the colonizing state became preoccupied with the “sequestra-
tion of the indigenous marketplace from its traditional lineage. When the officials of the Company be-
came, through legitimacy of conquest, the ideologues of a colonial state, the protean nature of authority
in exchange was seen simply as the tyrannical exploitation of commerce and thus was made the object of
reform, regulation, and appropriation for the (larger and rightful) share of the state revenue.”(Sen 1998,
p.10-18).
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differently, political modernity then can be defined by the moment where the commercial
classes and their thoughts gripped the public imaginary and power. The uneasy cohab-
itation of acrimonious harmony between commerce and TSP was transformed to active
participation in accruing commercial gain. I need not go into the global history of thought
regarding the role of sovereign power, commerce, and wealth, because it is not necessary
for the distillation of concepts concerning neoliberalism. However, it is important to note
that the political and economic modernity ushered in a TSP whose legitimacy was not
only to be derived from popular will, but also from the collective gain it can muster for all
its citizens by engaging in profit making itself. The only difference was that, for the TSP
to be profitable, it had to shed its general disposition of bellicosity towards commerce and
orient state power to manage commerce in a way that increases the collective wealth and
expands the treasury.
In the context of mid twentieth century, Timothy Mitchell has shown how this mod-
ern distinction of the political and economic spheres solidified further into the contempo-
rary (post second world war) commonsense term: “the economy.”38 I have argued before,
the idea of “the economy” provides the marker of certainty for the modern TSP based on
popular will and solves the radical problem of legitimacy ensuing from the dissolution of
transcendental markers sovereignty. During the second world war “the economy” emerges
as the primary space of legitimation of state power. The primary source of legitimacy of
modern TSP would now depend upon its ability to improve “the economy.” But it’s exis-
tential need to provide answers to those age-old questions Q(A) and Q(B) remain as per-
tinent as before. I situate neoliberalism within this theoretical and historical context, as
a set of ideas that (like Mercantilism, Liberalism, Marxism, and Keynesianism) primarily
attempt to answer those questions.
However, since the locus or language of analysis has now shifted focus to the idea of
38See Chapter 1 of this work
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economy, we can reformulate our questions in the contemporary context as
(Q1) What is the appropriate role of TSP towards the national economy?
(Q2) What is the appropriate role of the sovereign power towards creation and distribu-
tion of national wealth?
In what follows I will analyze the literature on neoliberalism in the way it answers
these two questions and distill the core elements of the neoliberal discourse.
2.4 Core Components of Neoliberalism
In 1926, John Maynard Keynes pronounced the swan song of Laissez Faire in an essay
straightforwardly titled “The end of Laissez Faire.” Here he claimed the doctrine’s in-
sistence “that individuals acting independently for their own advantage will produce the
greatest aggregate of wealth, depends on a variety of unreal assumptions,” and clearly
spelled out the role of the state towards the economy as follows.
I come next to a criterion of agenda which is particularly relevant to what is urgent
and desirable to do in the near future. We must aim at separating those services
which are technically social from those which are technically individual. The most
important Agenda of the State relate not to those activities which private individuals
are already fulfilling, but to those functions which fall outside the sphere of the indi-
vidual, to those decisions which are made by no one if the State does not make them.
The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing
already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which
at present are not done at all.(Keynes [1926] 2010)
In the next two decades, catalyzed by economic depressions, second world war, and
widespread (yet partial) decolonization, popular and academic support for “free market
thinking” in the western and non-western worlds evaporated, and the role of TSP was
seen to be not just as an eminent business entity (like that of the previous order), but also
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as a redistributive business entity. Keynes observes the popular reaction against contem-
porary role of state inaction towards economic well being of its subjects.39 The literature
that is critical of neoliberalism unanimously locates its germination in the collective dis-
trust and skepticism among an increasingly marginalized and predominantly transatlantic
group of economists who remained, against the popular, perhaps Keynesian current of the
inter-war period. As free market advocates they were automatically opposed to state plan-
ning and Keynesian measures of fiscal spending for economic justice. Primarily based out
of the London School of Economics and the University of Chicago, they found their free
market advocacy sequestered within small academic bubbles. Namely, within Hayek’s elite
Mont Pelerin Society(MPS) launched from a Swiss mountain village of the same name
in April 1947. In 2012 the society claimed to have 699 members and that “it has no offi-
cial views, formulates no policies, publishes no manifestos. . . It does not even try to reach
agreement in its discussions; no votes are taken, and to promote frank argument, its pro-
ceedings go unreported.”40 The critical literature is correct in locating the reactionary im-
39In his criticism of a sort of dogmatic capitalism he says,
Many people, who are really objecting to capitalism as a way of life, argue as though
they were objecting to it on the ground of its inefficiency in attaining its own ob-
jects. Contrariwise, devotees of capitalism are often unduly conservative, and reject
reforms in its technique, which might really strengthen and preserve it, for fear that
they may prove to be first steps away from capitalism itself. Nevertheless, a time
may be coming when we shall get clearer than at present as to when we are talk-
ing about capitalism as an efficient or inefficient technique, and when we are talk-
ing about it as desirable or objectionable in itself. For my part I think that capital-
ism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient for attaining economic
ends than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in itself it is in many ways
extremely objectionable. Our problem is to work out a social organisation which
shall be as efficient as possible without offending our notions of a satisfactory way
of life.(Keynes [1926] 2010)
40Although expressly non-political the society boasts an impressive roster of members who are politi-
cally influential.
Some have become senior government ministers (such as Sir Geoffrey Howe of the
United Kingdom, Antonio Martino of Italy, Ruth Richardson of New Zealand, and
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pulse of MPS against the dominant ideas of state intervention in the economic life of indi-
viduals that became politically salient after the second world war. According to its self de-
scription posted on its website the initial members of MPS wanted to rejuvenate liberalism
in the “European sense” of the term.41 In the official historical narrative available from
the MPS website, (Butler 2012, p.1) claims, “the original members,shared a common sense
of crisis – a conviction that freedom was being threatened and that something should be
done about it.” According to this official history the MPS has been successful in this bat-
tle against state intervention in economic life of its subjects, even though still somehow
claiming to remain unequivocally against political action. (Butler 2012, p.2-3) maintains,
The Society’s contribution to world affairs is its provision of a forum for debate,
discussion, study and self-education among its members, not through political ac-
tion...The Society has played a crucial role in that battle. It has done more than just
keep liberal ideas alive; it has expanded and deepened liberal philosophy and spread
liberal thought across the globe. Equally profound and even more subtle has been
the strength, courage, friendship, learning and ideas that members draw from each
other. And as members of the Society, liberals who may otherwise feel intellectually
isolated and overwhelmed can take strength from the realization that they are not
alone in their views...And new liberal ideas are taking hold. A score of countries are
replacing their old state-run Ponzi-scheme pension systems with individuated private
pension accounts, like those designed by Chile’s Labor minister (and Society mem-
ber), Jose Pinera. School choice and school vouchers, an idea rediscovered and pop-
ularized by Friedman, are reforming and improving education in many more places.
George Shultz of the United States) or senior officials (e.g. former Federal Reserve
Chairman Arthur Burns). A few have even become presidents or prime ministers
(among them Ludwig Erhard of Germany, Luigi Einaudi of Italy, Mart Laar of Es-
tonia, Ranil Wickremasinghe of Sri Lanka and Václav Klaus of the Czech Repub-
lic). And others, including academics, educators, journalists, authors, businesspeople
and many in policy research institutes, have wielded influence in other ways. But
they have done all this as individuals, not as representatives of the Mont Pelerin So-
ciety. The Society’s contribution to world affairs is its provision of a forum for de-
bate, discussion, study and self-education among its members, not through political
action.(Butler 2012, p.1)
41This is an important distinction that MPS members want to clarify time and again. It is emphasized
elsewhere in their website. below the Statements of Aim, it says, “Here, liberal is used in its European
sense, broadly epitomized by a preference for minimal and dispersed government, rather than in its current
American sense which indicates the opposite preference for an extension and concentration of governmen-
tal powers. See (MPS 1947).
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Property rights are being restored and business paperwork scaled back in large parts
of South America, thanks to Peruvian economist and Society member Hernando de
Soto.
According to the same document Lionel Robbin’s of The London School of Economics
(LSE) wrote the statement of aims which “remains the guiding statement to this day.” for
the sake of clarity I reproduce parts of the statement below with added emphasis for the
purpose of our analysis.
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the Earth’s
surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disap-
peared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of current
tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group are pro-
gressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most precious pos-
session of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the
spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a
minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and
obliterate all views but their own. The group holds that these developments have
been fostered by the growth of a view of history which denies all absolute moral stan-
dards and by the growth of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law.
It holds further that they have been fostered by a decline of belief in private prop-
erty and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associ-
ated with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may
be effectively preserved.The group does not aspire to conduct propaganda. It seeks
to establish no meticulous and hampering orthodoxy. It aligns itself with no par-
ticular party. Its object is solely, by facilitating the exchange of views among minds
inspired by certain ideals and broad conceptions held in common, to contribute to the
preservation and improvement of the free society.42
Again we see, although the reactionary nature to increasingly dominant ideas about the
role of the TSP as a redistributive business entity, centralizing interventionist, etc. is ob-
vious, it is “liberalism in the European sense” and not neoliberalism the MPS wants to
keep alive. But according to its self-representation it is strangely at odds with itself. First,
there is a general discomfort with political affiliations, political action, or politics in gen-
eral while taking the task of fighting an intellectual battle concerning centuries old po-
litical concepts like liberty and liberalism, not to mention, many of their members are
42See (MPS 1947).
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politicians. Second, the texts are completely silent about the uncomfortable coexistence
of European liberalism with imperialism and colonization, capitalism and slavery, or the
ideological support it provided for shaping these institutions. Third, it is indeed ironic to
note that original founders were lamenting the death of freedom in a precise moment in
history, when millions of people in South Asia were celebrating freedom from the political
control of the European TSP s. India in 1947, for example, with its 400 million people up-
held the rubric of private property, electoral democracy, in a continent which had two sig-
nificant communist states. Yet the members felt “the precious possession of western man”
is plummeting into the nadirs of illiberalism. And finally, although any authoritarianism
either from left or the right is decried as a principle, this narrative always remains conspic-
uously and perhaps tellingly silent about overwhelming journalistic and academic work on
the unfree rule of various pro-market right wing governments in Latin American and other
countries, where the pro-market forces came with profoundly unfree policies of violent sup-
pression of rightful dissent and undemocratic coups of democratically elected governments,
extra-judicial killing, not to mention unbelievable human misery and deprivation.
These elements of contradiction, systematic omission, the apolitical approach, and
general lack of direction, clarity, or label, championed by this group, is a boon in disguise
because one can explain such a contradictory dissociation with politics as a function of
the historical context in which it was produced and the internal logic of their ideas. As
(Burgin 2012, p.10) argues, “in the interwar and the early post-war years ’neoliberalism’
held a valence, on the rare occasions when the term was employed, that diverged signifi-
cantly from that associated with it today.” It was a grim historical moment for a group of
free market advocates where they couldn’t see themselves as conservatives and yet in pop-
ular imagination they were construed as such. They couldn’t be liberals either because in
the popular imagination meaning of liberalism, meant a large redistributive state, which
was in opposition to their understanding of the same. In fact, Hayek himself became in-
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creasingly frustrated with the world around him where the meanings of words like “liber-
alism” and “democracy” became incoherent. The members of the society almost certainly
despised “conservatism” as an idea that resists change, because the chains of an emerg-
ing and increasingly consolidated redistributive state (something that was being forged
for the first time in human history over the ashes of worldwide economic and human mis-
ery) is what they wanted to break asunder. However, in popular imagination “their coun-
cil of quietism” was the status quo itself which the TSP wanted to change in the middle
of global economic misery. The word liberalism on the other hand was a double-edged
sword. To the members it reflected the Smithian ‘common sense’ of “free market” politi-
cal economy, and the glories of capitalist enterprise. But in popular prejudice it signified
the commonsense legitimate authority of the TSP in safeguarding positive liberties like
freedom from basic needs, which the MPS members prima facie rejected as the epitome of
aggression on negative liberties of private property. Cordoned off as they were within tiny
academic cliques in LSE and Chicago and without many allies, mired by confusion rather
than clarity. Angus Burgin points out
The conversation circled relentlessly back on the question of what term might serve
as a formal designation, and “liberalism”, “neoliberalism”, “individualism”, “laissez-
faire”, and “liberalism of the left” were all variously raised and rejected. The con-
tinual focus on matters of wording...which might seem at first consideration trivial,
attested to the importance of developing a single rubric to encompass the various
members of an ideological group.43
Even Milton Freedman, who the critics of neoliberalism have positioned as an icon
of neoliberal thought recalled later that the proposition: “you just have to let the bottom
drop out of the world” was not a convincing argument to him and many other in the MPS
at that time. He concluded that by encouraging a “do-nothing policy both in Britain and
the United States,” Hayek and Robbins “did harm.”44 Henry Simons and Frank Knight
43See (Burgin 2012, p.65).
44By this time Hayek’s own work has considered dated and he himself confirmed this outlook was
prevalent among younger economists. See (Burgin 2012, p.30).
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held similar views as well, and were publicly critical of the anti-statist stance of Lionel
Robbins and Ludwig von Mises.45
Even though there were no appropriate singular label to encompass the diversity of
opinions regarding a just society, we can argue that one of the core elements of the un-
derlying unity of the thought was unanimously against totalitarianism and even if in an
uneasy manner in favor of liberalism “in the European sense.” The role of the TSP was to
uphold a charter of negative individual liberties against any kind of collective claim, and
refrain from governmental intervention in the automatic functioning of the price system,
the system of private property, and the system of capital/profit accumulation.46 As Hayek
explains in Road to Serfdom:
It is necessary in the first instance that the parties in the market should be free to
sell and buy at any price at which they can find a partner to the transaction, and
that anybody should be free to produce, sell, and buy anything that may be pro-
duced or sold at all. And it is essential that the entry into the different trades should
be open to all on equal terms, and that the law should not tolerate any attempts by
individuals or groups to restrict this entry by open or concealed force. Any attempt
to control prices or quantities of particular commodities deprives competition of its
power of bringing about an effective co-ordination of individual efforts, because price
changes then cease to register all the relevant changes in circumstances and no longer
provide a reliable guide for the individual’s actions.47
It is important to note that these ideas are indeed very similar to the standard early-
to-mid 19th century thinking in political economy that Keynes is critical of and sets out
45For example Henry Simons’ thought Ludwig von Mises’s and Lionel Robbins’ ideas of minimalist
state were “fanatically extreme.” “We confront a picture of laissez faire bordering on the conception of
a worldwide anarchist utopia...a vision of universal freedom and brotherhood, if only governments would
cease from troubling and politicians go out and die, except for police functions.” Concerned about the
moral implication of the model of economic man he calls the construct it “selfish ruthless object of moral
condemnation.” He is clear that “Market societies encourage such undesirable behaviors while discour-
aging the production of values not reflected by the price mechanism. “In a social order where all values
are reduced to the money measure in the degree that this is true of modern industrial nations...a consid-
erable fraction of the most noble and sensitive characters will lead unhappy and even futile lives.” c.f.
(Burgin 2012, p.33-36).
46As (Burgin 2012, p.58) puts it “However halting and imperfectly considered, their actions cultivated a
sense of solidarity and developed networks of communication that persisted beyond the collapse of the in-
stitutions they built. The sense of crisis that brought them together would continue to inspire their shared
project long after its specific conditions had fallen away.”
47See (Hayek [1944] 2014, p.38).
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to debunk in his aforementioned essay.48 Keynes demonstrates that such a line of argu-
ment which claims to provide a scientific justification of a non-interventionist state (based
on the conviction that social and private interests are necessarily harmonious), has fallen
out of favor by the late nineteenth century. “Scarcely a single English economist of re-
pute,” Keynes writes,“will join in a frontal attack upon Socialism in general.” According
to Keynes, even the forceful advocates of laissez-faire were declaring “the maxim of laissez-
faire has no scientific basis, but at best a handy rule of practice.” 49 In fact, Keynes shows
in detail throughout the essay that in his contemporary times “the general opinion that
an individualistic laissez-faire is both what they ought to teach and what in fact they do
teach” was orthodox thinking based on misreading of important authors, but more impor-
tantly a function of political developments of the 18th and 19th centuries.50
In some sense Keynes saw Hayek and others to be perpetuating an increasingly de-
bunked dogmatic and orthodox political economy which, contrary to the claim of its ad-
vocates, was not scientific. However, Hayek was making a point that was similar to the
laisses-faire of the last centuries, yet quite radically different from a simple return of the
TSP to nineteenth century role of a business entity that is its hostile to commerce, and
allows commercial activity to take its own form. Like Hayek, Milton Friedman in his 1951
essay Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects also forcefully makes the case that the “collectivist
belief” the state can “remedy all evils itself” is a reaction to the erroneous philosophizing
48For example Keynes writes,
“By 1850 the Easy Lessons for the Use of Young People, by Archbishop Whately, which the Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge was distributing wholesale, do not admit even of those doubts which Mrs
B. allowed Caroline occasionally to entertain. ’More harm than good is likely to be done’ the little book
concludes, ’by almost any interference of Government with men’s money transactions, whether letting and
leasing, or buying and selling of any kind.’ True liberty is ’that every man should be left free to dispose
of his own property, his own time, and strength, and skill, in whatever way he himself may think fit, pro-
vided he does no wrong to his neighbours’. In short, the dogma had got hold of the educational machine;
it had become a copybook maxim.” See (Keynes [1926] 2010, p.278)
49See(Keynes [1926] 2010, p.282).
50For example he states unequivocally that, “the divine or scientific harmony (as the case might be)
between private interest and public advantage pointed to laissez-faire. But above all, the ineptitude of
public administrators strongly prejudiced the practical man in favour of laissez-faire.”
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about the role of the state towards commerce. 19th century orthodoxy was, according to
Friedman “a negative philosophy,” because it posited that the state actions were by de-
fault detrimental to commerce. As a result, “this philosophy assigned almost no role to the
state other than the maintenance of order and the enforcement of contracts,” leaving open
the possibility of collusion among “private individuals” to “usurp power” and “effectively
limit the freedom of other individuals.” According to Friedman’s understanding, 19th cen-
tury thought championed laissez-faire for its own sake: “Laissez-faire must be the rule.”
this disposition failed to consider market failures: “some functions that the price system
could not perform.” Yet the provision of these functions were the necessary conditions for
the price system to “discharge effectively the tasks for which it is admirably fitted.” “A
new faith,” “the doctrine sometimes called Neo-liberalism,” Friedman claims, avoids the
errors of the 19th century thinkers. While recommending a “severe limitation” on state
power “to interfere in the detailed activity of individuals”. According to Friedman, the
doctrine of neoliberalism also recognizes “important positive functions that must be per-
formed by the state.” But what exactly are these positive functions? Friedman replies
Neo-liberalism would accept the nineteenth century liberal emphasis on the fun-
damental importance of the individual, but it would substitute for the nineteenth
century goal of laissez-faire as a means to this end, the goal of the competitive or-
der. . . The state would police the system, establish conditions favorable to competi-
tion and prevent monopoly, provide a stable monetary framework, and relieve acute
misery and distress. The citizens would be protected against the state by the exis-
tence of a free private market; and against one another by the preservation of compe-
tition.51
It is evident from the text that neoliberalism doesn’t seek to nullify the role of the
TSP in the realm of economic activities, but to realign it towards competition. For exam-
ple, Hayek doesn’t debunk the rational planning of experts; after all he maintains that “an
economist” is the last person to “object to planning in a general sense,” as in a nominal
fashion “everybody who is not a complete fatalist is a planner.” After all, “every political
51See (Friedman 1951).
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act is (or ought to be) an act of planning,” which could be “good or bad,” “short-sighted
or fore-sighted.” But he distinguishes his idea of planning in opposition to what he calls
“modern planners” “who demand a central direction of all economic activities according
to a single plan, laying down how the resources of society should be ‘consciously directed’
to serve particular ends in a definite way.” This opposition, he warns, is not to be con-
flated with a “dogmatic laissez-faire attitude,” because after all the “liberal argument” is
“not an argument for leaving things as they are,” but the best way to harness “forces of
competition as means of coordinating human efforts.” Oddly enough, it seems this “lib-
eral argument” might not even be an actual argument after all, but rather based “on the
conviction that where effective competition can be created, it is a better way of guiding
individual efforts than any other,” and competition is superior because “in most circum-
stances it is the most efficient method known” such that “our activities can be adjusted to
each other without coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority.”52 One is also not sure
why and if competition based on pecuniary motive necessarily encompass the entire idea
of just society. But for this liberal conviction to work, the TSP should act as a planner
who institutes a deliberate and rational planlessness by creating and enforcing the legal
system that serves the purposes of efficient market competition. After all, planning for
competition “does not deny, but even emphasises, that, in order that competition should
work beneficially, a carefully thought-out legal framework is required.” 53 Notice that this
framework is agnostic about the source of such a pro-competitive legal system, and the
process by which it will be implemented. It doesn’t require any particular form of govern-
ment or political party. In theory this legal system is entirely compatible with an undemo-
cratic government. Logically, the legal design must be conceived by an all-knowing mind
that is convinced about the superiority of competition and comes to the realization that
52See (Hayek [1944] 2014, 38).
53See (Hayek [1944] 2014, p.36).
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the market itself is the all-knowing mind. This realization, that the total of social reality
can and ought to be modeled on market competition, cannot be however itself subject to
the market forces of ideas, it is an a-priori condition, which produces society in the image
of competition, but is not produced by it. He maintains that “an effective competitive sys-
tem needs an intelligently designed and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as
any other.” Here we see a striking similarity to the Freiburg School of post war Germany,
or what is more commonly known in the literature as Ordo-Liberals. Foucault indicates in
his lectures that this school of thought was convinced about “anti-naturalistic conception
of the market”- that market competition is not driven by natural laws which a TSP needs
to uncover only to keep untouched. Rather, for Ordo-liberals, market competition must
be instituted and maintained by the TSP , through incessant and active politics of fine
tuning.54 Planning has not vanished, human interactions ought to be shaped, controlled
and planned by the all-knowing TSP who knows that only market is the all-knowing mind
that preserves individual liberty. To put it differently the ambit of individual liberty posits
the right to participate and engage in fair market competition to be most important of
all: all rights in this political system are not made equal. Based on understanding, the
54To use Foucault:
In this view, like the market, competition, too, is not a natural fact always already
part and parcel of the economic domain. Instead, this fundamental economic mech-
anism can function only if support is forthcoming to bolster a series of conditions,
and adherence to the latter must consistently be guaranteed by legal measures. Pure
competition is therefore neither something that exists ‘naturally’ nor is it something
ever completely attained, but provides the justifications for a projected target which
necessitated incessant and active politics. In such an approach there is no room for a
conception that distinguishes between a limited domain of liberty and the legitimate
domain of government intervention. Unlike this negative conception of the state typ-
ical of liberal theory in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the Ordo-liberal
view, the market mechanism and the impact of competition can arise only if they
are produced by the practice of government. The Ordo-liberals believe that the state
and the market economy are not juxtaposed but that the one mutually presumes the
existence of the other.
See (Lemke 2001, p.193).
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TSP sets out to institute the omnipotence of markets by creating a legal system which
structures society for the primary purpose of maintaining and/or imposing competition.
Seen in this way the TSP is subsumed under, or made subservient to the sovereignty of
value-free market forces. Insofar politics is concerned with the idea of the good and bad
in collective life, neoliberalism robs politics of its political content, one can say it is pol-
itics without politics, it is politics for the sake of “successful competition.” According to
(Friedman 1951, p.43) “planning and competition can be combined only by planning for
competition, not by planning against competition. The planning against which all our crit-
icism is directed is solely the planning against competition.” Moreover Hayek also makes
an exactly similar point when he writes
Neither the provision of signposts on the roads, nor, in most circumstances, that
of the roads themselves, can be paid for by every individual user. Nor can certain
harmful effects of deforestation, or of some methods of farming, or of the smoke and
noise of factories, be confined to the owner of the property in question or to those
who are willing to submit to the damage for an agreed compensation. In such in-
stances we must find some substitute for the regulation by the price mechanism. But
the fact that we have to resort to the substitution of direct regulation by authority
where the conditions for the proper working of competition cannot be created, does
not prove that we should suppress competition where it can be made to function.55.
The government is relegated to the accomplishment of mundane chores like an obedi-
ent disciple in a road to being serfs of market competition: “to prohibit the use of certain
poisonous substances, or to require special precautions in their use, to limit working hours
or to require certain sanitary arrangements.” The provision of an “extensive system of so-
cial services” by the TSP are entirely compatible with competition “so long as the organ-
isation of these services is not designed in such a way that makes competition ineffective
over wide fields,” and only if “the advantages gained are greater than the social costs.”56
Since the market itself, as Wendy Brown notes, becomes the “organizing and regulative
principle of the state and society” the TSP is supposed to become a competitive business
55See (Hayek [1944] 2014, p.40).
56See (Hayek [1944] 2014, p.39).
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entity itself, competing with other similar TSPs for wealth and resource, and subjecting
itself to the game of market driven accumulation, along with the individuals over which
it rules. The legitimacy of the sovereignty of the TSP , is now to be derived only from its
ability to propitiate and increase economic activity and its ability to act as a successful
economic unit in a world market populated by other TSP s. Legitimate authority of the
state should only be evaluated in terms of a narrow concept of economic growth.57 We will
return to the effects of this thinking on the politics of our times. For now, it is sufficient
to note that Hayek’s liberal prescription of the role of state towards the economy is differ-
ent from that of classical liberalism. The state here takes as an active role by instituting
and maintaining market competition rather than passive nonintervention in existing mar-
kets. At the same time, the TSP also seeks to subject its sovereignty to market forces by
enforcing the legal framework that privileges competition and allows pecuniary motives to
be the main driver of distribution of resources. In this sense, the TSP seeks to become a
competitive business entity itself, constantly competing with other TSP s to attract busi-
ness and wealth towards its boundaries, and constantly reformatting its legal system to
serve this purpose of the international market. Thus, the members of the MPS, or what
Miroswski calls the “Neoliberal Thought Collective,”58 universally shared a commitment
to profess a societal transformation where the rule(r) of law protects negative individual
freedoms against collective claims, putatively the most important freedom of all, the right
to buy and sell goods and services without hindrance at market driven prices. The TSP is
charged with enforcing this legal framework compatible with private property and material
gain. In a way, it is sort of a liberalism lite, where the role of the TSP towards positive
aspects of liberty is delegitimized, or positive liberty is seen to be a function of the proper
enforcement of the narrowly defined negative ones. In this limited role, the TSP should
57See (Brown 2015, p.41).
58See (Mirowski & Plehwe 2015).
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also make itself profitable, by withdrawing from spending and orienting itself to compet-
itive accumulation with other TSP s. This form of liberalism can also be called “authori-
tative liberalism” where the TSP ’s role in the protection of negative rights, is emphasized
a priori in an opposition to claim of positive rights, (for example right to livelihood, right
to livable wage, right to education). More importantly within the roster of negative rights
it accords the right to market participation, or rather right to markets where they don’t
exist, a hierarchically superior position.
This thought process is robust enough to be reiterated several times in the histori-
cal narrative available at the MPS website. For example, in the context of 2012 General
meeting (“a glittering affair” in the Prague Castle, hosted by the President of the Czech
Republic, and MPS member Vaclav Klaus) it is noted that, more than two decades after
the disintegration of the Soviet Union
Members had become acutely aware of “liberalism’s manifest inability to translate
its intellectual victories into political victories that seriously roll back the size and
power of the socialist welfare state,” as Feulner had put it. “Ideas,” he had told
the special 50th anniversary gathering in Mont-Pèlerin, “are decisive, but not self-
implementing.” Big government had been discredited intellectually, but government
was still bigger than ever; central planning had been abandoned, but a mass of suf-
focating regulations had filled the interventionist void. Soviet socialism might have
ended, but there were new threats to freedom – and the Prague meeting focused on
the growing politicization, regulation and centralization of the European Union, and
the single European currency that was raising tensions between countries and mak-
ing the post-crash economic adjustment much more difficult.59
We can thus isolate three core principles of neoliberalism that provides answers to the age
old existential questions (Q1-Q3) regarding the relation between sovereign power and com-
merce.
Principle 1 (P1) The TSP should enforce fair market competition and impose market
structures where there is none. The legal framework should be planned and imple-
mented primarily towards this goal of marketization.
59See (Butler 2012, p.22).
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Principle 2 (P2) The TSP should reduce spending by withdrawing from welfare and re-
distribution functions, and must bring in more than it spends.
Principle 3 (P3) The TSP should orient itself to the role of a competitive business entity
which primarily strives towards increasing the rate of accumulation within its bor-
ders, constantly vying with similar other TSP s in a world of markets.
Such a theoretical construct is predicated upon an ideal type model of human behav-
ior. After all, it will be individuals who will compete. Market competition is dependent
on the ideal subject who is required to keep the competition alive by conforming to the
model of rational calculation, advertently or inadvertently striving at all waking moments
to maintain their positive net benefits. The disease of market failure that both Hayek and
Friedman want the state to cure, preferably using the price system, logically arises from
the utility maximizing model of rational behavior that the individuals are assigned to. Re-
counting the history of neoclassical marginal revolution in Economics and its characteriza-
tion of human nature is beyond the scope of this project, but it suffices to say that it sim-
plifies human rationality to only include “market rationality”. The ideal type individual
should only possess pecuniary motivation, or to use Wendy Brown’s phrase “the human
being configured exhaustively as homo oeconomicus”.60 Gary Becker’s understanding of
marriage is an illuminating example:
According to the economic approach, a person decides to marry when the utility ex-
pected from marriage exceeds that expected from remaining single or from additional
search for a more suitable mate. Similarly a married person terminates his (or her)
marriage when the utility anticipated from becoming single or marrying someone else
exceeds the loss of utility from separation...Since many persons are looking for mates,
a market in marriages can be said to exist: every person is trying to do the best he
can, given that everyone else in the marker is trying to do the best they can.61
The rational subjects then look at all aspect of their lives through market rational-
60(Brown 2009, p.40) Also see (Brown 2003).
61See (Becker 1990, p.10).
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ity or behave in a way as if everything should be filtered through a cost benefit calculator.
The legal framework that the activist TSP is supposed to constantly “fine tune” for the
chorus of competition will logically reward this behavioral norm. I argue that taken to its
logical limit, the universal competitive order that neoliberalism envisions and prescribes,
posits an accumulative individual at its center and endows it with moral authority. In the
neoliberal scheme of things comprehending all of life within a network of competition for
scarce resources and behaving in a rational fashion to accumulate is a good thing to do. In
this way, the individual is nothing but a microcosm of the TSP , both are in the service of
the market, both needs to accumulate to be remain legitimate entities in each other’s eyes,
and both need to be protected from each other. In this interpretation of neoliberalism, po-
litical parties wouldn’t, and more importantly, shouldn’t make a difference to the role of
the state. The ideal individual’s rights to participate in competition without impediments,
which the intelligent design of the TSP will protect by deploying an appropriate legal sys-
tem, must be matched with corresponding moral duties to compete in the service of per-
sonal accumulation. It is impossible not to see the similarity of all this to the student Car-
oline, (in Mrs. Marcet’s Conversations on Political Economy from 1817, c.f. Keynes) who
initially in favor of “controlling the expenditure of the rich” conceded and conceives “that
the interest of nations, as well as those of individuals, so far being opposed to each other,
are in perfect unison.” But the moral that Caroline received from the educator is strik-
ingly different from the “accumulation as moral action” that I argue is the true essence of
the MPS synthesis. To Mrs.B. “the superiority of science over mere practical knowledge”
activates “liberal enlarged views” that ”teach us to cherish sentiments of universal benev-
olence towards each other.”62 Such an option of benevolence is not available to “the last
man” at the end of Fukuyama’s history. His motive is still same as that of the TSP but
now they are both endowed with the moral duty to accumulate, or strive for accumula-
62See (Keynes [1926] 2010).
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tion, through engaging in competition with other similar entities. The territorial sovereign
power is just an individual who competes to grow.
How does this normative prescription pan out in the real world? After all, global pol-
itics has undergone tectonic transformation since the first five decades of the of the 20th
century. Fomented by steady decolonization and the spectacular Soviet disintegration,
we live in a fundamentally different world, made unrecognizable, unfathomable, incon-
ceivable to our late nineteenth and early twentieth century thinkers. In the face of new
industrial revolutions in the forces of production through marvels of electronics and com-
putational power, the steady acceleration of world trade in goods and services, and the
tentacular growth and embedding of the power of international institutions displacing the
older imperial orders, what are the practical implications of such an intelligent design that
orients the TSP towards the reification of market sovereignty? Here it is not my inten-
tion to rehearse the ways in which neoliberal thought, after languishing decades in aca-
demic trenches, achieved its political victory in Anglo-American domestic politics by the
Reagan-Thatcher-Right only to be consolidated and furthered by the Clinton-Blair-Left. It
only suffices to note the underlying stability of some new common-sense notions of legit-
imate role of the TSP towards “the economy” fixated in contemporary popular imagina-
tion. Bringing together theoretical works of Timothy Mitchell, Claude Lefort, and Thomas
Blom Hansen I have argued before that the idea of “the economy”63 came to solve the
problem of radical indeterminacy of power in modern nation-states.64 During the gradual
63An objective, asocial, and apolitical space; a natural reality with its own laws to be discovered
through observation and measurement; a space mapped onto the body of each nation-state; a space con-
tinuously represented through popularized measures of worth ,health, growth based on which the nation-
state-economies could be constantly categorized and ordered like one can order and categorize individuals
based on their basic metabolic rates; a space, although amenable to human intervention, normally un-
derstood to be incompatible to ethical judgments since it is like the natural world. See (Mirowski 1989),
(Mitchell 1998), (Walter 2013).
64“The economy” took the position of “the divine” in the sense that, legitimacy of ruling would be
primarily predicated upon the rulers’ ability to nurture and govern the economy instead of the legiti-
macy predicated on divinely ordained powers or divinely ordained imperial powers which marked the ear-
lier political orders. It was a constructed and imagined space that came to occupy the “empty center”
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and worldwide transition from the empire-state-economy system to nation-state-economy
system from 1950s and 1960s, as the idea of the economy (in the sense we understand and
talk about it today) slowly came into being, the appropriate role of TSP was increasingly
seen to be attending and serving the economy of the nation-state. By the early 1990s, for
example, it was completely natural for one to be considered stupid if they didn’t under-
stand that it was “the economy” that is sacrosanct in democratic politics.65 Nowadays it
is common to conceive a world consisting of sovereign nation-states each possessing its own
economy. This conception is represented through, what I call, a numerical and pecuniary
picture of the world. A cornucopia of congealed numerical and monetary estimates which
attempt to specify, among other things, monetary worth of countries statistically recorded,
reported, disseminated, circulated, and ranked by state, transnational, and private enti-
ties. With exponential and astronomical advances in global connectivity there has been a
rapid proliferation of economic data that catalogs the wealth of nations and their peoples.
To modify Timothy Mitchell’s formulation in the context of a globalized world, we live in a
world of perpetual “world exhibitions” where countries exhibit a resume of different aggre-
gate (monetary and non-monetary) quantitative and statistical estimates. These estimates
are of course not value neutral but are imbibed with moral undertones. These numbers be-
come legible only because they serve as indicators to conditions that are to be understood
as good or bad for a NSE. Each measure in the resume of TSP is constantly compared
with that of other resumes, ranked, mapped with distinct color codes, observed through
time. It is only through this constant comparison of the vitals of the economy across time
and space that we provide meaning and life to “dead” data. One could read out a coun-
try from its charts in comparison with other charts and prescribe remedies to better its
which is, as Lefort points out, an ontological problem of political power based on people’s sovereignty. See
(Lefort 1988).
65Those who didn’t want to feel stupid voted for William Clinton for the office of POTUS in 1992
based on his campaign slogan “It is the economy, stupid.”
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numbers. Thus, the comparisons of resumes of national well-being try to validate and per-
petuate a directionality to these statistical estimates such that they are to coincide with,
or fit into the overarching norm of increasing economic power, which is now the moral and
legitimate role of the TSP. This vision of growth is clearly manifested in a “A Neoliberal’s
Manifesto” from 1983 written by one Charles Peters who was the editor of the Washington
Monthly.
If neo-conservatives are liberals who took a critical look at liberalism and decided to
become conservatives, we are liberals who took the same look and decided to retain
our goals but to abandon some of our prejudices. We still believe in liberty and jus-
tice and a fair chance for all, in mercy for the afflicted and help for the down and
out. But we no longer automatically favor unions and big government or oppose
the military and big business. Indeed, in our search for solutions that work, we have
come to distrust all automatic responses, liberal or conservative.66
The piece goes on to claim that neoliberalism’s “primary concerns” are ideas of “commu-
nity, democracy, and prosperity.” and “economic growth is most important now, because
it is essential to almost everything else we want to achieve.” The ideal subject who is the
vehicle of this growth, the “hero” “is the risk-taking entrepreneur who creates new jobs
and better products.” Raghuram Rajan, the governor of the Reserve Bank of India, re-
cently commented “There are so many other things that we can lecture the rest of the
world - cultural achievements, historical achievements etc., but on growth, let us lecture
once we have achieved another 10 years of 8-10 per cent.”67 This expectation for growth
impetus to be provided by the TSP , while remaining within a competitive order has be-
come common sense. Here the divine or scientific harmony (as the case might be) between
private interest and public advantage pointed to laissez-faire. But above all, the ineptitude
of public administrators strongly prejudiced the practical man in favor of laissez-faire - a
sentiment which has by no means disappeared. Following is a representative narrative pro-
duced by Ricardo Hausmann, (who was a minister of planning of Venezuela and teaches
66See (Peters 1983, p.9)[e.a]
67See (TheEconomicTimes 2017).
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in Harvard University) who explains that developing countries can converge with the more
developed ones.
Learning to master new technologies and tasks lies at the heart of the growth pro-
cess. If, while learning, you face competition from those with experience, you will
never live long enough to acquire the experience yourself. This has been the basic
argument behind import-substitution strategies, which use trade barriers as their
main policy instrument. The problem with trade protection is that restricting foreign
competition also means preventing access to inputs and know-how. Participating in
global value chains is an alternative way to learn by doing that is potentially more
powerful than closing markets to foreign competition. It enables a parsimonious ac-
cumulation of productive capabilities by reducing the number of capabilities that
need to be in place in order to get into business. This strategy requires a highly open
trade policy, because it requires sending goods across borders many times. But this
does not imply laissez-faire; on the contrary, it requires activist policies in many ar-
eas, such as education and training, infrastructure, R&D, business promotion, and
the development of links to the global economy. Some dismiss this strategy, arguing
that countries end up merely assembling other people’s stuff. But, as the famous as-
tronomer Carl Sagan once said: If you want to make an apple pie from scratch, you
must first invent the universe. 68
In practice then, P3 translates to the TSP ’s primary role as an accumulative creature
competing with other TSP s in a world of scarce resources. This in turn translated to its
primary role in increasing the economic growth rate measured most popularly by GDP.69
The TSP is tasked with keeping constant records of market transactions of final goods
and services undertaken within its border, including the transactions made by the state
itself. At the same time, the legitimacy of the TSP is derived from its ability to achieve a
progressively high yearly growth rate of the total market value of all final goods and ser-
vices produced the nation-state. The synoptic measure of GDP fixes the status of “the
nation-state-economy” as it enters the common parlance. Within the competitive order
harnessed by neoliberal thought, legitimacy of TSP translates to being, first and fore-
most, an able manager of high GDP growth. Increasingly after the cold war, in the realm
68See (Haussman 2014).
69For detailed treatment of ascent of GDP as a preeminent measure of the national economy see
(Appel 2017). The author notes “Countries that wanted to receive post-war aid under America’s Mar-
shall plan had to produce an estimate of GDP...To be a nation was, in part, to know your GDP.” Also see
(Economist 2016).
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of policy core principles of P1 and P2 are manifested in the form of D-L-P formula (dereg-
ulate, liberalize, privatize) instituted by TSP s, to disembed the liberalism of the Keyne-
sian/centrally planned states. P1 and P2 also indicates the general propensity towards
contracting social expenditures related to aspects of positive individual liberty and expan-
sion of the movement of goods and services across borders by lowering controls on trade.
P3 is realized through the hegemonic status of GDP growth which a world full of TSP
competes to achieves.
2.5 Observations on (In)formal Economy
Before I tease out the contradictions that neoliberal principles run into, in the context of
the informal sector of the economy, it is useful to clarify the concepts of informality. It is
standard in the literature on informality to trace its discovery to Keith Hart’s study of
employment opportunities in 1970s Ghana where he observed:
The distinction between formal and informal income opportunities is based essen-
tially on that between wage-earning and self-employment. The key variable is the
degree of rationalisation of work - that is to say, whether or not labour is recruited
on a permanent and regular basis for fixed rewards. Most enterprises run with some
measure of bureaucracy are amenable to enumeration by surveys, and - as such -
constitute the ’modern sector’ of the urban economy. The remainder - that is, those
who escape enumeration - are variously classified as ’the low-productivity urban sec-
tor’, ’the reserve army of underemployed and unemployed’,’ the urban traditional
sector’, and so on.70
In Hart’s scheme of things informal sector comprised both legal and illegal activities, and
was primarily distinguished from it modern or formal counterpart in terms of a) the ab-
sence of regularized wage relation and b) absence of enumeration. Such a characterization
remains agnostic about the nature and characteristic of regularized wage work in the for-
mal sector. As a representative example of the condition of work and wages in the formal
70See (Hart 1973, p. 68).
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and the informal sector, I think is important to highlight the following two examples. The
first example is from a self-employed worker in the informal service sector and the second
one is a salaried worker in the formal service sector.
A taxi driver, let’s call him Rana, in 1991 worked for a leather factory as a truck
driver hauling leather jackets that were, as he put it, “for fashion shows.” He often used
to get cheated on wages, in some cases he was not sure if there was any overtime pay.
“Whenever they wanted me I’d go, day or night for 55 rupees a day.” He and his cowork-
ers were denied even a 5 rupee / day raise, and the factory, often embroiled with disputes
between labor and management, finally closed in the mid-nineties relocating to Chennai.
Since then, unable to find “a comparable job,” he drives taxis. Due to the recent govern-
ment ban on taxis older than 15 years, the market has become “extremely competitive.”
He thinks “this is long work but the money is better” and “he works for himself,” as long
as ‘malik’ (the owner of the cab) gets his share of 400 per day. “I can work whenever“ he
mentions time and again. In terms of the job itself, the “only problem” even “bigger than
unions,“ is the regular harassment by the police, for example the 50 INR ticket that he got
the other day for wearing slippers while driving, because of a rule that “drivers of public
vehicles must wear shoes.” When I asked Rana about his understanding of a good job, he
plainly said, “there are no good company jobs for people like us.” He is thinking of getting
some contract work through the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, and perhaps after some
years he can become permanent, because of his high-school degree.71
In a different situation72, Rajiv’s father worked in the leather factories in the Park
Circus area, but it closed and he remained on a “no work no payment” for a year. After
‘recovering’ now working in “plumbering[sic] and labor contract.” Rajiv himself was try-
ing to find a job after his undergraduate degree in commerce and was accepted for a sales
71Rana(taxi driver) in discussion with the author, January 10 2010.
72Rajiv (call center worker) in discussion with the author, February 3, 2010.
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representative position for a Reebok Showroom in the big South City Mall in Kolkata.
It was 9-10 hour days for 4500 INR per month, where they deducted 40 INR from ev-
ery paycheck to pay for the Reebok uniform he had to wear at the job. On days leading
up to important festivities he was made to “roam around the mall with a pair of sneak-
ers strung around his neck” as a mode of advertisement. He left the job soon after and is
preparing for statewide exams for government positions, “because of pressure from par-
ents.” But he pointed out that government jobs “are not for everyone” because it requires
“luck, backing, and cash” and “not many government jobs are available.” So, he is now
trying to figure out a career in BPO (call center). The one he works for is a vendor work-
ing for another vendor working for Reliance India and Citi Finance. Here he gets 4500
INR per month after formal deductions of 500 INR. This was not quite a monthly salary,
but rather disbursed at the rate of 150 INR a day, for a six-day work week starting from
4pm and ending at 1am each day. His performance is tied to the call duration, nature of
communication with customers, and mistakes in providing information. The primary goal
is to maximize the volume of calls and reduce call durations (in the first 10 seconds you
must able to understand what the customers problem is). During “high volume” nights
where he takes about 200 calls (25-30 an hour) the manager screams to “wrap up the calls
fast.” Unions are not possible here, because firstly there will be problems (chaap acchhey)
and secondly there is simply no time, “unionizing in these places has no benefit” (koraar
kono maaney nei). He cannot really ask anyone for a raise. For entry level “agents” like
him, high school graduates get a gross salary of 4500 INR a month, college graduate get
5000 INR, and if he becomes a “senior agent” he will make 5500 to 6000 INR per month.
“This is not a real job,” he tells me, “even a daily laborer (matikata lok) makes more than
that” and “you can’t do this for long.” According to his colleagues at the call center about
a third of the people leave. His father has agreed to pay for “a course on costing,” which
will help him in the job market. To him, a good job was definitely a government job, but
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short of that a “private industry” job was good if it was a “high post.” In many ways,
these accounts don’t fall very far from the recounting of the nature of work in American
warehouses or nomadic workers hired by, say, Amazon’s ‘Campforce’ initiative.73 I want to
underscore three critical issues about, a) the perception and experience of what it means
to have a good job, b) the perception of the role of the state in economic life of citizens,
and c) the enterprise and employment approach to the informal economy.
First, my field research demonstrates is the precarious nature of regularized wage re-
lations in the enumerable modern sector. It also shows a general perception in the lack of
“good jobs” in the formal sector that pay better than comparable jobs in the informal sec-
tor. My interviewees didn’t use or were cognizant about the formal/informal dichotomy
and phrases used were “company job” “factory job,” and occasionally among those with
a formal college education “private sector.” In many cases, the formal factory jobs simply
weren’t there any more, as is a familiar result of the logic of capital mobility in a world
of free competition. The own account/self-employed workers also characterized their for-
mal sector work by abysmally low and irregular wages, long hours, and precarious employ-
ment (ease with which one could be fired if they didn’t perform or obey). A cab driver,
after all, is making more money than a call center agent, and both aspire to work for the
government. In fact, of the 50 informal sector workers (40 of them street vendors) I have
interviewed, 38 of them have worked in the formal private sector jobs at some point in
their lives. 12 of them have never worked in the formal sector and were tied to urban-rural
seasonal migrations, spending significant times in agricultural activities beside working
in the informal sector in Kolkata. Since call center and formal retail jobs were identified
and invoked as a viable alternative to their present employment in the informal sector (es-
pecially among people in their twenties) I also interviewed 5 people who had “nominally
formal” jobs where the characteristics of employment was comparable to, (and sometimes
73See for example, (Bruder 2017) and (McClelland 2012).
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perceived as worse than) that of informal work. In all 55 of such interviews, everyone un-
equivocally expressed their aspiration to have (apply for, look for, or want) a government
job over a “company job.” Those who have worked in the formal sector before had no de-
sire to work in those jobs again, not just because of depressed wages, but also due to lack
of leisure and freedom, more importantly lack of dignity (shomman nei). Second, in the
Indian case, this perception that state jobs are the ultimate source of economic better-
ment and stability, and that the state has a direct obligation/mandate to ameliorate the
economic conditions of workers is a commonly held perception. After all there is a con-
stitutional guarantee that (with qualifications) everyone has a right to “life and personal
liberty” and the “freedom to practise any professions, or to carry on an occupation, trade
or business.” These have been a fountain of authority from where the case for the right to
livelihood is made. In a 1986 court case concerning pavement dwellers (who work within
the informal sector) the Supreme court maintained
The question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right
to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The
sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does
not mean, merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by
the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure
established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life an equally important
facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the
means of living, that is, the means of livelihood.74
In subsequent chapters, we will see the ways in which such legal prerogatives are deployed
by the street vendors in shaping state policy, but for now it is important to note the ne-
oliberal mandate of the minimalist state as understood in P3 is creates complication in
the India case. This is view simply corroborated by the overwhelming evidence in the
macro-political realities concerning the informal sector workers. For example,(Agarwala
2013, p.7) has meticulously shown how “Informal Worker in India have launched an inno-
vative labor movement that has nudged an increasingly neoliberal state to open potentially
74c.f. (Azad 2013).
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new paths to state based welfare.” Even the pessimistic predictions that organized class
based politics will wither away in the face of neoliberal policies of the minimalist state,
deindustrialization due to capital mobility, the proliferation of subcontracting and casual
employment in the formal sector, has been proven untrue. Lastly, due to practical need
to distinguish between diverse types of employment within the formal sector, one needs
to treat employment separately from the formal and informal enterprises which escape
the enumeration of the state. In the context of India, “informal” and “unorganized” are
not used interchangeably. Based on the International Conference of Labor Statisticians in
2003 this differentiation is used to distinguish between the employment and sectoral ap-
proaches to informality. In the sectoral sense, that is in the sense of an imagined space
within “the economy,” the Unorganized Sector is comprised of unincorporated private en-
terprises which produce goods and services but do not have a legal personality separate
from the owners, and operates with less than 10 workers. Here enterprise means an active
economic unit that produces goods and services for money or barter. This might involve
self-employed, own account workers, and owners who, working in a proprietary or partner-
ship basis hires employees. Accordingly, enterprises which are in the organized sector, are
“corporations, non-profit institutions, unincorporated enterprises owned by government
units.” The employment approach to informality on the other hand considers the condi-
tions of work, especially in terms of the regulatory mechanisms of labor legislation that
pertains to workers. Hence informal unemployment involves employees whose jobs are
in law or in practice, not subject to national labour legislation, income taxation, so-
cial protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits (advance notice of dis-
missal, severance pay, paid annual or sick leave, etc.) for reasons such as: nondecla-
ration of the jobs or the employees; casual jobs or jobs of a limited short duration;
jobs with hours of work or wages below a specified threshold (e.g. for social security
contributions); employment by unincorporated enterprises or by persons in house-
holds; jobs where the employee’s place of work is outside the premises of the em-
ployer’s enterprise (e.g. outworkers without employment contract); or jobs, for which
labour regulations are not applied, not enforced, or not complied with for any other
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reason.75
The following table 2.1 disaggregates the Indian Economy in terms of employment
and organizational types during the the time period that is relevant to my work.76
2004-2005
Organized Unorganized Total
Formal 32.05 (52) 1.35 (0.3) 33.41 (7.3)
Informal 29.54 (48) 396.66 (99.7) 426.20 (92.7)
Total 61.61(13) 398.01 (87) 459.61 (100)
2011-2012
Formal 37.18 (45.4) 1.39 (0.4) 38.56 (8.1)
Informal 37.18 (45.4) 390.02(99.6) 435.66 (91.9)
Total 81.92 (17.3) 392.31 (82.7) 474.23 (100)
Figures in Millions and (Percentage)
Table 2.1: Employment Type by Sector between 2004-2012
It is astounding to note that, 90 percent of workers are employed informally and less
than a fifth of workers are employed in the organized sector. More importantly we notice
an increase in employment in the organized sector was more informal in nature: between
2005 and 2012 informal employment in the organized sector increased from 48% (of total
employed in the organized sector) to 54.6%. Formalization of enterprises have not led to
higher formal employment in the organized sector.
We are finally in a position to tease out the contradictory tensions that arise in terms
of governing the economy based on the neoliberal principle P1-P3. In India, competitive
markets are everywhere in their text book version of many buyers and many sellers, but
most of the business happens within the unorganized sector. The reality is that the Indian
Economy is primarily informal and yet driven by market competition. Thus, the neoliberal
prescription of achieving high growth rate of GDP(P3), will inevitably face a significant
impediment as the growth rate will be quite logically underestimated as it will fail to enu-
75See (Sengupta 2009).
76Source: (Srija & Shirke 2014, p.41).
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merate and tax the informal economy. The following arguments are representative samples
that advocate formalization for achieving an accurate, higher growth rate.
Given the spread of cellphones, roads and electrification/ automation, productivity
growth has been the most dramatic in the informal side of the economy. For exam-
ple, a casual worker has to find a job every few weeks: a cellphone sharply reduces
the time taken to find the next opportunity, and a road to the village makes remote
jobs more accessible. But if half of the GDP (the informal part) and 90 per cent of
India’s workforce is seeing such dramatic changes, why is this not reflected in GDP
growth? This doesn’t show up in the current GDP statistics because we don’t mea-
sure it. Given the paucity of accurate data on the informal economy that can be col-
lected with reasonable frequency, the national accounts team (that calculates GDP)
uses assumptions and past surveys to estimate its growth. The assumptions for the
most part do not build in productivity improvement: for example, the value added
per worker (say, a carpenter, a plumber) or value added per vehicle (the output of
a truck) are mostly unchanged since 2007. This means GDP growth is likely under-
reported.77
(Farrell 2004) takes a different route to reach the same conclusion:
Academics, development experts, and government officials often assert that informal-
ity will lessen as formal sector grows, or that informality actually serves a social good
by providing employment to people. MGI research, however, doesn’t bear out that
optimism. Around the world, these informal players operate at just half the average
productivity level of formal companies in the same sectors and at a small fraction of
the productivity of the best companies. As a result, informal companies persistently
drag down a country’s overall productivity and standard of living. MGI’s investiga-
tion also found that the substantial cost advantage that informal companies gain by
avoiding taxes and regulations more than offsets their low productivity and small
scale. Competition is therefore distorted because inefficient informal players stay in
business and prevent more productive, formal companies from gaining market share.
Any short-term employment benefits of informality are thus greatly outweighed by
its long-term negative impact on economic growth and job creation.
We can clearly see the tension between a) the TSP ’s imperative to harness legitimacy
by competing with other TSP s for a higher GDP growth (P3) and b) the real ways in
which market competition and capitalism is organized outside the TSP ’s angle of vision.
P3 can be better achieved only by reducing the unorganized sector. Moreover, the neolib-
eral prescription (P2) of reducing the welfare related expenditures and increasing revenue
77See (Mishra 2013).
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logically faces two impediments as a) taxation of the informal economy remains elusive
and hence provides a downward pressure on the revenue (but we will complicate this no-
tion later in the context of street vendors) and b) a tendency to reduce social expenditures
in education, health, and labor logically creates a workforce that will have difficulty in se-
curing high paying, secure formal employment in the organized sector due to lack of cul-
tural and human capital and hence perceives the state to have a moral obligation towards
protecting their informal work or allowing them a government job. Hence, P2 will lead to
an expansion of the unorganized sector which in turn will reduce its revenue. The only fea-
sible way to maintain P2 and P3 will require the TSP to violate P1 in an authoritarian
manner. Increasing GDP growth then must involve formalization of the economy through
large corporate investments (“I” is a component of GDP growth) and oligopolistic com-
petition while resorting to the widespread suppression of free market competition in the
unorganized sector. The pressures of reducing government spending and increasing taxes
in P2 can be maintained by incentivizing such corporate business entities to create formal
spaces of selling (retail chains, call centers, safe economic zones) with informalized employ-
ment. It is not the case that such an anti-market policy of formalization by the TSP leads
to a higher formal employment of erstwhile unorganized sector workers. Quite the con-
trary. The formalized wage relation that is now enumerable and taxable is, in its essence,
informalized employment. The politics of governing the economy in the neoliberal era thus
runs into an unholy trinity of contradictions. As we can see P1, P2, P3 cannot be satis-
fied simultaneously in policy. At most two can hold at a time and not all three (although
this more of a side point, a logical conjecture, rather than a central issue). What I want to
stress is that the neoliberal governance of the economy P1-P3, must confront the presence
of the vast unorganized sector which is already well entrenched in dispersed and localized
ways. The unorganized is well-organized (or as an activist working for a hawkers’ union
in Kolkata sternly yet politely urged me to use ‘self-organized’,) woven into the fabric of
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commercial life through interpersonal, semi-formal networks of trust (and deceit) and re-
sponsive to global/local forces of supply and demand that no one person can control. In
short, the TSP cannot ignore that the “self-organized” sector is an already existing capi-
talist market system based on price signals and competition among agents. In India, con-
fronted with this real-life scenario, governing the (in)formal economy based on neoliberal
principles, leads to its own contradiction in two ways. First, the state, in order to maintain
its commitment to P2 and P3, tries to authoritatively disrupt existing market competi-
tion, in favor of formalization by facilitating corporate investments, thus violating P1. We
hence see puzzling effect of the pro-market states with anti-market policies (small sellers
beaten up in India and around the world). Second, the state cannot wholly disrupt and
formalize the market competition in the unorganized sector because of the nature of real
markets and real market agents who protest. The informal workers (unable or unwilling
to get formal employment in the organized sector), organize themselves to extract eco-
nomic and political concessions from the state thus making it violate P2 (increasing gov-
ernment spending for welfare and redistribution in a time when it is predicted to reduce
such costs). The state then, is also forced to allow market competition in the informal sec-
tor because of (among other things) electoral pressure, thus maintaining its commitment
to P1. Its commitment to high growth rate of GDP (P3) would also have to be somewhat
toned down.
The political economy of street vending in India is a product of these contradictions
inherent within the neoliberal governance of the (in)formal economy. In this context, I
want to highlight three key features to the political economy of informal street vending
in the neoliberal era, that become clear. a) Formalization of informal spaces of selling (for-
malization of the S2 of capital as explained in the introduction) through the marginal-
ization and suppression of competitive and profitable market exchange in the unorga-
nized sector. b) Protracted and powerful contestations between state, informal workers
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over, spaces of selling and questions regarding the freedom and right to sell, which makes
the state ever more entangled with informal markets. c) The informalization of employ-
ment within the formalized spaces of selling, or informalization of previously formal labor.
The following empirical chapters visit these key features of the political economy of urban
street vending in Kolkata between 1990-2010. I study the ways in which state-policies re-
garding the spaces of selling in Kolkata are contested by street vendors, and the ways in
which politics of urban street vending is organized through the interaction of the state,
street vendors, and corporate entities.
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Chapter 3
Politics of Street Vending
3.1 The Lay of the Land
We are now in a position to see how the contradictions within neoliberalism manifests in
reality. I show this by studying the political economy of street vending in Kolkata up until
(the late 1990s) large scale and coordinated eviction drive called Operation Sunshine (OS).
This part of my work helps to set up the stage on which and from which OS type actions
derived their force and justification as India crossed over to the era of neoliberal gover-
nance. Through ethnographic work, primary and secondary documents, and journalistic
reporting, I pay close attention to the relation between competitive markets in the form
of informal urban street vending and the state policies that intend to intervene in urban
spaces of selling. This political conflict between the forces of the informal markets and the
forces of democratic state policy unfolds within the structure of a capitalist mode of pro-
duction, which includes within its logic of profit, not just accumulation, but an immense
dispersion of commodities1 as they are carefully (re)presented to end consumers in the sec-
1For my work by “commodities” I mean finished consumer goods at the retail level. If we are to think
of say a pavement haircut, or a fortune teller with parrots, concept of commodities could also include final
service to the end consumer.
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ond space of capital (S2).2
The act of selling a final commodity (away from the factory or the farm) is a service.
It adds value in terms of convenience, or ease of availability to the consumer. Thus, S2
is a space of final dispersion, where a seller based on his private motive of pecuniary gain
represents the commodity to the consumer in its final consumable form. The commodity
can be represented in its final form as churned out of S1 (be it a mobile phone or a fish)
but the finished commodity can also be represented to the consumer with further value
addition through service (be it an unlocked cellular device or a fried fish with relishes).
Thus, S2 in some ways is the space of simplification of the logistics of dispersion of com-
modities either in their unaltered final (factory) form, or in an altered form achieved by
additional labor input. Seen in this way, retail is a part of the service sector because the
act of selling commodities to the end consumer doesn’t just involve the commodity itself
but also the labor behind the (re)presentation of the commodity. As we have seen, in the
case of India, although S2 is an inextricable part of the capitalist mode of production, the
production process of retailing is not much formalized or mechanized through organized
corporate entities. Most of the retail industry remains in the unorganized sector where the
employment is informal (which is also the case in formal retail). But unorganized retail
still clocks in as the highest employer in the non-agricultural economy, coming up above
real estate.3 The following tables provide snapshots of the nature of employment and en-
terprise in the Indian Economy between 2004 and 2012 with a focus on the service sector
in general and retail in particular.4 I choose this time period because the conflict between
2See Chapter 1
3See (EconomicTimes 2007).
4Data collated from Unit level National sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data adapted from (Srija
& Shirke 2014, p.42). The standard definition that is used by scholars of informality in Indian Economy
comes from (Sengupta 2009, p.3) who defines the unorganized sector as “all unincorporated private en-
terprises owned by individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of goods and services
operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than ten workers.” Informal employment is
defined as “those working in the unorganized enterprises or households, excluding regular workers with
social security benefits, and the workers in the formal sector without any employment/ social security ben-
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2004-2005 Organized Unorganized Total
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Agriculture 0.76 0.99 0.00 56.75 58.50
Manufacturing 1.21 2.10 0.10 8.33 11.73
Construction 0.53 1.45 0.00 4.42 6.41
Services 4.48 1.89 0.19 16.80 23.36
Total 6.98 6.63 0.29 86.30 100.00
2011-2012 Organized Unorganized Total
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Agriculture 0.06 0.16 0.00 48.69 48.91
Manufacturing 1.48 2.79 0.06 8.28 12.60
Construction 0.69 3.77 0.01 7.18 11.65
Services 5.62 2.72 0.22 18.29 26.84
Total 7.48 9.43 0.29 82.43 100.00
Table 3.1: Employment and Enterprise Distribution over Broad Industries(Percentage)
corporate retail and unorganized retail, especially informal street vending becomes a po-
litically charged and salient issue during this time. While the neoliberal imperative of in-
creasing the growth rate (P3) made the case for formalization of retail spaces via corpo-
rate chains, it came directly in conflict with the task of maintaining and instituting more
market competition P1. The street vendors were in the forefront of this conflict, although
some some owners associations also resisted the force of formalization.
As is clear from Table 3.1, the norm of employment in India is overwhelmingly infor-
mal and unorganized. This trend seems to remain robust even after 20 years of liberaliza-
tion. More specifically we can see that, although total employment in the organized sec-
tor has increased by roughly 4%, most of this employment was informal in nature, which
increased by 3% in the organized sector. Formal employment in the organized service sec-
tor (which includes retail, hospitality, education, legal, medical etc.) registered a 1.14%
increase, and during the same time the informal employment in the service sector also
efits provided by the employers.” Although ‘informal’ and ‘unorganized’ can be used interchangeably as
long as we constantly differentiate between sector and employment, enterprise and labor, for the sake of
simplicity I use “informal” for labor/employment, and “unorganized” for business/enterprise.
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showed a modest up-tick of 0.9%. Most of the employment generated in the organized sec-
tor was in construction and were informal in nature. The broader picture of the Indian
economy remains unambiguously dependent on informal employment in unorganized en-
terprises. Particularly, within the S2 or what can be approximated here by the the ser-
vice sector, informal employment in the unorganized sector increased by 1.41%, which is
slightly more than the increase in the formal and organized employment. The trend here
seems to indicate that there is a slight increase in the share of organized sector employ-
ment in services but the nature of employment was equally split between formal and infor-
mal types.
If we narrow our focus specifically on employment in the non-agricultural sector in
general and retail trade in particular Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 provides a more detailed pic-
ture.
2004-2005 2011-2012
Non Agricultural Sector Organized Unorganized Total Organized Unorganized Total
Mining 0.91 0.90 1.82 0.99 0.80 1.79
Manufacturing 9.64 38.28 47.92 13.23 39.26 52.49
Electricity & Water Supply 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.78 0.43 1.21
Construction 5.60 19.35 24.94 16.12 32.80 48.92
Trade, Hotel & Restaurant 1.71 44.30 46.02 2.57 47.60 50.17
Transportation, Storage & Communication 1.35 13.31 14.66 2.31 15.71 18.02
Real Estate & Other Business Activites 0.49 2.93 3.43 1.05 3.96 5.02
Education 2.40 2.75 5.15 3.55 2.75 6.31
Insurance 0.41 0.72 1.13 0.67 1.14 1.81
Health 0.61 1.49 2.10 1.02 1.66 2.68
Public Admin & Defense 1.09 0.08 1.17 1.11 0.00 1.11
Other Services 0.64 11.62 12.26 0.58 13.92 14.50
Total 25.01 135.81 160.83 44.00 160.04 204.03
Table 3.2: Non-Agricultural and Informal Employment in millions
On the whole Table 3.2 reveals that the informal employment in the non-agricultural
sector increased by 27%. Most of that increase was captured by construction, followed
by trade & hospitality, and manufacturing. Informal employment in trade and hospital-
ity (within which retail falls) remained largely within the unorganized sector, - clocking in
96.2% of all informal employment in 2004 and 94.8% in 2012, and employing about a quar-
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Service Sector (2011-2012) Urban F Urban M Rural F Rural M
Retail Trade, except motor vehicles 96.66 97.49 99.36 98.89
Wholesale Trade, except motor vehicles 90.98
Other Services 96.44 92.62 97.32
Hotels and Restaurants 92.97 92.97
Domestic Personnel 98.07
Human Health Services 52.27 62.03
Financial except Insurance & Pension 26.61
Land Transport including Pipelines 83.38 92.85
Business Activities 48.86 58.79
Education 37.39 50.61 60.27 36.19
Public Admin, Defense, Compulsory Social Security 98.07
Table 3.3: Percentage of workers informally employed in Service Sector, by Gender
and Space
ter of the informally employed labor force. Table 3.3 shows the overwhelming presence of
informal employment within the service sector, especially in retail. One can conclude from
these numbers that S2 is unorganized and informal: more than 95 percent of retail trade is
run by millions of unorganized enterprises informally employing millions of workers.
Status 2004-2005 2011-2012
Self Employed
257.16
(60.36)
244.97
(56.22)
Wage/Salaried Labor
36.19
(8.49)
48.79
(11.19)
Casual Worker
132.81
(31.16)
141.91
(32.75)
Total Informal Workforce
426.16
(92.73)
435.66
(91.78)
Table 3.4: Informal Work Force by Status of Employment in millions (Percentage)
Combined with Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 we can infer that a majority of the informal
employment in unorganized retail is composed of self employed workers who are most
likely to have some form secondary education (or below).
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Education Level 2004-2005 2011-2012
Illiterate 22.65 22.97
Below Primary 10.55 10.74
Secondary Education 48.19 48.23
Higher Secondary 7.18 7.72
Diploma/Certificate 2.30 1.46
Graduation or above 9.13 8.88
Table 3.5: Education Level of Informal Workers in the Non-agricultural Sector (Per-
centage)
3.1.1 The Question of Hawkers
In this chapter I focus on a small portion of this vast enterprise of S2, namely the poli-
tics of street vending, or hawking as it is popularly known in Calcutta.5 I am studying the
politics of informal street vending in Calcutta as a tractable empirical referent to demon-
strate the real life consequences of the theoretical contradictions of neoliberal governance.
Similar political contestations in S2, among states, private agents, and corporate capital,
exist in the case of other informal services in the unorganized sector. From cab driving
to house cleaning, selling used books to garbage collection, worldwide conflicts over the
second space of capital is one of the defining features of contemporary global capitalism
and neoliberal management of the economy by the states. One can merely point to the
complexities in markets, governance and rights that have raged worldwide between taxi
drivers, ride sharing corporations, and the state. Or the fight between home sharing web-
sites, hotels, home owners, and the state. Or own account housemaids, big cleaning agen-
cies, and the state. In some cases, corporations themselves have created their own mar-
ketplaces, where prices of goods and services can fluctuate based on surges in supply and
demand, thus coming in conflict with price systems of pre-existing markets negotiated by
trade unions and the state. In some cases, the states have themselves created marketplaces
5The English spelling for the city was officially changed from Calcutta to Kolkata to align it with the
native pronunciation. In this work I use the two spellings interchangeably.
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in the form of special e conomic zones where employment could be informalized by relax-
ation of labor laws that do not apply within the zone. Conflicts over the means and right
to sell in S2 are ensuing all over the world among a) the state b) the profit seeking agents
in the unorganized sector in S2 who are engaged in various forms of informal employment
in a competitive market place, and c) corporate entities that seek to formalize or industri-
alize the spaces of selling while keeping the employment conditions informal and ad-hoc. I
have demonstrated that all such conflicts, where the state seeks to control and thwart the
economic activities of informal sellers in preexisting competitive markets, are manifestation
of the contradictions of the neoliberal statecraft. However, such conflicts in S2 are made
possible (but not determined) by the unimaginable advancements in the material forces of
production through information technologies. The formalization of selling through massive
investment in S2 will after all maintain the growth rate imperative of neoliberal gover-
nance while disrupting competition in pre-existing markets in favor of lesser competitive
environments, - hardly a neoliberal move. More importantly,. I think this is an open-ended
and on-going conflict in S2, where there is no clear winner. As we have seen most of the
employment generated in the formalized portion of S2 is still largely informal in nature.
Moreover, organized resistance of workers against formalization in the unorganized por-
tion of S2 is robust over the long term, and as (Agarwala 2013) and (Anjaria 2016) have
shown, is often effective in making the government deliver resources towards them, at least
in the short term. Finally, even after nearly three decades of neoliberal governance of In-
dian proportions, unorganized retail and informal employment is still the norm rather than
an aberration. A keen observer of the political economy of the developing world couldn’t
be sure that S2 could be so easily industrialized and formalized in the image of large cor-
porations and the trumpeting of the high growth imperative. In this chapter then, I focus
on the following question. How are spaces of selling politically contested in post-colonial
urban spaces like Calcutta? What are their moral arguments regarding the state’s role in
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their daily economic lives? How do hawkers counteract moral arguments against their pro-
fession? How did street vendors negotiate with the state and navigate the state policies
that seek to govern and manage urban spaces of selling before OS?
3.2 Street Vending in Calcutta
The month I reached Calcutta to start my field research, the Transport, Sport and Youth
Services minister Mr. Subhas Chakrabarty (a veteran leader of the Communist Party of
India (Marxist)(CPM), which was the leading party of ruling Left Front Government of
West Bengal), died from cancer in a private hospital. The news of his death was featured
in many prominent international, national and Bengali vernacular media. According to
the reports, supporters and veteran communist colleagues sobbed inconsolably and a par-
ticularly lachrymose6 Secretary of the West Bengal State Committee of CPI(M), Biman
Bose, called the deceased leader “one of the greatest mass leaders in West Bengal.”7 As
customary adulation was showered and a day-long state mourning was declared, sports
clubs lowered their flags, and the CPM party flag was flown at half-mast at the party of-
fice. His funeral procession gathered an overwhelming sea of people caught in such a grief-
ridden public hysteria (to catch the last glimpse of their leader) that even after the iron
gates of the party head-quarters at Alimuddin Street were drawn shut, the State Party
Secretary Mr. Biman Bose struggled to fight off the indomitable force of the crowd. In an-
other occasion when the procession arrived at the Salt Lake Stadium the leaders started
announcing over microphone that the flower garlands should be immediately removed so
that the glass hearse does not shatter. His communist colleagues and notable political ad-
6See (Hindu 2009).
7See (BBC 2009). This characterization of Mr. Chakrabarty was true in a somewhat literal sense
since the party depended on his organizational capabilities in carting masses of supporters from Cal-
cutta and its surrounding districts for huge political rallies organized by the CPM and the Left Front.
See (Anandabazar Patrika 2009c).
87
versaries (namely Mamata Banerjee and Siddhartha Shankar Roy) arrived to pay their
last respect. The former captain of the Indian cricket team, Mr. Saurabh Ganguly, also
paid his tribute. The national award winning actor Mr. Mithun Chakrabarty accompanied
him from his Salt Lake house to the cremation grounds, and the world famous Argentinian
footballer Diego Arvando Maradona sent a message of condolence.8 Over the next week,
obituaries depicted him as a rebellious character, who criticized the party bosses for hav-
ing lost contact with the masses, and once made a religious offering in a famous Kali Tem-
ple in Tarapith.9 About a week after his death, in a memorial meeting, among the various
leading members of the Kolkata’s civil society, the notable personalities who attended were
the Bollywood and Tollywood mega-star Mithun Chakrabarty, the famous singer Usha
Uthup, a former Olympic soccer captain Samar Banerjee, and former Lok Sabha Speaker
Somnath Chatterjee, who on the verge of weeping said “Subhash Chakraborty never dis-
played any pettiness in his life. Not only politics, education, culture, sports, everywhere he
was involved with the masses. Such a personality is rare.” He urged the members of the
party “to carry to a logical conclusion his fight for an exploitation free social order.”10 Mr.
Chakrabarty famously said, as news report reminded us, “I have the ability to implement
whatever I plan, except bringing a dead man to life.”11 In fact the allusion to this idea of
“bringing a dead man alive” hinted at incidents when the party leadership did put him in
charge when it came to matters of dissolving bizarre impasses. (Chatterjee 2004, p.41-46)
mentions that, in 1993 he led the forced extrication of the corpse of a guru (members of
this cult called Santan Dal apparently regarded him as being sympathetic to them) when
his disciples kept the body in a cold room for 51 days, refusing to cremate him, on the as-
sumption he was in a state of samadhi (a kind of spiritual comatose trance) just like was
8See (Anandabazar Patrika 2009a).
9See (Economic Times 2009).
10See (Indian News 2009).
11A number of sources mentioned this quote. See (Anandabazar Patrika 2009b) and (Anandabazar
Patrika 2009c).
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observed in 1967, when he had remained in such a state for 21 days.
3.2.1 Forgetting and Remembering
But, in 2009 the media reports completely failed to recollect that Operation Sunshine was
orchestrated by Subash Chakraborty in 1996 to clean the entire city of hawkers. This in-
cident as we will see, fundamentally transformed the politics of street vending in Kolkata
with worldwide implications. At the time many a Bengali elite came out supporting the
ends, if not the means of the eviction. Such an erasure of a significant event from public
memory, or a display of selective amnesia is according to (Fernandes 2004), symptomatic
of the new liberalizing Indian middle classes that, over the last two decades, have actively
undertaken the “political project of the urban poor and the working classes,” a project
that involves “exclusionary definitions of community and citizenship” producing “visions
of urban development that exclude poor and working class communities.”12 In this case
it was a dual erasure: media’s erasure from the recounting of Subash’s legacy of an evic-
tion event that he spearheaded as resolute way to permanently erase vending from the
city spaces. In face value such a claim makes theoretical sense; after all, the discourses
that posit the neoliberal imperative of high growth (and the people who have formal em-
ployment in the organized “high growth” sector) would construe the everyday scene of a
multitude of “poor” hawkers as a visible impediment to achieving these goals. However,
the overwhelming and ubiquitous visibility of hawkers and other informal working classes
interwoven with the economic and social life of the urban living in cities like Calcutta,
quite viscerally intrudes the project of forgetting. Exclusion is never complete without
the continued silence of the excluded voice: how can one be out of mind if they are con-
stantly in sight and clearly audible. Consequently, a couple of months into my fieldwork
12The liberalizing middle classes hear mainly points to the largely urban political elite, or what
(Chatterjee 2004) has called the de-facto civil society. In the context of my work could be understood as
people who have formal employment in organized sectors.
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in Kolkata, on 24th November 2009,13 the leader of the largest Hawkers’ Union in Kolkata
called Hawker Sangram Committee (HSC), Shaktiman Ghosh, rose to a podium reminding
a large crowd of street vendors, union activists, police, and onlookers that
At the dead of night on 24th November 1996, when operation sunshine happened,
since then Hawker Sangram Committee has continuously protested against police
torture and the CPI(M) cadres, couldn’t remove us. We did not give up one inch of
our land (jomi).
The meeting itself was held as an anniversary protest organized by HSC on the 24th
of November. Speaker after speaker in Bengali and Hindi reminded the public over echo-
ing loud speakers about their ongoing struggles, and their future demands. Each speaker
reminded the audience of the city wide Hawkers eviction in the winter of 1996, as a trans-
formative point in the politics of street vending. Medha Patekar, who was introduced by
Shaktiman Ghosh as a long-time supporter and friend of the movement, spoke in Hindi.
She criticized the government’s dishonesty with the street vendors, saying
The West Bengal Government in some ways are going to cheat the hawkers again
and this tendency that I have seen since 1996 ends in clashes (sangharsh). Just like
when the peasant revolts in Nandigram and Singur, are heard in Lalgarh, similarly
since 1996 we have made this into a growing peoples’ movement (jana andolan) and
we want to see to it that it yields results.
The political economy of unorganized urban retail in Kolkata, and the political contesta-
tion over postcolonial urban spaces of selling in the neoliberal era could be meaningfully
analyzed by tracing these opposing forces or processes of forgetting and remembering.
The project of forgetting involves the discourses surrounding the need to remove hawk-
ers from public spaces (like side-walks or railway stations) for the efficient circulation of
capital and labor in the organized sector, harnessed by people with formal employment.
The force part of the project of forgetting comes in the form of coordinated state actions
like OS. On the opposing hand, the project of remembering is the activism literature that
13Translated from the live recording of protest gathering in front of Kolkata Municipal Corporation
office on 24th November 2009.
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the unions and other little magazines generate and distribute. Unfortunately, but not sur-
prisingly, there is a paucity of basic qualitative and quantitative data by state agencies on
informal workers.14
3.2.2 Political and Civil Societies
At this point, it will be helpful to place this constant tussle between the projects of era-
sure and presence within a broader conceptual framework of “civil society” and “politi-
cal society” as theorized by Partha Chatterjee in The Politics of the Governed. He argues
that the nature of Indian democratic politics could be understood by differentiating be-
tween a) domains of rightful and legitimate citizenship or civil society (“a line connecting
civil society to the nation-state founded on popular sovereignty and granting equal rights
to citizens”), and (b) the domains of welfare governance or political society (“the line con-
necting populations to governmental agencies pursuing multiple policies of security and
welfare”). Although constitutionally every member of the society is de jure an equal citi-
zen with inalienable freedom and rights,15 de facto, however the civil society in India “as
an existing arena of institutions and practices [is] inhabited by a relatively small section
of the people whose social locations can be identified with a fair degree of clarity.” In my
context this could be understood as the members of the organized economy with formal
employment relations, people with suits and swipe cards. According to (Chatterjee 2004,
p.38) in reality, most Indian citizens are not a member of this civil society proper, but are
only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens
in the sense imagined by the constitution. They are not, therefore, proper members
of civil society and are not regarded as such by the institutions of the state. But it is
14Scholars who work in this field face this persistent lack of official data. See for example (Agarwala
2013, p.5) also makes this point. More specific to street vendors in Kolkata, (Bandyopadhyay 2009, p.116)
writes “though hawking is an everyday phenomenon and hawkers represent one of the largest, more or-
ganised, and perhaps, more militant sectors within the informal economy, the academic literature on the
subject is virtually non-existent.”
15I say this with reservations, for example, marriage equality is absent in India.
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not as though they are outside the reach of the state or even excluded from the do-
main of politics. As populations within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, they
have to be both looked after and controlled by various governmental agencies.
The states’ management of welfare and security (important aspect of P2 in my scheme
of things) through enumeration, classification, and economic analysis of populations and
their activities, according to Chatterjee brings these populations
into a certain political relationship with the state. But this relationship does not
always conform to what is envisaged in the constitutional depiction of the relation
between the state and members of civil society. Yet these are without doubt political
relations that may have acquired, in specific historically defined contexts, a widely
recognized systematic character, and perhaps even certain conventionally recognized
ethical norms, even if sub-ject to varying degrees of contestation.
In their dealings with the state especially in terms of the state’s governance of econ-
omy and social welfare of populations, these members of the political society,(Chatterjee
2004, p.40) argues
transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work. They may live
in illegal squatter settlements, make illegal use of water or electricity, travel with-
out tickets in public transport. In dealing with them, the authorities cannot treat
them on the same footing as other civic associations following more legitimate social
pursuits. Yet state agencies and nongovernmental organizations cannot ignore them
either, since they are among thousands of similar associations representing groups of
population whose very livelihood or habitation involve violation of the law. These
agencies therefore deal with these associations not as bodies of citizens but as conve-
nient instruments for the administration of welfare to marginal and underprivileged
population groups.
Members of the political society definitely accept their illegal and un-civic ways of
living, “but they make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a matter of right,” and
are always willing to be relocated. The state, on the other hand cannot completely shirk
its role in providing welfare, and has to acknowledge the legitimacy of such exhortations
made by the poor,
but those claims could not be regarded as justiciable rights since the state did not
have the means to deliver those benefits to the entire population of the country. To
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treat those claims as rights would only invite further violation of public property and
civic laws.
The bargaining process that ensues between the members of the political society and
the agents of the state (who are presumably members of the civil society as well) com-
prises of “constantly shifting compromise between the normative values of modernity and
the moral assertion of popular demands”. The essence of democratic politics in India ac-
cording to (Chatterjee 2004, p.41) involves
on the one hand, governmental agencies have a public obligation to look after the
poor and the underprivileged and, on the other, particular population groups receive
attention from those agencies according to calculations of political expediency.
Democratic politics in capitalist nation-states like India then, are to be evaluated
through this bifocal lens: one positioned towards a civil society properly ensconced within
the “high ground of modernity” that is “restricted to a small section of culturally equipped
citizens” conforming to “the constitutional model of the state.” The second lens reveals
the practical ways in which the “governmental agencies” of the state have to engage with
the poor member of the political society “in order to renew [the government’s] legitimacy
as providers of well-being” because after all the poor “often make instrumental use of the
fact that they can vote in elections.” Because of this negotiation, the state has to con-
stantly “descend from that high ground” of “the normative values of modernity” pertain-
ing to civilized citizenship, to broker compromises “with the moral assertions of popular
demands.”16 We can thus reconcile the conflicting projects of forgetting and remembering
that I laid out earlier, with the conceptual framework of the civil and political society. For
16One can definitely make the same distinction between de facto and de jure citizenship in the devel-
oped world. The anxieties of immigration of Muslim refugees putting a burden on the welfare provisions
of European states, the economic conditions of Algerian French in urban spaces which the US pundits of-
ten portray as “no-go zones,” the mass social movements exposing de facto discrimination against African
American and Latinos in the U.S., are clear examples of this distinction between the normative and de-
viant citizen. One might argue the conceptual differentiation between the political and civil societies could
hold for all capitalist democracies where the state plays a significant role in economic welfare, the differ-
ence is in scale and not substance.
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all practical purposes of classification, our street vendors are members of the latter group.
While negotiating control over urban spaces of selling as a means to lead a less precari-
ous life, the vendors indeed “transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and
work.” The state actors and political parties on their part, unable to ignore their presence
or deny their “claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a matter of right,” often capitu-
late to their dissent and/or exploit the fuzzy legalities of their economic endeavors. Reluc-
tantly, from time to time, the civil society and the state thus extends extralegal/informal
concessions for political edge or pecuniary gains. In this light we can suggest that the po-
litical society is also continuously preoccupied with the “project of remembering” by re-
formulating it at a conflictual or counter-hegemonic angle to the “project of forgetting”
propitiated by the state and the culturally equipped civil society. What is the content and
nature of conflict between these two oppositional projects? How do street vendors negoti-
ate and justify their legitimacy? What are the ways in which they express their demands?
What ethical, moral or ideological arguments do the street vendors and their allies use to
portray their dissent as rightful?
3.3 Contours of Conflict
Ajay,17 who has been selling bags from 1985, reminded me of the ad hoc and whimsical
nature of negotiation and interactions with the state, since he started business at the Gari-
ahat Junction, a meeting point of four important arterial roads in South Kolkata.
When we came here there were stalls all over Gariahat, we couldn’t get a stall, we
came much after the stalls were in place. So, we started doing business within fifty
feet of junction. At that time often police will lodge a case, called “petty case,” then
we were arrested and taken to court the next day and there was a 5 rupees fine. But
the “harassment” was much more, we were made to stay in the precinct (thana).
The next day we were taken to the court and bailed (jaamin er bishoyta chhilo).
17Ajay (street vendor) interview by author, January 10, 2010.
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He was one of the 93 late arrivals in 1985 after the area was already populated by a
lot of unorganized retail shops. They often banded together (oikyoboddho bhabey) and
went to different political parties. None of the political parties wanted to associate with
them in any meaningful way (amader shathey jukto hotey chaini). Many have come to
‘utilize’ them, and many have taken money (textitpoishao foishao niyechhen onekey). But
nothing came of it.
The only thing that we wanted is that our place is secure and that we can sit in
peace, and that we don’t face “police torture,” which no association could help us
with. (kono shon-gothoni shebhabey shahajyo kortey pareni). So till 1996, we kept
on like this, with a somewhat “negotiation” with the police that they can write us
up (apnara case korun) but only in exchange of money (kintu poishar binomoye ko-
run) so that we were not made to do the “night-stay.” So, the police also came to
somewhat of an understanding (onarao motamoti ekta jaygai ashen) where they took
a little more than the “case money” but wouldn’t have to “night-stay.” Sometimes
they will take away all the goods but will return them the next day. This is how
things went on till 1996.
Ajay told me that sometimes the police will have to violate their informal negotiations
because of pressures from above (‘government’ and ‘corporation’) and will often ‘heckle’
them or ‘arrest’ them, so they protested (andolan korechhi) and vandalized the precincts
(thana bhangchur korechhi) because they had to do it for survival (payter sharthey). The
benefits they demanded were communal benefits pertaining to humane conditions of work,
that all hawkers could access. Another seller of ready-made garments called Amir18 put it
simply
Now we are in the waters, no one really wants to think about us. We have no pro-
vision for water, electricity, or sanitation. We go here and there to meet our basic
needs while selling. You saw how we sell, birds are defecating on my things. Can you
stand in that sun for three to four hours in summer? You will fall sick. But we are
not allowed to put a plastic covering on the structure because of pollution. All we
want is a ‘systematic formula,’ where we can sell in peace.
All the 40 street hawkers that I interviewed in depth, when confronted with the is-
18Amir(street vendor) interview by author, December 9, 2009
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sue of the role of government, did not couch their demands in terms of monetary transfers
from the government. In fact, there was a general acceptance that the government can-
not provide them direct monetary benefits. None of them have ever received any govern-
ment transfers related to their informal work, or has heard of any programs or schemes
that have afforded them cash gain. The demands were simply and ubiquitously expressed
in terms of their struggle to gain and maintain the freedom to participate in the market
as profit seeking agents, without unreasonable interference from the state and “the pub-
lic” (which is the South Asian colloquialism for civil society). All of them also adamantly
denied they are doing anything illegal, although hawking is technically illegal, since the
Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act of 1980, doesn’t allow any form of street vending.19
Raju,20 who had been selling leather bags in Gariahat before and after Operation sun-
shine, put it this way.
I have made a card in employment exchange 10 to 15 years ago, nothing happened.,
We can’t become a burglar or a thief, after we have appropriate education. Maybe I
couldn’t secure ‘hi-fi results,’ because we had to study under conditions of poverty/need
(obhab onoton). So now that I am selling on the street, is making-do illegal (kore
khaoa ki beyaini)?
In their self-articulation members of the political society do make demands from the
state, but the demands are primarily directed towards attaining the capability to carry
on their business with dignity. Many of them identified a regularized method, a “system”
where they have the right to sell like any other members of the civil society. It is true
they have to negotiate with government and non-governmental agencies and actors. By
all means, these street vendors are, to reiterate Chatterjee’s words “only tenuously, and
even then, ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by
the constitution.”21
19(Bhowmik 2001).
20Raju(street vendor) interview by author, October 17, 2009
21It is true they transgress the law that forbids selling (even though they forcefully disagree it is “ille-
gal” in spirit, often mentioning their educational backgrounds) and they do provide their moral justifica-
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However my interviews necessitate some further theoretical modifications to the poli-
tics of being governed. The nature of argumentation or the vendors’ reasoning behind the
justification of their presence in the public spaces, fell squarely within “a line connecting
civil society to the nation-state founded on popular sovereignty and granting equal rights
to citizens.” Vendors explained the source of ethical content of their dissent by stressing
ideas of dignified humane conditions for carrying on their livelihood and access to equal
rights to business. At a higher level of magnification, which the interviews provide, the
members of the political society, are “culturally equipped” to register and expand, even if
in an abstract way “the constitutional model of the state” and their position within them
as rightful participants in the market. The circumstance of poverty and being a subject
of governance and control by the state and governmental agencies does not erode the pre-
conceived notion of a fundamental equality that is fixated in popular prejudice. This sense
of belonging to the civil society, while experientially being a part of political society, an-
imates the project of remembering, against exclusionary push backs. In the case of the
street vendors, the political society in a way hijacks the civil society by adopting its lan-
guage of equality and modes of operation, such as forming free associations, and filing de-
positions and court documents. It is a population subject to enumeration and control (al-
though governmental agencies don’t collect or archive information about street vendors)
but the street vendors derive the “moral assertion of popular demands” through the lan-
guage of the “normative values of modernity.” It is also important to note that the street
vendors didn’t seek to leverage their right to livelihood claims by making “instrumental
use of the fact that they can vote in elections,” (most of them couldn’t vote for local gov-
ernments that regulate their workplaces22) but “in order to renew legitimacy as providers
tion through arguments of livelihood as a matter of right. The state, especially the police, doesn’t treat
hawkers the way they would treat other members of the civil society. But having forced to acknowledge
the presence of hawkers everywhere the state is forced to make certain concessions in lieu of cash.
22Also See (Bandyopadhyay 2016)
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of well-being” they expect the government to treat and govern their profession according
to norms of the civil society. Also, far from accepting that their ways are un-civic or il-
legal, their intention is to build a counter-hegemonic project of remembering, where, by
making arguments within the normative framework of civil citizenship, and by deploying
those arguments against the “civil society” discourses of exclusion, they want to legalize
their access to the market just like other members of the civil society. To extend Chatter-
jee’s analysis, we can see how, in the struggle over spaces of selling, the political society
disrupts the civil society through its project of remembering. In my case of informal street
vendors, “politics of the governed” is not just about being governed, but to actively gov-
ern/shape the terms of that governance in accordance with standards that are applied to
members of the civil society, based on arguments fabricated and bolstered within the dis-
courses of equality and citizenship that are firmly entrenched in civil society. As a method,
the street vendors ally with culturally equipped sympathetic members of the civil society
who articulate their ideas to other members of the civil society. The “civil society” argu-
ments of illegal encroachment of public space are often turned on their head and deployed
against the members of the civil society to expose a sort of a middle class hypocrisy. For
example, towards the end of the protest gathering to remember OS, a question answer ses-
sion was arranged with the press. A member of the press asked the activist leader Medha
Patekar about her position on a standard argument that has been continuing for ages.
We are seeing there are a lot of road accident these days because there is hardly any
place to walk...like you claim that vendors have the civil right to sell but the pedes-
trians also have a right to walk, but in many places we see there is no place to walk.
What do you have to say about this issue?
“I completely agree,” Medha replied, “we have been noting this conflict where the right to
do business is coming up against the walker rights.” Then she proceeded to offer a counter-
hegemonic idea, where the civil society arguments of accidents and lack of space to walk,
(which often serves as the logic behind the project exclusion and forgetting) was turned
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against itself, where equally plausible sources of lack of space was located within the very
consumption habits of the civil society itself.
So I see, for every private vehicle three spaces are generally reserved, one, when the
car will come to the house there has to be an empty space in front of the house, an-
other, there has to be space to park in front of the office, and then, when it is on the
road there has to be that much space as well. Each month hundreds and thousands
of new cars are coming to big cities, and in order to ‘favor’ the industries and their
‘profits’ agenda, in the name of building ‘infrastructure’ the government (sarkar)
is just building only one type of ‘infra-structure’...We are claiming that in spaces
of public transport, whether it be bus or railway stations, there must be separate
spaces of selling, and state should be a part of that initiative. As long as spaces re-
served for private vehicles will grow, we can compare that to how much space hawk-
ers have. Then we also have to ask how much space are the shopping malls and the
McDonalds are asking for and how much space they are getting?
Here the argument of right to space for walking, which is constantly used as a justifi-
cation behind the exclusion of hawkers from urban space, is turned on its head, by ques-
tioning the legitimacy of other forms of space-hogging activities that the members of the
civil society depend on to carry on their livelihoods. This stance pushes the members of
the civil society to an uncomfortable moral position where, if they resist the market activ-
ities of the members of political society, logically they also have to undermine and criticize
their own forms of “normalized” or legitimate activities. The project of exclusion based
on the negative rights to space (ability to walk without hawker encroachment) can only be
justified now if the arguer privileges the car owner’s right to space over that of the hawk-
ers, especially when both are occupying space to secure their respective livelihoods. The
implication is that the “right to walk” brigade should complain about car owners too, be-
cause after all, if all men are equal, then what moral basis does the civil society have to
treat the hawkers’ encroachment worse than that of the car owners’?
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3.3.1 Arguments Against Exclusion
To counter the arguments within the project of exclusion involving negative rights (say
pollution, hygiene, or safety), the hawkers and their interlocutors identify a similar and
more damaging activity common among the civil society and ask why one’s negative ex-
ternality is better than the other’s. Or why one’s ability to act freely without hindrance
should not be equally applied? In this way, arguments of rights to clean environment are
countered with massive amounts of hot air pumped out by industrial air conditioners in
shopping malls. Right to eat food without contamination is countered with the news of
sickness caused by eating in restaurant chains, or by pointing out that inside their closed
doors many restaurants have ghastly kitchens, and that, at least in the case of street ven-
dors, everything is on display. Such arguments make sense only if one presupposes the con-
stitutional, normative framework that connects the civil society and the state, namely the
equal moral worth of all citizens and state’s obligation to protect negative rights in equal
fashion. The members of the political society and their allies base their politics on a con-
viction, a self-evident truth, that juridically the street vendors are already part of the civil
society. The political society thus anchors their ideas of justified struggle over spaces of
selling, against the ideas of exclusion led by the civil society, on the bedrock principles of
civil society itself, namely equal application of negative rights. In short, they refuse to con-
cede their profession is any less legitimate or any more harmful than other jobs and activ-
ities in the civil society. Condition of poverty, or lack of access to formal employment in
the organized sector, indeed brings the street vendors in “a certain political relationship”
with the state. But that relationship, in spite of its differences with those that exist be-
tween the members of the civil society and the state, is ultimately cultivated to extract de
jure and de facto legitimacy of spaces of selling and the profession of street vending.
These arguments used in the project of remembering exposes the contradictions of
the negative rights approaches that argues against the profession of street vending. An
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analysis of the ideational conflicts over the spaces of selling will not be complete without
a proper treatment of the positive rights arguments used against the forces of forgetting.
Here the arguments stem from a conviction among street vendors that they have a right to
realize their human potential by having control over their means of production, and hence
their means of livelihood. They are unfree to the extent they are not able to use their la-
bor in their own interests, and are being made incapable of self-determination. Arguments
regarding the equality of access to the means of livelihood, or equal capability of partici-
pating in markets for earning income, or the equal right to labor in one’s own interest is
woven into the discourse of positive rights. In all my interviews with the street vendors
and other informal sector workers this aspect of positive rights in the conflict over S2 was
repeatedly underscored. As Amal23 mentioned in a long discussion under a soft soaking
winter sun, while his partner oversaw his stall of bags.
Have we protested and fought but at different levels of government we have also
started a discussion, we have even petitioned the prime minister in Delhi, that those
of us who are engaged in “hawkery” in India, what you are seeing directly are us but
that is not all, that includes other small distributers, manufacturers and their fami-
lies, and our laborers and employees (karmachari). If you take all, this about 20% of
people in India are related to “hawkery” profession. This number you cannot ignore.
They are all dependent on us, and everyone has to make a living form the market
(shobai key to marketey korey khete hobey).
Binoy24 has been selling tea and other snacks in an improvised ramshackle stall on a busy
thoroughfare for over a decade. He decided to move to Kolkata after his job as a can-
teen manager vanished from the Durgapur steel plant as it decided to retrench in the late
1980s, and he was in his 50s without a job. Family connections eventually led him to seek
employment in South Kolkata. After going through various employment agencies, whose
promise for dignified work in lieu of cash appeared to him as a scheme for swindling vul-
nerable job seekers, and after being almost conned by a middle man (dalal), he finally de-
23Amal (street vendor) interview by author, December 15 2009
24Binoy (street vendor) interview by author, January 13 2009
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cided to open a tea and snacks stall on a pavement in front of the gates of an apartment
complex that houses government employees and their families. Our discussion eventually
arrived at the issue of encroachment, or what is pejoratively called “claiming the footpath”
(footpath dokhol) by civil society organizations that resist vending. I asked Binoy what he
thought about pavements (footpath) being taken over by hawkers. He wanted to clarify if
he can talk from a personal standpoint (byaktigoto bhabey boltey pari? ). He said
All this people, now India is full of unemployed people, what I say is, even if some
find it a little difficult to walk, they should adjust a little keeping in mind that some-
one else is also making a living (korey khachhey). That is how it should be in a civ-
ilized society (shobhyo shomaj ), but we don’t live in a civilized society. In America
or Russia, where low class people are less, or like in Bombay, if you throw a cigarette
on the foot path, or get out through a wrong door of the bus, there is a “spot fine.”
But here people barely make a daily living (din aney din khaaye), and are dying of
hunger. So now if someone is conducting “business” on the footpath, and because
by doing so they can feed themselves, then no one needs to complain. You have ac-
cepted it, I have accepted it, many people have accepted it, then what is the prob-
lem with street vending? And walkers who complain are “high standard,” so they
should walk with perhaps a little bit of difficulty. It’s not that someone is hurting
them or cursing them. You behave according to the place you live in (jashmin deshey
jodachar). For example, when I lived in the village I wore a lungi and a towel, and
now in the city I wear pants and shirts. From the government what I want is to en-
sure my safety and security, end the harassment and all these threats of breaking up
stalls and eviction. And understand that the main thing is provision of employment.
Finally, excerpts from a letter written in 2002 by the general secretary of HSC to the
Chief Minister of West Bengal, sums up the argumentation on positive rights in a concise
way.25
Sir, as you know, our governing system has failed to provide a path to employment
even after 55 years since independence. Among all the aimless people who have come
to rely on self-reliance hawkery is one of the most important professions. As new
industries have failed to keep up with the rising unemployment there is no job cre-
ation. Globalization, liberalization and privatization has led to closed factories, lay-
offs, lockouts, and firing of workers. This has increased the number of jobless contin-
uously. In this socio-economic context hawkery is the humble way to make an hon-
est living, and it provides income to a lot of families that rely on the hawkers and
their trade. In this context of intense joblessness, lack of work due to closed facto-
25HSC’s unarchived collection of primary documents, in author’s possession.
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ries, and lack of year-long work in village and suburban areas, I urge you to think
about the livelihood and existence of hawkers and those who depend on them and in
order to keep alive this alternative economy for the lower classes (nimnobityer bikolpo
orthoniti), just beside the markets of the rich (bodoloker bajaarer pashapashi) allow
these spontaneous moving markets.
Through these narratives, that expose the nature of ideational conflicts over S2, it is easy
to discern not merely the exhortation for providing safety and security of the profession
and the professionals (expressed in terms of negative liberty), but it is forcefully a capabil-
ity argument as well, where freedom is understood not just in terms of being able to sell,
but also in terms of being capable of making a living by depending on the market forces.
Throughout the 1980s, in multiple cases involving hawkers and slum dwellers, the Supreme
Court, while allowing the state to regulate, have consistently maintained the constitution-
ally guaranteed positive right to livelihood. Most cited among them is the case of Sodhan
Singh, a garment seller from New Delhi. Upon eviction by the municipal corporation his
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) appeal to the Supreme Court of India contested the con-
stitutionality of such an eviction. The plaintiff argued that such an action violates Article
19(1)g of the Indian constitution, which guarantees a citizen the right to carry on business
or trade. In a landmark 1989 judgment on street vending the Court held26
If properly regulated according to the exigency of the circumstances, the small traders
on the sidewalks can considerably add to the comfort and convenience of the gen-
eral public, by making available ordinary articles of everyday use for a comparatively
lesser price. An ordinary person, not very affluent, while hurrying towards his home
after a day’s work can pick up these articles without going out of his way to find a
regular market. The right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1)g
of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated cannot be denied on
the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or re-passing and no
other use.
26Supreme Court of India, Judgment in Sodhan Singh vs NDMC, 1989. c.f. (Bhowmik 2003, p.1544).
103
3.3.2 Analysis of Conflict and Market Society
Based on this evidence, several observations on the capability arguments characteristically
different from those of safety and security can be derived. First, both the judgment and
the letter quoted above stress the pertinent and positive role of hawkers in sustaining the
survival of many more families through upward and downward economic linkages. By de-
manding what is to be sold to the end consumer hawkery generates circulation of capital
and labor in S1 and S2, and the livelihoods of “those who depend on them.” At the same
time by supplying end consumers with goods and services it augments “the comfort and
convenience of the general public” by providing competitive prices or to use the court’s
words “comparatively low prices.” Here is a realist emphasis on the parallel universes of
economies within “the economy,” namely, as the letter suggests, “the alternative econ-
omy of the lower classes.” Consequently, there exists, to use the Court’s nomenclature, a
diversity of markets: informal retail for the ordinary and the regular markets supplying
the affluent. This form of argumentation questions the hegemony of the economic growth
narrative and draws attention to the nature or composition of economic growth by imag-
ining the economy through the lens of market competition and circulation of capital that
arises out of the real ways people earn their livelihoods. The economy is not the abstract
national entity encapsulated within a synoptic GDP figure, but rather it is a product of
the actual ways in which people earn a living by participating in the variegated, local,
and competitive markets that provides the cornucopia of capitalism’s products to people
of different economic classes. It is not the way the economy is imagined but the way it
is lived. Second, this idea of the economy as a product of the collective economies of be-
ings eking out livelihoods, rather than a rapidly increasing total market value of all goods
and services, provides the logic of criticism where the state’s legitimate role in improving
the economy is called into question. How can a state claim to improve its economy, if the
policies are directly hurting the massive competitive private enterprise of selling goods in
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markets of capitalism? Within the project of remembering, the (elected and unelected)
agents of the state are called upon to perform their role in improving the economy by not
destroying the livelihood of millions of workers who depends on street vendors and pro-
moting the positive role that street vendors play in capitalism. Third, this is also a de-
mand on the state to be appropriately neoliberal and fulfill its role to promote and protect
market competition (P3) because it alludes to the competitiveness of informal retail and
its benefits to consumers in terms of a more consumer surplus for a lesser price. After all,
the hawkers are also making and helping make livelihoods. Street vendors are actively par-
ticipating in the circulation of capital within neoliberalism’s much haloed system of price
signals and selfish human behavior, as much as participants of affluent markets. To put
it succinctly, the argument is not that the state is being pro-market, but the state is not
being pro-market enough. In other words, it is not that the state is being too neoliberal,
but the state is not truly neoliberal, because they are hurting competitive private enter-
prise. (Agarwala 2013, p.7) makes the point that workers in the unorganized have success-
fully organized to elicit social safety net expenditures from the state namely in the form
of Unorganized Sector Workers’ Social Security Bill (2002) which provide informal work-
ers with life, disability, health, and old age insurance. While this is true, the reality on the
ground three years after the passage of the bill was very different. None of the hawkers in
Kolkata had obtained any benefits, haven’t heard about this bill, and did not show any
hope or interest in such a scheme. In fact, a seller of coconut water insisted that I was get-
ting things mixed up. A seller of fresh fruits nonchalantly waved his hands- “many such
‘schemes’ come and go, ultimately nothing happens.” What my fieldwork reveals clearly
however is that the main motivation behind the organization of hawkers is not to exact or
expect any welfare expenditures from the government, but primarily to earn the right to
participate in markets without disruption.
This brings me to the final and most important observation about the nature of ide-
105
ological contestation over urban spaces by hawkers. In the end analysis the focus of re-
sistance among street vendors, as expressed in their own words, involves their ability to
participate in markets of profitable exchange. Repeatedly and posthumously doing busi-
ness and making money without disruption was the fight they thought they were in. Their
very need to sell in markets, or their imperative to make their livelihoods as unorganized
urban retailers, was in turn expressed in terms of their absolute dependence on markets.
Unlike the members of the civil society with formal employment contracts that cushion
them from the vicissitudes of capitalist competition (like unemployment benefits and sick-
leaves) the hawkers understood that they are completely dependent on a capitalist money
economy. This was the cornerstone argument that hawkers repeatedly invoked to imbue
the project of remembering with its moral legitimacy. This is where we can extend Chat-
terjee’s formulation of political society its logical conclusion. Like all members of the po-
litical society, politics of informal retailers, is the struggle for the means to sell final com-
modities/services to end consumers, because their livelihood fundamentally depends on
these everyday monetary transactions. Unlike members of the civil society who have for-
mal employments that shield them from the vagaries of market volatility, the political so-
cieties dependence on the market forces is more visceral, acute, and fundamental. To use
Chatterjee’s words, “their livelihood and habitation involve violation of the law” precisely
because they must depend on a capitalist market economy more viscerally than formal em-
ployment arrangements. “They make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a matter
of right” because their sustenance depends on their ability to sell their products and ser-
vices in markets, but more importantly they are more exposed to the market forces of cap-
italism without the safety nets enjoyed by members of the civil society. In a way then, po-
litical society should be more appropriately conceptualized as a market society because its
“tenuously right bearing” members and their economic activities that “bring these popu-
lations into a certain political relationship with the state” is ultimately a function of their
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compulsive dependence on the materialist conditions of market access and their ability to
accrue livelihood through profitable competitive enterprises in a capitalist system. The
fundamental difference between the “politics emerging out of the developmental policies
of government aimed at specific population groups,” (hawkers in our case) and the pol-
itics of “culturally equipped citizens” is that the former is not shielded by the securities
of formal employment, and hence is much more exposed to the vagaries of market failures
and its “system of prices signals.” No doubt then, the politics of the market society is to
resist and co-opt the forces that hinder their access to profitable market transactions on
an everyday basis. After all, following my argument from Chapter 2, the hawkers are also
convinced about the neoliberal moral imperative of the private accumulation, and they
clamor for their right to be a homo economicus as much as members of the civil society. In
the following section I will focus on one such particularly important instance of resistance
and negotiation, called Operation Sunshine, that, as we have seen, continues to serve as
historical marker in the politics of street vending in Kolkata.
3.4 Road to Sunshine
If Kolkata is a city of joy, it is also a city of hawkers.27 Buying and selling on the streets
is an economic activity interwoven throughout the ways people live out their lives. The
city manifests itself through the diversity and ubiquity of street vending: the empirical
referent to the conceptual imaginary of the second space of capital. All public spaces are
potential market places. Operating within these sinews of citywide competitive system of
price signals, the worker/laborer that produces the convenience with which the consumer
meets the final commodity form, is also present as a seller. These unorganized retailers
are not in a strict wage relation with a capitalist, although they are a crucial element of
27See (Statesman 1989).
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global capitalism, and hence are completely dependent on market forces. After all, the la-
bor power spent in selling stuff back generates a substantial profit/income. This curious
case of the seller-worker in contemporary global capitalism - who is at once a worker de-
void of wage relations and an entrepreneur motivated by profit - has always been a source
of anxiety among the discourses of forgetting prevalent within the civil society. In what
follows I will analyze this exclusionary discourse deployed by members of the civil society,
through a close reading of articles in popular press, official documents, and personal inter-
views, to events leading up to the Operation Sunshine. The enormous profitability of the
market society, which like all profit seekers in capitalism engages with the politics of sell-
ing, doesn’t invoke the sense of vibrant national economy harnessing the economic growth
through free markets, but rather a sense of moral and civil decay. “You may find walking
on them perilous but Calcutta’s pavements are laid with gold,” as a newspaper article puts
it, a decade after OS, in 2006. Since the scenario portrayed by the article is representative
of the civil society’s (irrational) anxiety of markets, I provide a lengthy quote to reveal the
elements of this anxiety in some detail.28
In order to conduct their business from what is public property for public use and
should, therefore, be closed to private business, hawkers make an annual clandes-
tine payment of Rs 265 crore29 to various authorities. Hawkers are exploited by the
agents of trade union leaders, politicians, police, civic councilors. They have to pay
to earn their bread, said Shaktiman Ghosh, leader of the Hawker Sangram Commit-
tee, an apolitical union. In the staggering sum of money at stake lies the secret of
why hawkers will never be evicted, never mind the enormous inconvenience they
cause to citizens. It also explains why mayor Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya is rein-
venting Lord Cornwallis’s permanent settlement concept to make sure the city’s side-
walks are forever occupied by peddlers.
When it comes to hawkers, this concern about the people making profit in public space, is
a constant source of anxiety among the civil society of contemporary India. Like the ne-
oliberal discourse analyzed in the previous chapter, this argument is also strangely at odds
28See (Ganguly 2006).
292.65 Billion
108
with itself, since one of the key features of state policy in post liberal India is a concen-
trated orchestration of the fire sale of public land for private use often under tremendous
sociopolitical unrest. While pre 90s’ acquisitions were mostly for large public projects,
post liberalization there has been a significant shift towards aiding private accumulation
through the forceful acquisition of public and private land. Indian states have scrambled
to court private capital for tax free Special Economic Zones to promote economic growth
at the cost of acute unemployment and loss of livelihood. Sustained and often success-
ful resistance against such use of public and private land has shown the undemocratic
and illegitimacy of these acquisition policies.30 It begs the question, why is one form of
private use of public land worse than other forms, especially given the tremendous eco-
nomic contribution of the street vendors? After all, according to the same article, Ghosh
explained that at last count, the city had 2.75 lakh (275 thousand) hawkers who pay any-
thing between Rs.30 and Rs.150 a day, depending on location. Agents of the claimants
to the booty collect the bribe daily from the hawker and deliver millions to party coffers.
This thought process within the project of forgetting doesn’t however engage with the de-
mand side of things such as the consumers who participate in exchanges with hawkers.
Generally, these pieces, within the project of forgetting, avoid the perspective of buyers.
Also, narratives unsympathetic to street businesses avoid the reality that providing cer-
tain benefits to state agents and receiving the ability to operate at the edges of legality
is an integral part of global capitalism, and in fact, as (Münster & Strümpell 2014, p.1-6)
has shown, this form of capitalism is the very definition of neoliberal India. In fact, the
Land Acquisition Act of 2011 arbitrarily fixes the prices of land without allowing for the
future market value to be included in the price, and this has been criticized by (Ghatak
30For example (Levien 2013) finds “While steel towns and industrial estates reflected a regime of land
for production with pretensions of inclusive social transformation, SEZs represent a neoliberal regime of
land for the market in which ‘land broker states’ have emerged to indiscriminately transfer land from peas-
ants to capitalist firms for real estate.” Also See (Sengupta 2013), (Mallik 2018).
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& Ghosh 2011, p.66) as a way to keep ”considerable room for officials to manipulate the
figure by use of selective sampling or fake deals as any industrial or development project
will cause significant appreciation of real estate prices, making it impossible for displaced
farmers to buy back land with compensation money if they so wished.”
Given the significance of hawkers in the broader economic life and livelihood of peo-
ple living in the city and its hinterlands, given it is the perfect example of real-world com-
petitive market forces entrenched within the neoliberal logic of profit accumulation and
economic growth through private enterprise, and given, like all businessmen, hawkers are
also willing to pay the necessary taxes in exchange for right to sell, one might predict that
neoliberal policies will seek to champion this competitive economy by formalizing or legal-
izing hawkers’ right to sell. Yet like all news articles within this genre it remains adamant
about any such legalization, as it goes on to say
He (the Mayor) wants to legalise a part of the illegal by collecting a tax and giving
hawkers an identity card to protect them from harassment. While the Rs 265 crore
they part with as bribe is just 3 per cent of the business, the hawkers association is
aware of the influence it can wield and not on the Calcutta Municipal Corporation
(CMC) alone. In meetings of the apex committee, formed by the CMC with hawkers
leaders to work out the permanent settlement framework, the Rs 265 Crore carrot
was used to good effect.
This intransigence by civil society groups against the right to sell on the streets re-
veals a certain kind of vision of the city increasingly espoused by civil society groups since
the 1990s. The reason why the hawkers don’t fit into the neoliberal conception of eco-
nomic growth garnered by free market competition (which is exactly what the street ven-
dors signify), is a function of the State’s imperative to achieve higher economic growth
by courting large scale capital investments, which as I have shown, comes in contradic-
tion with the mandate for competition. But these policies or advocacies in favor of hawker
purges are also a result of a particular vision of the city, namely “global city” or “mega
city” that economic life must conform to. In other words, it is not enough to justify an
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economic activity in terms of its contribution to the economy and employment of others,
but the economic growth or economic development must confirm to certain kind of visual
order: economic growth must, in the real world, look a certain way, and follow appropri-
ate propriety and aesthetics. Economic growth should be visually manifested in a certain
way. The presence of hawkers in particular, and informal economic activities in general,
contradicts that vision. Conversely, one can also argue that as Indian states compete to
court corporate investment in urban retail (for high economic growth) it necessitates the
concomitant reorganization of the flow of people and commodities in accordance to the
needs of formal retail establishments. To institute this need for the easy access to formal
retail the states end up manufacturing a visual and administrative uniformity that make
the cities look a certain way. It is within this dialectical relation between ideational and
material change in the conception and reorganization of cities in the neoliberal era, that
one can explain the widespread eviction events like Operation Sunshine. In the following
sections I analyze the political economy of street vending before the 1990s and comment
on the change in discourses regarding the city and the position of hawkers as India moves
to the neoliberal era.
3.4.1 Politics of Selling Before Operation Sunshine
Ritajyoti Bandyopadhyay provides an excellent account of state policies towards hawkers
before the 1990s. In the 1950s, the influx of millions of refugees from partition hastened
the creation of these spaces of selling organized and operated by refugees, and places like
“Kalighat Refugee Hawkers’ Corner” in the southern parts of the city were allowed by the
Chief Minister Bidhan Roy himself.31 However, of the 1.2 million refugees that came in
during that time, only 23 percent took shelter in the refugee camps. There is a consensus
among scholars that “with enterprise and flexibility” the refugees had to settle themselves,
31See (Bandyopadhyay 2009, p.116).
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often abandoning traditional occupation choices. A rising population of an educated yet
semi-skilled youth expanded the service sector and led to a rapid proliferation of small
businesses. They were also aided by national rehabilitation schemes.32 It is important to
note that in the 1950s, the state, even though reluctantly, played a positive role in estab-
lishing licensed marketplaces and settlement colonies for the refugee population and en-
couraged their creation, maintenance and legalization.33 The 1960s saw the migration of
new refugees from soon to be Bangladesh, and the motivation to find gainful employment
attracted displaced individuals to informal retail, the result being burgeoning informal
hawker markets beyond and around formal municipal market places. “Eviction became
a routine act” for the municipal authorities, although the street trading continued to re-
main and flourish.The hawkers entrenched themselves within the structure of local party
politics and politicians who were dependent on the hawkers “to maintain their rent-seeking
financial structure.”34 (Bandyopadhyay 2009, p.117-p.118) shows how the “activist” ad-
ministrators of the state agencies in the 1970s identified competition posed by “hawker
menace” to be the root of losses sustained by formal market spaces. By the 1970s, the
nine formal municipal markets which ensured a revenue for the state were also running
losses. Based on a joint plan designed by various agencies of the state it was essential to
“identify and quantify” and “if necessary to evict” the hawkers, especially in front of the
legal retail markets. Thus “Operation Hawker” was to be implemented in a coordinated
top-down manner for the first time in the history of the city. The operation, however, was
overwhelmingly unsuccessful. “The chief surgeon of the operation noticed with a docile
look how the post-operative hazards became unmanageable.” The reason for the botched
operation was not just the resistance of hawkers, but curiously, the unevenness of the op-
eration was also due to the resistance mounted by big retailers (called mahajans) or brick
32See (Chatterjee 1995, p.71-73).
33See (Bandyopadhyay 2016, p.688).
34See (Bandyopadhyay 2016, p.690-691).
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and mortar stores who had regularly employed people to sell wares on the streets. More
importantly, from the mid-seventies, “the anti-eviction drives gave the hawkers a greater
cohesion cutting across socio-ethnic lines and brought them under greater politics, both
right and the left,” with slogans like “Hawkers of the World Unite,” and “Kill Poverty, not
the Poor.” It is important to note the discourses of enforced sanitization and beautifica-
tion has started to take hold among the ruling elite by the mid-1970s, which is evidenced
by widespread demolition of slums in Delhi and Bombay. The political context of Calcutta
was however different due to electoral competition between the Congress Party, the Left
Front, and their respective factions. Intra and inter faction rivalry at the local level pro-
vided a political climate in which the hawkers could effectively resist evictions by forging
relational ties with local politicians and forming themselves into unions that were affiliated
to the major political parties. In 1977, as the Left coalition, with CPI(M) at its helm, won
overwhelming majorities in the state legislature, thus inaugurating a 35 year of unbroken
democratic rule in West Bengal, it also found itself in a precarious situation. On the one
hand, as a champion of the poor it has energized the hawkers covertly and overtly dur-
ing the hostile and brutal anti-communist repression of Congress party rule, who by the
late 1970s, organized themselves into unions affiliated to several smaller left parties who
were in the ruling coalition. On the other hand, as pragmatic reality of ruling presented
itself, anxieties of the city overrun by militant, organized, and ungovernable hawkers also
came to the fore. The compromise solution came in the form of an entry barrier, where
“ no hawkers who had occupied the footpath after 1977 would be given vending licences
(which were never issued).” One is not sure how this could have been implemented in any
realistic way. However, one could be sure such a measure didn’t stop the proliferation of
street vending in any meaningful way. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a series of favorable
court rulings during the 1980s solidified the position of hawkers as it provided them the
protection from outright banishment and confirmed their fundamental right to carry on a
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profession as per Article 19(1)(g). In 1983 for example, an article in a renowned English
daily observed with exasperation35
Once described as a “City of Palaces,” Calcutta now looks like a city of hawkers’
stalls. Thousands of such stalls - crude bamboo structures covered with plastic or
tarpaulin sheets - have sprung up over the busy streets. Hawkers here sell everything
under the sun - from ready made garments to photo albums, from shoes to all kinds
of foreign goods. The concentration of hawkers on pavement here is so heavy that
pedestrians are forced to walk on roads and the result is traffic tie-ups and road acci-
dents.
What ensued for years till the Operation Sunshine in the mid-1990s is what (Bandyopadhyay
2016) describes as “state-union complex”: the “critical interface of the state and the ‘move-
ment’ of the hawkers,” in terms of the gradual formation and solidification of hawkers
within the established and newly formed trade unions and their repeated negotiations with
political parties. I will return to this in more detail in the next chapter. What is how-
ever, missing from the literature is a detailed account of the actual economic activity of
the hawkers themselves. How was entry and exit into the spaces of hawking structured
and controlled over time? How did the hawkers organize their economic activities? How
did they negotiate the oppositional forces of individualized market competition and collec-
tive bargaining? The importance of these questions cannot be overstated, because a proper
understanding of the hawkers’ politics from the inside out will not only provide us with a
richer understanding of the political economy of street vending, but also allow us to ex-
plain the nature and aftermath of the mid-nineties eviction drives. An understanding of
the internal organization of the informal hawker economy so to say, will provide insight
into the problems that such market arrangements pose for neoliberal forms of growth ori-
ented governance of the 1990s. Here I draw from several interviews with veteran hawkers
from the Gariahat Junction Boulevard in South Calcutta. It is one of the principal areas
which has been repeatedly targeted for all eviction proposals since the 1970s.
35See (Statesman 1989).
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3.4.2 Informal Retail in Gariahat
One typically cold evening in January 2011, Sanjay Chaudhuri, informed me about the
details of hawker politics in the Gariahat Junction area.36 The entire Gariahat Boule-
vard market was made up of three separate “Boulevard Islands” separating north and
south bound traffic. These three markets were settled in separate times and contexts and
run by completely three completely different committees. Immediately after 1947 “ev-
erybody were sympathetic to the East Bengal refugees” and they could set up shop in
the southern-most boulevard island. “There was no written permission from the corpo-
ration, just a verbal agreement with the corporation” “so that they can earn something,
naturally.” There was nothing there in the 1950s, everything was dark, terrible in rain,
much less people and traffic, informed Pradip Roy over warm cardamom tea on a crisp
and sunny fall afternoon in December 2010.37 Pradip came to Gariahat as a book seller in
1984. Mr. Chaudhuri recalled that between 1956 and 1961, initially 30 refugee settlers set
up markets and this kept expanding up until 1969 to 38 stalls and then to 58 in the late
1990s. This will be called the Gariahat Boulevard Hawkers Committee. Pradip Roy agreed
with Sanjay Chaudhuri that they didn’t have a written permission from the CMC, but
he was extremely sure there was a written permission by Chief Minister Bidhan Roy as
he was sympathetic towards the refugees from East Pakistan. However, after Bidhan Roy
passed in 1969, no amount of negotiation with the political elites of the same party as Bid-
han Roy, including the elected Mayor, Subrata Mukherjee, yielded any security of tenure
in terms of trade or business licenses. The Congress leadership refused to provide any le-
gal tenure, only a consent of occasional acquiescence. By 1970s, more hawkers were selling
their wares on the pavement and now the CMC was determined to evict them. However,
Sanjay recalled Subrata Mukherjee and Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi, “two stalwart leaders of
36Late Sanjay Chaudhuri (Ex Gariahat Boulevard Vendor) interview by author, January 18 2009
37Pradip Roy (Ex Gariahat Boulevard Vendor) interview by author February 5 2010.
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the Congress party,” asked the “pavement hawkers” to move into the middle Boulevard
island. They named their market Gariahat Biponi (106 shops) and formed a “democrati-
cally elected body,” “an association” (registered as Gariahat Hawkers Association) which
passed rules and regulations for selling in the boulevard market. For example, “smuggled
goods” or “anything which is contraband” were not allowed. Often the party leaders were
honored with the position of presidents and vice presidents of these committees. When
Gariahat Municipal Markets was developed, a lot of shopkeepers who had their “peddlers
license” were relocated to the northern most boulevard island (they formed the Mahatma
Gandhi Hawkers Association with 78 people). Pradip Roy recalled finally by 1971 all three
boulevard islands have been “settled.” In spite of the lack of security, hundreds of hawkers
started occupying the pavements spreading out all along the entire Gariahat area. Why
didn’t this lack of security dissuade the new entrants in the 70s? Pradip Roy and Sanjay
Choudhuri identified three main reasons.
A) Even though the trade was not legally binding, the associations and democrat-
ically elected committees formed by hawkers could be registered and were legal. These
were not unions affiliated to major political parties, but market associations which were
registered with the state, and paid its dues. This gave the hawkers some institutionalized
communal recognition even though individual tenures were not secure under the law and
provided a market level forum for collective action. It gave a sense of security among the
sellers and controlled entry and exit in a democratic manner.
B) Initially they were mostly “middle class” and “lower middle class” refugees who
were unemployed, and lacked wealth and skill, and as a result became hawkers. Slowly this
changed the professional culture of the Bengali youth. In sort of an honest confessional,
Pradip Roy revealed initially he would feel bad about opening his shop. Even with the
undignified work life in the private company job, which was unbearable and unsustainable,
he kept on working for years because of the social dignity it carried within Bengali culture,
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compared to setting up small shops. He was certain hawkery as a profession has changed
that cultural inhibition to do business. The ability to carry on a small business changed
the professional culture or mindset of the unemployed Bengali youth. Instead of insisting
on trying and failing to get government jobs or other gainful employment in the private
sector like clerical jobs, they could see one can earn an honorable and decent living by be-
coming small businessmen. “In my opinion” this is a very big contribution of the hawkers:
that hawkery has changed the sense of ethics (mulyobodh) among unemployed Bengalis.
The taboo among Bengalis that selling things is shameful or undignified has largely eroded
due to the sustained movement of hawkers. More Bengali youth are willing to start busi-
nesses rather than living in despair from unrealized dreams of formal employment in the
organized sector. Mr. Chaudhuri also recalled that, due to immense turmoil of the Nax-
alite movement and the industrial unrests of the 1960s and early seventies organized by
the left front unions, it was difficult for the youth to find a job. “People were afraid to hire
young people.”.
C) There was a significant political change in the 1977, Pradip noted. After decades
of struggle, when the Left front came to power as the government for the poor and un-
derprivileged (Sarbohara-r Sarkar), there was a sense of victory among the initial group
of hawkers who have settled and struggled. After the boulevard islands were fully occu-
pied by the mid-seventies, more and more hawkers started setting up shop on the pave-
ments and there was a “character change” among hawkers. The new batch of hawkers who
started to come during the late 70s and 80s didn’t share any sense of a larger struggle for
the underprivileged. To Pradip, they were engaged in an instrumental politics, where the
main motive was to maintain occupancy over portions of pavement in return for doing
petty favors to leaders of political parties. They were willing to do whatever the politi-
cal party said. Many of them didn’t come from this area, and they didn’t share any sense
of solidarity with the Boulevard Hawkers. The struggle for legitimacy of their profession,
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which according to Mr. Roy, was the main goal of the earlier cohort, by the late 70s, was
replaced by an obeisance mixed with a regularized payment system to the party and the
police in return for morsels of pavement. Protests were outsourced by payments so to say.
In 1977, Mr. Chaudhuri, who eventually became the general secretary of the Gariahat
Hawkers Association, bought a shop from an existing owner in the thriving middle island.
“Actually you don’t buy it directly” he said. “You hand over your shop to the commit-
tee who negotiate with the owner and they have the right to reject the deal as well.” It
was mostly a garment and piece cloth market, and it “went quite smoothly” but there was
only “one snag,” there was no electric connection. One couldn’t get power if they didn’t
have the “trade license,” which the hawkers did not have. There were electricity “distribu-
tion boards” in and around the area, so the body negotiated with, “not the so called lead-
ers” but “middle rank” people. The “inspectors” came and were paid “kind of a bribe”:
“a couple of shirt pieces, may be cash sometimes,” but the bottom line attitude was that
“let the hawkers do some business.” People started complaining about the power cuts, and
it was not until the mid-1980s, that they successfully moved the local MLA Sachin Sen
who got them official metered connection and hawkers were also allowed to set up their
own local pay phone services. Even then, Pradip recalls, there was an internal fight among
the three groups of Boulevard Hawkers, only a few original settlers, mostly their children
by now, got the electricity connections and other hawkers started to get connections from
them. Finally, the whole thing blew up politically and there was a consensus among the
three associations that either everyone gets a connection or no one can. Finally, each mar-
ket got its own meter. All this, Mr. Chaudhuri stressed, was a clear “recognition” among
the hawkers and the political authorities that “there was some legitimate business going
on there.” Moreover, to make matters even more legitimate, the hawkers started paying
a professional tax. “We planned to get recognized by the government by showing that we
pay taxes as well.” There was also a “drive” to pay income taxes and they started to file
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income taxes, and petitioned the corporation to accept rent on the their 35 to 70 square-
foot shops. From several interviews it was confirmed that at the end of the 1970s there
was a clear understanding from repeated interaction with the political leaders that the
Boulevard Hawkers will not be evicted and if they had to move they will be properly re-
habilitated as units.
Some important observations about the political economy of the Boulevard Hawk-
ers (before OS) surfaces from these discussions. The actual markets in which the hawkers
operated are self-organized into committees and associations, with a democratic process
of controlling entry and exit. Although these associations worked with political parties
across the spectrum, all the respondents vehemently denied any official political affilia-
tion and in many occasions expressed their association as “purely apolitical.” They didn’t
have any legal recognition, but they found out a way to project their legitimacy by be-
having and looking like registered businesses. Although the Chief Minister Jyoti Basu has
declared that all hawkers who came after 1977 shall be deemed illegitimate, throughout
the 80s and 90s, a new kind of Machiavellian politics of payment versus pavement control
has given rise to a hawker-police-political party nexus which led to the massive increase of
hawkers from outside the area. It shows not just the working of market society, but more
importantly the everyday politics of this market society is primarily a triangular negoti-
ation between the police, the local party leaders, and themselves. The main negotiations
that affected their trade on a daily basis were carried out with the mid-level local party
leaders and the police, and on occasions with elected representatives. The policies of state
agencies devised by expert administrators and blessed by the Chief Ministers or Mayors
from the top, at least throughout the 1980s, played a minimal role in the everyday life of
the hawkers in and around Gariahat. Hawkers who came to the Gariahat area during the
1980s and 1990s expressed affiliation to labor unions of major political parties and nom-
inated important political leaders for honorary posts in their local union, but they will
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often switch sides and hitch themselves to different leaders and parties as need be. As a
member of Indira Hawkers Union put it bluntly, “we did many unions, but the police ha-
rassment continued.”38 When it came down to the everyday, the local party operatives and
the local police was what mattered the most, and top down state action by activist admin-
istrators had no permanent effect over how informal retail was organized on the streets.
As one example among many, in 1983, a few days after the Chief Minister Jyoti Basu had
authoritatively ordered the police to take action against hawkers who arrived after 1977,
“an annoyed Chief minister pulled up the Calcutta Police administration. . . for its failure
to discipline Officer in Charge of Police stations who have been unable to remove hawk-
ers from important street crossings.39 On their part, the local party leaders ensured cash
flow to the party in the form of union fees and other regularized cash donations, which is
crucial for competitive elections in capitalist democracies. When pressed for detail, respon-
dents will often be confused about whether the money went to the union or the party or
the police, and they will try to explain it really didn’t matter. Money went to an identi-
fiable person, a local office or a shop, it went out of the association funds in a lump sum,
and it didn’t matter. Hawkers associations will negotiate with the police separately, per-
sonally, and will often complain to the local party leaders to deal with the police. All my
respondents claimed that what mattered was how much was due each month, “to make
things legal” as Pradip put it. There was no electoral blackmail that they were mount-
ing. By Pradip’s account, most latecomers didn’t work where they voted. In my fieldwork
all hawkers lived outside the electoral map of their places of selling (not a vote bank for
politicians representing the Gariahat area). However, it is a lucrative money bank which
ensured a steady flow of capital into the party treasuries, the very life blood of political
parties in capitalist democracies. All unorganized sector workers in the transportation in-
38Discussion with Indira Hawkers Union members located at Gariahat
39See (Statesman 1983).
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dustry I have talked to paid something to a party/union and had a nearest party office to
go to. For example, all the Auto Rickhsaw drivers in different routes in South Calcutta
were paying 3 INR a day to “the party.” Although officially this fee (chanda) was sup-
posed to pay for costs in case of mishaps, it was often delayed or denied. News articles
from the 1980s and 1990s frequently featured articles which spelled out entente between
political parties and hawkers, and the reason for its resilience. This one, just before Opera-
tion Sunshine spells out this mechanism in detail.40
Due to eviction, it is not just that the hawkers are fearing economic loss. In order
to maintain illegal control over the footpaths the encroachers have to pay regular
dues (nazrana) to the union of different political party unions and the police. This
nexus of interest on the footpath has been happening for ages. . . According to a cal-
culation made by the police, Burrabazar and Hare Street Precincts make 3 to 5 lakh
(300 to 500 thousand) monthly from tola and petty case. But in the southern parts
of the city police doesn’t take any money, only the unions related to political parties
have a right to collect the dues. . . In Gariahat and Hazra areas, CITU is very demo-
cratic and takes money on a sliding scale based on the hawkers ability. On behalf of
CITU local leaders extract money from different areas of Kolkata. For example, in
the North Amal Chakrabarty and “Nepal,” in central Kolkata it is Mohammad Siraj,
Tohrab, and in the South it is Jayanta Dasgupta.
3.4.3 Partisan Society?
In the context of rural party politics in West Bengal, (Bhattacharyya 2010, p.53) expands
and refines Chatterjee’s idea of political society to conceptualize something called “party-
society” or the “modular form of political society in West Bengal’s countryside.”. Party-
society is characterized by the usurpation of the rural social space by established political
parties, instead of growth of non-partisan civil associations. As a result of this crowding
out civic associations, Bhattacharya argues “public action in party-society tends to be
election centric, appealing directly to the calculus of enlarging the share of votes by dif-
ferent political parties.” 41
40See (Anandabazar Patrika 1995b).
41Also see (Bhattacharyya 2011).
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In light of my interviews and reporting from the 1980s and 1990s, I distinguish the
urban politics of market society, especially the politics of street vending, by its pecuniary
and transactional element rather than electoral calculations. I call this a democratic urban
politics, a Partisan Society. It refers to intensely competitive democratic political envi-
ronment in the realm of urban politics surrounding market society. Here political parties
seek to establish control and influence at the street level, not for electoral victory in any
instrumental way of creating vote blocs, because transient hawker population doesn’t al-
low a sedentary mapping as in rural areas. It rather involves political parties competing
for the opportunity to loosely protect the interests of the members of market society in
return for a share of their monetary income. Parties provide resources like a party office
doubling up as predominantly male spaces of recreation called “clubs” and local cadres
through which to negotiate an electric connection or an overzealous policeman. In return
the party gets cash. The market society depends on political parties for its everyday work-
ing, but the political parties also depend on the former’s income to ensure its long-term
survival. Controlling the interstices of street level business ultimately provides the money
which all parties need to contest in a capitalist democracy. But the hawkers, as we have
seen, can also change affiliations. After all they can and do shop around for their parties,
for their street level point-man who will take the call when needed, and collect the money.
The market society uses this leverage of shifting partisanship to negotiate a layer of insu-
lation from eviction and harassment. In the Partisan Society then, power circulates in the
form of money and vice versa. The M −C −M ′ of the street vendor is mutually reinforced
by Power −Money − Power′ logic of electoral competition. The commodity market of S2
meets a market of parties and partisans at the street level marketing their powers to pro-
tect against the agents of the state, in lieu of some regularized transfer of income. In the
1980s and till the late nineties, the rhetoric of the top brass of the ruling party who were
in positions of government, or municipal level elected officials and administrators contra-
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dicted with the street level material reality: the constant need for all parties to make more
power out of controlling the “footpaths lined with gold.” As the evidence overwhelmingly
shows, this turned out to be a stable social formation. A part of the untaxed income of
the unorganized sector goes to competing political parties and unions, giving the hawkers
some sense of (contingent) tenure. And in capitalist democracies electoral competitions
operates in the logic of P − M − P ′ so being in power becomes synonymous with com-
peting for steady sources of party funding from the workers in the unorganized sector, and
hence the streets and neighborhoods.42 In fact, one might say the nature of electoral com-
petition among political parties in places like Kolkata entrenches the parties in workings of
the market society in such a way that the intention and resolve of elected (and unelected)
state officials (beholden to the civil society) to evict hawkers via a centralized coordinated
action is frustrated by the structure within which the agents have to operate. The very
nature of electoral competition forces parties and their affiliated unions to depend on the
income of hawkers (and other informal sector workers) they seek to evict. For example
by mid 80s one finds newspaper articles claiming that the Municipal Commissioner Asim
Berman was awkwardly surprised to know that leaders of a national labor union (called
Centre for Indian Trade Unions (CITU) affiliated to the ruling CPM) were leasing out por-
tions of footpaths in the Burrabazar area. Moreover, the CITU leader (neta) is also no-
tarizing stamp papers to hawkers as a form of “legalizing” the lease. Hawkers apparently
were willing to pay thousands to let a “lease” on the footpath.43 Thus, the materiality of
Partisan Society, explains the resilience of the street vendors in face of centralized eviction
policies. No doubt, veteran hawkers who claimed to have come from a sense of working
class struggles of the 1960s, themselves evaluated this form of politics of instrumental par-
42Of course the capitalists in the formal sector are also a great source of funding for political parties
and politicians but that story is widely available in all news media everywhere, and has become the func-
tional basis of representative government in the US, which scholars like Samuel Kernell have called “indi-
vidualized pluralism.” See (Kernell 2006).
43See (AajKaal 1985).
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tisanship with skepticism and disdain, ironically, exactly when the champions of working
class, i.e. the Left Front came into power in West Bengal.
3.5 Hawkers and the State in the 1980s
By the mid-eighties the hawker population increased steadily and, given the stable symbio-
sis of Market Society and the Partisan Society I have described above, business was brisk
and profitable in the Gariahat Boulevard region. As Pradip recalled, from the late 80s on-
wards his own book stall, like other businesses was booming. He had more than 100 ti-
tles, and had developed a niche clientèle by being able to supply “little magazines” from
Bangladesh and semi urban (mufassil) Bengal. He could have intellectual “exchanges”
with a lot of interested customers and talk to them about books, and started to “enjoy”
his work more. The West Bengal Legislative assembly convened a committee to study the
issue of hawkers just when Pradip’s business as well as his colleagues’ had “taken off,” to
use W.W.Rostow’s phrase. In 1983, the Central Calcutta Hawker Sangram committee,
which was formed to protest against eviction over the construction of the Shealdah flyover
in 1981, presented the issue of hawking to West Bengal Legislative Assembly.44 A “Com-
mittee of Petitions” recognized that lack of employment opportunity leads to hawking.
Between 1985 and 1987, the “Committee of Petitions” held 22 meetings and acquired of-
ficial evidence from 12 other states. They recommended “peoples should be educated and
public opinion be created against encroachment of foot-path pavements and grabing [sic]
of public lands,” and recognized hawking as a national problem and that “it cannot be
solved.” Instead, strict zonal and identity regulations would be compounded with “make
hawking in no-hawking zones a cognisable and non-bailable offense,” carrying a “minimum
punishment of rigorous imprisonment for three months with a fine up to Rs. 1000.” For
44See (Ghosh 2000). Also Unpublished Document. “Struggle for Survival. The Hawkers Movement in
West Bengal. Collection of some documents,” HSC.pg.8-10.
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the purpose of such “summary trial” “mobile courts” should be created. More curiously,
the committee also promoted the creation of a “special cell” for “dealing exclusively with
the hawkers [sic] problem.” The “special Officer created for the purpose” would be tasked
with maintaining a “manual with maps” mentioning the nature of land ownership. The
committee also mustered some positive and positively general recommendations “develop-
ing new avenues of employment in rural areas,” “alternative accommodation at nominal
cost in case of eviction,” and creation of “growth centers” and “regulated markets” along
roads linking rural and urban Bengal. In 1989, the inevitable happened. After several
meetings one “Municipal Consultative Committee” found “this unwanted problem is there
and there has been no solution yet, though there has been various discussions, meetings,
decisions taken at the highest level.” The consultative committee concluded that “at best
we think about maintaining some discipline in this affair so that minimum disturbance is
created for pedestrian or carriageway.” Modes of such disciplinary measures ranged from
“levy scavenging charges” on hawkers, forbidding them from the vicinity of public build-
ings, allowing them to hawk between 9am and 9pm, and provide them with space ranging
from 1 to 4 square meters. “By late eighties,” Pradip told me, “there was hardly any time
to talk and business was in peak.” Moreover, there was a “culture” that had developed.
Many people in the area were supportive and became regular patrons. A part of the sur-
plus generated by the political society of hawkers was directly siphoned into markets for
party funds that drive effective electoral competitiveness, and in turn the hawkers gained
an increased legitimacy to sites, with an occasional show of state control and management,
followed by “business as usual.” Even the middle class that lived nearby in multi-storied
apartments were, willy-nilly, accepting of the stalls in Gariahat Boulevard, because the
boulevard being busy all day, inhibited “anti-social activities” in the area. It seemed the
stability of partisan society in Kolkata was playing out splendidly in the political econ-
omy of urban informal street vending. What then justifies or necessitates a sudden evic-
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tion move like Operation Sunshine in 1996 that seek not to control but to outright elim-
inate hawking? Why and how did the discourses surrounding the hawkers change in the
mid-1990s? What effect did this have on the political economy of street vending in the ne-
oliberal era? I turn to these questions in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Neoliberalism and Informal Retail
4.1 Transformation of a Crisis
In the late 1980s, the second space of capital in India was constituted by vast networks of
markets with many sellers and buyers. Most businesses concerned with selling final goods
and services were within the unorganized sector, and those working there were informally
employed. The Indian state didn’t have a deep and large social security systems of public
welfare like the ones that Thatcher and Reagan will start to dismantle in the West. More-
over, GDP growth rate in real terms was, the so called “Hindu Rate,” was still, as Table
4.1 shows higher than the two of the most industrially advanced nations of the world.1
Country Name 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
India 5.5 4.9 4.7 6.9 5.6 8.5
United States 2.5 4.0 2.4 4.0 2.7 1.2
United Kingdom 1.14 4.18 1.3 3.0 3.0 0.5
Table 4.1: Real GDP growth rate
Since the 1970s, although willy nilly, India had embarked on a path of liberalization
and export promotion through Special Economic Zones (SEZ). It still had significant state
1Data collected from World Development Indicators Database
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control of industries in S1, and through the Public Food Distribution system in S2. Its
borders were opaque to international flow of capital and commodities, instituted in the
form of export and import licensing, tariffs, and subsidies. Thus, the Indian state was not
a competitive neoliberal TSP in a world of markets. Nor did it foster competitive market
systems everywhere within its borders. More importantly, even though the Indian State
didn’t spend nearly as much on welfare as say US or the EU countries, and even though it
didn’t possess a large security system apparatus like the latter countries, it was not bring-
ing in more than it was spending. A Balance of Payment Crisis was looming large, as it
was running out of Dollars. Between 1988 and 1991, world growth fell by a massive 2%
, U.S growth rates tumbled from about 4.2 percent in 1988 to -0.7% in 1991. Although
Indian current account deficits remained manageably low (1.5% of GDP) during the be-
ginning to mid-1980s, the rate of growth of imports far surpassed the exports. By 1990-
1991, due to the Gulf War there was sharp increase in cost of imported oil. The War made
things worse. The value of oil import increased from 2B Dollars in 1988 to 5B in 1991,
while the monetary value of non-oil exports rose by a measly 5%. Inward remittances from
Indians working in the oil producing Persian Gulf kingdoms fell, and U.S.S.R. (another
important trading partner) collapsed from its own Vietnam. India’s international credit
rating was downgraded and the soon fear of pecuniary losses overtook national ties as the
money of Non-Resident Indians (NRI) started to fly out rapidly. Commercial bank lending
became impossible, as the debt servicing ballooned.2
Internal political instability and the ensuing drama made matters unmanageable. In
the newly formed government of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar (who was, unlike his
predecessor Prime Minister Viswanath Pratap Singh, opposed to an IMF loan), one cab-
inet minister offered to raise “2 billion dollars from the Sultan of Brunei and super-rich
non-resident Indians” within a fortnight.3 This scheme failed and the impending incapa-
2Data retrieved from World Development Indicators and (Cerra & Saxena 2002).
3See (Nayyar 2016) Deepak Nayaar served as chief economic adviser to the Government of India from
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bility to meet international debt payment obligations due to a case of vanishing commer-
cial lenders, changed the ideological outlook of PM Chandra Shekhar. Towards the end of
1990 he, along with Devi Lal orchestrated a breakway from Janata Party (Peoples’ Party)
to form his own Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) (Socialist Peoples’ Party(National),
or SJP (R) in short. IMF came through as an imprimatur with and a 1.8 Billion Dollar
check in January 1991. But these were Dickensian times. The Congress party with which
SJP(R) had formed a coalition to topple PM V.P. Singh, now withdrew support in Febru-
ary 1991. As the chief economic advisor to the Government of India recalls, “there was
capital flight from non-resident deposits. The prospect of default hung over our heads
like the sword of Damocles.” The Chandra Shekhar government going in caretaker sta-
tus, froze up any credit from global markets in March, 1991. In April, India’s credit rating
was downgraded.4 In May, as the polling had commenced former Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi while campaigning on his own bid to be the next prime minister, was assasinated
up by a woman called Dhanu who blew herself up in the process. The house of India was
heading to sovereign default under a government with no effective policy making powers,
let alone the communal bigotry and intolerance spawned by leaders of the BJP and its
other Hindu nationalist outfits who by the December of the following year will start break-
ing up a historic mosque in Ayodhya. In May, it came down to pawning off “20 tonnes of
gold, confiscated from smugglers, to raise 200 million Dollars.” from the Union Bank of
Switzerland(UBS).5 With foreign exchange reserves worth two weeks of essential imports,
the Reserve Bank of India(RBI) airlifted 67 tonnes of gold to the Bank of England and the
Bank of Switzerland raising 605 million in lieu of IMF emergency disbursements of SDR
1.4 billion.6 The general election of 1991 with low turnouts returned a minority govern-
1989 to 1991.
4See (Vikraman 2017).
5See (Nayyar 2016).
6See (Telegraph 2009) and (IMF, Resident Representative (accessed February 3, 2014)).
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ment, headed by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, who employed Manmohan Singh as
the Finance Minister (FM). Singh, who didn’t represent a LS constituency but instead was
chosen as an RS member from Assam. Manmohan Singh devalued the currency in early
July and on the famous 24th Budget Speech provided emphasized that “we have not ex-
perienced anything similar in the history of independent India.”7 In terms of specifics of
policy implementation, the content of the speech could be interchanged point for point
with the World Bank (WB) prescriptions that were to follow along with the an approval
of a 500 million Dollars Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) in December 1991. The WB
terms were as follows:8
Description: The proposed structural adjustment loan and credit is for the equiva-
lent of US $500 million, equally divided between IBRD and IDA. It is proposed that
the first tranche be US $300 million, and that the remainder be disbursed in the sec-
ond tranche. The amount of each tranche is also proposed to be equally divided be-
tween the loan and credit. It would support the initial phase of the Government’s
program of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform. In addition to a ma-
jor fiscal adjustment effort, the main areas covered by the program are: (i) deregula-
tion of domestic industry and promotion of foreign direct investment; (ii) liberaliza-
tion of the trade regime; (iii) reform of domestic interest rates coupled with measures
to strengthen capital markets and institutions; and (iv) initiation of public enterprise
reforms.
Benefits: The adjustment policies being supported by the SAL/SAC in conjunc-
tion with an IMF stand-by arrangement, will restore macroeconomic balance and
strengthen external creditworthiness. The Government’s reform measures would ini-
tiate the opening up of the economy and would also alter fundamentally the param-
eters of public-private interaction in a manner that would promote domestic compe-
tition, improve the incentive system, and would foster sustained growth with rising
productivity.
4.1.1 Making the India Inc.
“There is No Alternative” for Indians in 1991 but to embark on the realization of the prin-
ciples P1-P3. But the challenge, according to Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, was
7See (Shri Manmohan Singh, Minister of Finance 1991 (Accessed February 4 2014)).
8See (The World Bank 1991 (Accessed February 10 2014)).
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that India was facing a crisis “without precedent.” The industrializing west in its ascent
“concentrated on the creation of wealth, unmindful of the social misery and inequity which
characterised this process,” where democracy was deferred. India, unlike the West or USSR,
must embark on wealth creation “while remaining steadfast in allegiance to the values
of a democratic system.”. Given “A vast number of people live on the edges of a subsis-
tence economy” and hence not a “part of the market system,”, it was the obligation of the
government to provide those at the edges with “social services such as education, health,
safe drinking water and roads,”, such that they can be served by the market system. The
uniquely “basic challenge” for India was to “create wealth...tempered by equity and jus-
tice” with the “goal of removal of poverty and development for all.”9
Here we already see the tension arising from maintaining the core neoliberal princi-
ples P1-P3 within a democratic framework. It is important to note neoliberalism is ag-
nostic about the type of political rule under which P1-P3 could be enacted, as long as the
political arrangement has the desired outcome of P1-P3. But for India, structural adjust-
ments towards P1-P3, unlike Pinochet’s Chile or Yeltsin’s Russia, had to happen within
the framework of plural democratic rule. Such rapid transformations within the political
framework of democratic rule could be self-defeating to political parties, thus scuttling
the project of neoliberal transformations. In a report on the loan to India published a few
months after the budget speech,10 the World Bank itself had such premonitions of failure
in implementing neoliberal adjustments stemming from democratic opposition.
Failure to follow through with the implementation of forceful stabilization measures
and reforms is the first important risk. The reform process will change the complex
system of rents and patronage which has been established over the last four decades
and thus will affect the minority government’s constituencies. The government’s
management of the politics of reform has consisted of stimulating public debate to
forge the consensus necessary to sustain the process of reform. It has articulated,
quite convincingly, the urgent need for reforms and actively sought the cooperation
9See (Shri Manmohan Singh, Minister of Finance 1991 (Accessed February 4 2014)).
10See (The World Bank 1991 (Accessed February 10 2014), p.32).
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of political parties and various interest groups, including organized labor. Neverthe-
less, social/political reaction to the adverse transitional consequences of the adjust-
ment program (e.g., labor retrenchment, subsidy reductions, and higher user fees and
other administered prices which could fuel inflation in the short run) could slow the
pace of reform and jeopardize its sustainability.
The (The World Bank 1991 (Accessed February 10 2014), p.22)disclaimer to the structural
adjustment stated:
The Government’s agenda for stabilization and reform carries a risk of significant
transitional costs. These costs include potential losses of output, employment and
consumption due to the deflationary impact of fiscal consolidation, and frictions in
the process by which productive resources move between alternative uses in response
to changes in economic incentives. The slowdown in growth anticipated for the next
year or two is likely to lead to a stagnation in per capita real incomes, and some seg-
ments of the population may experience a significant fall in living standards. The
main losers are likely to be the small minority of the population that benefitted from
the rents created by the previous restrictive and distorted economic environment.
However, a large proportion of India’s population continues to be subject to malnu-
trition and ill health, and does not have the educational skills and access to means of
production that will enable it to participate fully and benefit from the growth process.
For this group, government expenditure restraint as well as the restructuring steps
envisaged above may prove particularly costly. In the short term, some urban poor,
particularly the unemployed and underemployed, and displaced workers are also likely
to be adversely affected by the adjustment program. Urban wages for unskilled and
semi-skilled labor in particular would probably decline in real terms as Government
expenditures are reduced, and the liberalization of firm exit and international trade
lead to job losses in inefficient public and private enterprises. [e.a.]
In fact, the World Bank loan document mentions11
The Government recognizes that, in addition to the risks of adverse economic shocks
and an inadequate private investment response, the adjustment program faces the
risk of successful opposition from groups who may perceive that they are being asked
to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of the program.
Notwithstanding the fact that two decades later thousands of farmer suicides and (as
(Oza 2012),(Fernandes 2004) and others have shown) a hyper consumptive middle class
will result from the ashes of the Hindu rate of growth, how was India to achieve such cap-
ital accumulation and rapid wealth creation within democratic rule? The answer lies in
11See (The World Bank 1991 (Accessed February 10 2014), p.22).
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the ideological reorientation of the individual subject. It is important to note the ideals of
social justice and norms of subject-hood that the finance minister invoked all through the
speech. After all, a change in the philosophy of governing the economy assumes an ideal
citizen with a different mindset to make a nation of “sustained growth with rising produc-
tivity.” I quote relevant portions of (Shri Manmohan Singh, Minister of Finance 1991 (Ac-
cessed February 4 2014), p.8-10) to demonstrate the nature of ideal subject-hood without
which neoliberal governance wouldn’t be successful.
For the creation of wealth, we must encourage accumulation of capital. This will in-
evitably mean a regime of austerity. We have also to remove the stumbling blocks
from the path of those who are creating wealth. At the same time, we have to de-
velop a new attitude towards wealth. In the ultimate analysis, all wealth is a social
product. Those who create it and own it, have to hold it as a trust and use it in the
interest of the society, and particularly of those who are under-privileged and with-
out means...The austerity that Gandhiji practiced and preached is a necessary condi-
tion for accelerated economic development in the framework of a democratic polity.
The trusteeship that he prescribed for the owners of wealth captured the idea of so-
cial responsibility.
In highlighting the significance of reform, my purpose is not to give a fillip to mind-
less and heartless consumerism we have borrowed from the affluent societies of the
West. My objection to the consumerist phenomenon is two-fold. First, we cannot
afford it. In a society where we lack drinking water, education, health, shelter and
other basic necessities, it would be tragic if our productive resources were to be de-
voted largely to the satisfaction of the needs of a small minority. The country’s needs
for water, for drinking and for irrigation, rural roads, good urban infrastructure, and
massive investments in primary education and basic health services for the poor are
so great as to effectively preclude encouragement to consumerist behaviour imita-
tive of advanced industrial societies. Our approach to development has to combine
efficiency with austerity. Austerity not in the sense of negation of life or a dry, arid
creed that casts a baleful eye on joy and laughter. To my mind, austerity is a way of
holding our society together in pursuit of the noble goal of banishing poverty, hunger
and disease from this ancient land of ours.
We might call it Neoliberalism with Gandhian flavors. The ideal neoliberal Indian subject
is an austere entrepreneur with a “new attitude towards wealth,” who, while encouraging
capital accumulation strives to remove the “stumbling blocks” that thwart capital accu-
mulation. But the entrepreneur doesn’t engage in frivolous “mindless and heartless con-
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sumerism” but feels the austere “social responsibility” to spend money as a trusteeship for
ameliorating the vagaries of capitalist accumulation that affects the poor. It was not a just
a payment crisis to be fixed by mortgaging gold and taking loans, but the crisis itself (as
Naomi Klein had shown in different contexts), is to be capitalized to induce a structural
break in the ways of thinking about and managing “the economy.” The state and the indi-
vidual subject must align their orientation to be relentlessly austere, competitive and accu-
mulative. But what about the markets themselves? It is not that India lacked markets of
goods and services in S2. Markets were a ubiquitous expression of Indian life and sprawled
across the rural and urban areas of the subcontinent. The unorganized sector workers in
general, and more particularly the unorganized retailers, are already a part of this vast
yet localized form of market system. As we have seen, depending on market forces of sup-
ply and demand to sell their wares helps them to remain, even if partially, outside hunger
and poverty. The nature of their austere subsistence as member of the Market Society is
rooted in the relentless pursuit of the M − C − M ′ circulation, already oriented towards
creation of wealth. Remember how Pradip Roy recounted the slow erosion of inhibition to-
wards selling among the Bengali youth as the possibility of hawking provided them with
a dignified life. Members of the market society already possessed “a positive attitude to-
wards wealth” that FM Singh was advocating: all they wanted was removal of “stumbling
blocks” in their ways of accumulating capital. What will new India hold for them? How
does the relation between the hawkers and the state evolve as India embarked on neolib-
eral governance? What effect did this national move towards neoliberal governance have
on the ways in which cities and their hawkers are envisioned and controlled? In answer-
ing these questions, I hope to reveal that the politics of neoliberalism is better interpreted
and understood through a lens that magnifies three interrelated processes involving the
struggle for spaces of selling a) formalization in S2; b) informalization of labor within the
formalized spaces of selling; and c) formation of political coalitions by unorganized sector
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workers engaged in S2 that negotiate (i.e. resist and compromise) with the forces of for-
malizations.12
4.2 Global Dreams and Local Nightmares
The curious case of our hawkers falls squarely within this tenor of equity, justice, and cap-
ital accumulation. They were motivated in negotiating forms of comfortable market ac-
cess within the structure of Partisan Society. They are “part of the market system” and
are “served by the market system,” but unlike the members of the civil society, they must
completely rely on the market system for the reproduction of their everyday.13 Accord-
ing to Singh’s own logic then, the urban street vendors should be the ideal subjects for
the new pro wealth austere India ushering the beginning to the end of history. But, as In-
dia jumped square and center into the global markets of commodities, labor, and capital,
accepting the core neoliberal principles P1-P3, we see a renewed enthusiasm in ridding
cities of hawkers. By the mid-1990s, as courting foreign and domestic capital became a
competition among Indian states, serving as the prominent marker of governmental legit-
imacy, India and its states’ competitive accumulative disposition was being translated by
the civil society into a certain vision of an investment worthy city to which city life must
conform. It desired for organized sector enterprises to come and set up glistening shops,
for big capital to invest in projects of beautification and infrastructure. Obstacles to rapid
accrual of growth and wealth had to be removed, but not in favor of member of the Mar-
12The chapter then provides the empirical grounding for the theoretical contradictions of neoliberal
governance shown in Chapter 2. My analysis regarding evolving relations between Kolkata street vendors
and state actors (in the context of control over spaces of selling in S2), should be seen only as a symptom
of neoliberal governance in contemporary capitalism. I hope my theoretical framework explaining the in-
herent contradictions of neoliberal policy making, can be extended to analyze other forms of selling in S2.
13It is empirical and theoretical naivety to assume that subsistence living and being part of the market
system are mutually exclusive. In fact, it is also a leap of faith to assume a necessary correlation between
“served by the market system” and being out of poverty, and one can just as well show that the market
system sustains poverty as well.
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ket Society. It is not just important that a city thrives and makes money by participating
in global capital in its own local capabilities, but it should be subjected to a new order of
flow and a new visual order. Although people like Sanjay and Pradip by the 1990s were
making brisk business, and hawkers easily adapted to new and competitive foreign prod-
ucts, they didn’t “look” like growth and wealth. Even though business was happening all
around and people were making money, it was not enough, because it lacked the visual of
a wealthy global city. For the high growth imperative to be sustained, capital accumula-
tion must occur through formalization of the economy, or in our case formalization of the
spaces of selling, which in turn must operate within a certain aesthetic framework of the
city.
4.2.1 Imaging the City
Some of the prominent members of the Bengali civil society even put their visions and jus-
tifications for hawker eviction in writing, notably, in a collection of essays called Opera-
tion Sunshine (published a year after the event). However, this publication is an excel-
lent compendium of civil society fantasies of what the city should be, and its publication
after the eviction drive doesn’t interfere with our understanding of the vision of the city
itself. I particularly want to highlight elements of this consensus, through a couple of rep-
resentative essays. Professor of Drama (and as the blurb claims, “an eminent personality
in stage and screen”) Bibhash Chakraborty in his essay titled An Enlightened Operation
starts with an urgency that “the whole thing had reached the bounds of tolerance.” He
stresses that “we the citizens” who are the “helpless unorganized mass” are being “throt-
tled” by “an organized minority” (hawkers). “The tax paying citizens were being deprived
of their rightful privileges and a sense of security.” In this essay the point of contention
for Mr. Chakrabarty is not just “illegal hawking” but a whole host of “lawless atrocities,”
like ”random pasting of posters or graffiti on walls in middle-class residential areas or in
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offices and other establishments,” “speeding buses,” and “unrestricted polluting of the at-
mosphere.”14
Rachpal Singh, who was introduced as “a very energetic and renowned Indian Police
Service (IPS) officer -associated with many social activities,” posed a rhetorical and per-
haps anti-social question in an article titled Do Hawkers deserve sympathy?. He recounts
that in the 1980s the Calcutta Police and the government in vain had “tried all persua-
sive measures to contain their unabated spread.” Given the documents we looked at in the
previous chapter, it were the hawkers who were doing the persuasion, and the committees
came up with measures that were quite concrete in their punitive aspects of encroachment
but rather vague on their solutions to reduce it. But to members of the civil society like
Rachpal, “greed has overtaken need” and the hawkers were “decaying as lively and beauti-
ful city and converted beautiful areas into armpits of the city.” He asks, “was it not sheer
vandalism?” and like Mr. Chakrabarty maintains that the “common citizen suffered in si-
lence.”15
And finally, to demonstrate how the neoliberal transformation of the nation-state
manifests locally in the renewed conceptualization of urban spaces, I present one “Ener-
getic IAS Officer,” K.S. Rajendra Kumar, who wrote an essay called “Sunshine Thoughts.”
He recognizes Calcutta is cultured, joyful, humane, and very congested, because of “con-
flicting demands for spaces on Calcutta roads.”. But “speed is a sign of development” and
hence “in today’s competitive world everybody, and every country must attain speed,”
something that is lost in Calcutta streets because of “businesses on footpaths.”. Mr. Ku-
mar agrees that such businesses generate income for “many a poor family,” but wonders
that “no attempt seems to have been done or might be possible to do to assess the overall
cost to the economy of the state due to the marginal economic activities...by a few poor
14See (Chakraborty 1997, p.65).
15See (Singh 1997, p.64).
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families.” But without much attention to the contradiction he concludes: “It is definite
that these poor families were earning a living at great cost to the economy as a whole.”
The guilt of enjoying “leisurely walk” or “fast ride” is glossed over by the “hope that the
benefits of the economic development” will “soon” compensate for the “sacrifice of their
business.”. The pain that might cause the poor businessmen because of eviction “will re-
sult in a sunshine in the economic scenery of the state.”16 Journalist, Shankar Mukherjee,
wrote the hawker problem is everywhere in the world, but in Calcutta it has become insur-
mountable. The rich businessmen, or “prospective investors,”, are hesitant and hence, the
state government has become firm in its manner of courtship. “It has realized that the city
should unfold itself to the prospective investors in an attractive manner.”17
4.2.2 The Reality of Selling
But such an exclusive order of a hawker free shining, speedy, and growthful city was not
in any sense or form the way the issue of hawkers was unfurling in late 1980s and early
90s, locally and nationally. The Sodan Singh Verdict of 1989 from the Supreme Court of
India observed that, “in a nut shell,” Article 19(1)(g) “takes into its fold” the fundamental
guarantee that a citizen of India can carry on “any activity” “to earn his living.”18
Once street-trading is accepted as legitimate trade, business or occupation it auto-
matically comes within the protection guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Con-
stitution of India. Street trading is an age-old vocation adopted by human beings
to earn living. It is one of the traditionally recognised business or trade in England.
This is so in spite of the fact that there is a complete social security in that coun-
try and as such no compulsion on the citizens to be driven to street trading out of
poverty or unemployment. On the other hand, abysmal poverty in India warrants
outright rejection of the argument that nobody has a right to engage himself in
’street trading’. . . Street trading being a fundamental right has to be made available
16See (Kumar 1997, p.63).
17See (Mukherjee 1997, p.112).
18The court maintained that “the activity must of course be legitimate and no anti-social like gambling,
trafficking in women and the like.” See, Sodan Singh Vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee [1989], 1989
SCR (3)1038 (Supreme Court of India).
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to the citizens subject to Article 19(6) of the constitution. It is within the domain of
the State to make any law imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of general
public. This can be done by an enactment on the same lines as in England or by any
other law permissible under Article 19(6) of the Constitution.
Although, as we will see later, invocation of Article 19(6)19 provides untrammeled dis-
cretionary power to the state to intervene in unorganized retail and market competition,
in principle it maintained that their right to trade derived from a fundamental constitu-
tional right to livelihood, couldn’t be outright denied by the state even if it is carried out
in public spaces. Previously in 1986 in Self-Employed Women’s Association Vs. Municipal
Corporation of Ahmedabad, the Supreme Court directed the state to provide appropriate
licenses to vegetable vendors.20 In 1990, the Calcutta High Court directed the government
to regulate hawking through zoning, and allow for rehabilitation in case of evictions.21 It
seemed the 1985 Supreme Court judgment in Bombay Hawkers’ Union and Ors. vs Bom-
bay Municipal Corporation held by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud was significantly di-
luted in the favor of hawkers by the end of the decade.22
19Article 19(6) of The Constitution Of India 1949 states that “Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said
clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from mak-
ing any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the
right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating
to, (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any
occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled
by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of
citizens or otherwise.
20See Self-employed Women’s Association and Ors. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad and
Ors.[1986]Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 32061(Supreme Court of India)
21See (Ghosh 2000).
22“No one has any right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance, annoyance or incon-
venience to the other members of the public. Public streets, by their very nomenclature and definition, are
meant for the use of the general public. They are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or
business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them, they could hold the society to ransom
by squatting on the centre of busy thoroughfares, thereby paralyzing all civic life. Indeed, that is what
some of them have done in some parts of the city. They have made it impossible for the pedestrians to
walk on footpaths or even on the streets properly so called.” The court also held that “the right conferred
by Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution to carry on any trade or business is subject to the provisions of
clause (b) of that Article, which provides that nothing in sub-clause (g) of Article 19(1) shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing.
in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the
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In 1993, the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health (AIIHPH), Calcutta,
was tasked with implementing an United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization
project entitled Street Foods in Calcutta. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC)
and the Calcutta Police (CP) assisted in the implementation of the study. The advisory
committee didn’t include any food hawkers, or their representatives, but the committee
followed a “coordinated approach” and conducted a series of meeting with “vendors unions
with representative vendors.” The study revealed some “remarkable issues” in economics,
“though the areas and clientele differed markedly in their economic status the price of the
food was nearly the same in all areas irrespective of the income status of the clientèle.”
Self-reported profits and wages ranged from 37.5 dollars to a 100 dollars a month, and
15 to 40 dollars a month, respectively, but the committee believed the variance could be
higher. Of the 50 kinds of food that were popularly consumed, the study concluded, “the
street foods could provide 200 calories of energy per Re.1 (0.02 US$), which work out to
be approximately 1,000 calories per Rs. 5-6 (viz. 1,000 calories for 16-19 cents).” But
under the microscope it found bacterial hazards, which “presumably arose because of re-
peated handling and use of substandard water at different stages.”23 In one of the meet-
ings24 held on 4th May 1993, all the implementing agencies were present to discuss the
report of the study and the accompanying recommendations. Prof. Indira Chakrabarty,
who was one of the principal investigators of in the report, “highlighted the need to im-
prove the quality of street food by creating awareness among vendors” and by “intensive
training of all the concerned personnel in this aspect.” She also highlighted the need to co-
ordinate the actions between CP, CMC, and the Local Government in implementing the
recommendations of the report. The Police Commissioner, Mr. Tushar Talukdar, himself
said subclause.” See Bombay Hawkers’ Union And Ors. Vs Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors.[1985]
AIR 1206. (Supreme Court of India)
23See (Chakrabarty 2002) and (Chakravarty (accessed March, 2014)).
24Minutes of Meeting No. BN/-93-454. Dated. 30.3.1993.
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held that “due to acute unemployment problem” the total eviction of food vendors was
impossible, “both from the point of view of consumes and sellers.” But because of “nui-
sance factor” caused by these vendors, their numbers could be “reduced by 25 to 30%”.
A way to implement this will be to issue a “sort of identification/temporary licence from
which the Corporation can earn some revenue and at the same time it will help in control-
ling the influx of hawkers.” (e.a.). Dr. Subodh Dey, Mayor-in council (Health), seconded
all the foregoing propositions wholeheartedly. Dr. S.I. Zakhariev, Chief of FAO in India
and Bhutan, stressed the importance of “cheap” and “fresh” street food in sustaining the
“health of poor people all over the world.” An idea of mobile kiosks had been penned out,
which was to be designed by the Calcutta Police. Dr. Bela Dutta Gupta, Member of the
State Planning Board, noted that in places like Singapore and Kualampur, “kiosks had
permanent fixtures in specified areas and provided with water supply and electricity” and
“they also follow hygienic practices in these places”. She advocated for such utility be sup-
plied “every twenty yards,”, but had “some reservations of kiosks as such.”
4.2.3 Who Represents Who?
On the Hawkers’ side of the representation, Md. Nizamuddin, MLA and President of the
CITU Hawkers Union, “was happy to note the developments of the meeting” but did not
agree with the proposition of a 25-30% decrease in numbers.” He “agreed that such ven-
dors should be allowed specific spaces and could also be vacated from the existing places
if required, but it should be ensured that no other vendor could occupy such places at a
later date,” and called for an “in depth discussion on the structure of the Kiosks.” Mr.
Shaktiman Ghosh, President of Hawkers Union, welcomed the idea of the kiosks, and “in-
dicated that there shouldn’t be any permanent structure for vending” as such structure
could be occupied at night by “anti-socials.”. Shri Santiranjan Ganguly, MLA and Pres-
ident of Bengal Hawkers Union, thought “street hawking is not a problem of Calcutta or
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West Bengal alone but was a world wide(sic) problem.” With certain personalized modi-
fications he was supportive of mobile kiosks and calculated that the CMC might make “1
crore of revenue per month” if “they were provided with licenses. Summarily, the commit-
tee recommended that although microbiological analysis of the vendors’ food needed im-
provement, it was “comparable to those obtained from small hotels,.” and that there was
need for much awareness, training, for both the regulators and the regulated. It stressed
that “vendors cannot be evicted totally” but “steps are needed” to “immediately” stop all
new entrants. There was also a sense of immediacy observed by decision makers in terms
of “regulatory mechanism” to control the food quality and hygiene, environmental san-
itation, congestion on thorough fairs, etc.” which could be accomplished “by providing
some identity to vendors” and the usage of mobile foldable kiosks. Subsequently, the rep-
resentatives of hawkers and trade unions held several meetings with the officials of CMC
and Calcutta Police between 1993 and 1996. Hawkers cannot have permanent structures
and must use kiosks. They should only be allowed to vend in certain zones within certain
hours. Unions must comply by the maximum capacity of hawkers allowed in each zone
and will issue photo identity cards indicating the kiosk number and location. At one point
in January of 1996, there were even meetings held for financing the cost of kiosks. One
Shri M.K. Sen, the Deputy General Manager of United Bank of India, “intimated that un-
der the Scheme for Urban Micro Enterprises (SUME)” loans at a rate of 12.5% could be
available to hawkers, as long as they are ration card holding residents of West Bengal and
“an ordinary resident” of Calcutta for at least three years.25 Going through the minutes of
these meetings it becomes clear that a consensus towards transformation was developing
within the stable contours of the Partisan Society. It was a sort of negotiated settlement
251. Minutes of the Meeting Held on 26.10.95 in the Chamber of JT.CP (Traffic) Regarding Regulation
of Hawkers in the BBD. Bag Area and Camac Street.(Document Available from Author)
2. Minutes of the Meeting. The representatives of Banks and Hawkers’ union regarding bank loans. on
12.1.96 in the Chamber of JT.CP (Traffic) Regarding Regulation of Hawkers in the BBD. Bag Area and
Camac Street.(Document Available from Author)
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“with a view to regulate hawkers,” a sort of reluctant semi-formalization of the informal.
But it was agreed by the unions and state authorities to be an appropriate solution to the
“nuisance factor,” or as a representative of the hawkers himself portrayed it, “a worldwide
problem.” This plan to reduce hawkers by identifying and curtailing entry with a licens-
ing regime (when India was doing away with the license Raj) seemed to be all ready to
be implemented. The press reported in the end of 1994 that, the hawkers’ unions and the
Calcutta police have come to an understanding, and that this system will also bring in a
lot of money into the treasury. Going through the minutes of these meetings it becomes
clear that a consensus towards transformation was developing within the stable contours
of the Partisan Society. It was a sort of negotiated settlement “with a view to regulate
hawkers,” a sort of reluctant semi-formalization of the informal. But it was agreed by the
unions and state authorities to be an appropriate solution to the “nuisance factor” or as
a representative of Hawkers himself portrayed it, “a worldwide problem.” This plan to re-
duce hawkers by identifying and curtailing entry with a licensing regime (when India was
doing away with the license raj) seemed to be all ready to be implemented. The press re-
ported in the end of 1994 that, the hawkers’ unions and the Calcutta police have come
to an understanding, and that this system will also bring in a lot of money into the trea-
sury.26
There was severe dissatisfaction within the press with this solution of reducing mar-
ket competition with state intervention. In a special essay(Bartaman 1994) one Obboy
Sen asked in 1994: “Does this mean the authorities are trying to accept the overflowing
(upchey pora) of hawkers. Shall we be now be forced to navigate the hawker covered foot-
paths and station platforms?” The writer concedes that there is a humanist angle which
connects vending with socioeconomic conditions, and acknowledges that the Indian Supreme
Court has considered Street vending to be a legitimate and legal profession, but like Rach-
26See (Jugantar 1994) and (Telegraph 1994).
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pal Singh, his logic of exclusion rests on the consequentialist logic which questions the
constitutional validity of allowing the distress of millions for the livelihood of thousands.
Mr. Sen argues that in order to accommodate some hawkers’ livelihood one cannot disre-
gard the fundamental right of walkers to walk without any hindrance (nirbighney chola-
chol), and hence selling out empty urban spaces will result in giving up the city (taho-
ley to shohor kei tuley ditey hoi). But what about the kiosks? The minutes of the meet-
ings discussed above, were obsessed with a visual order of neatness and cleanliness. What
could be the problem if licensed hawkers sell stuff on the streets in an orderly fashion reg-
ulated and controlled by a licensing/identity card regime implemented by (to use Ritajy-
oti’s phrase) “the state-union complex”? What would be the problem if they start selling
wares in kiosks? Abboy has an answer:
This plan is quite encouraging (utshaho byanjok). If we could make this happen in
Kolkata then there could have been a stable solution to the problem. Although this
solution might seem to be quite attractive in the streets of Rome or in some neat
and clean European city, it is quite out of place/mismatched (bey-manan) in the con-
text of congested (ghinji), dirty, and dense (aparisar). Kolkata hawkers sell many
more things than food, and how could those be kept in those glass wrapped kiosks?
If the number of these mobile kiosks increase, then it will be an even bigger disas-
ter on Kolkata roads. Hence the solution to hawkers is not giving them license but
proper rehabilitation.
What is rehabilitation? Obbyoy here echoes the idea of the civil society of creating
vertical markets in place of old established market spaces or give hawkers some open space
far away from the area where they usually sell. But this form of rehabilitation defeats the
purpose of rehabilitation which must be concerned with the restoration of the ability to
continue one’s livelihood as effectively as before. Taking hawkers away and putting them
in empty areas away from their usual profit generating spaces, eliminates the very aspect
of locational efficiency and advantage that hawkers use for competitive profit making, and
as experience suggests, doesn’t have the desired results.
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4.3 Changing Tides of the Mid-90s
In 1995 things took a peculiar turn in local politics as the press reported, “Despite the
chief minister Mr. Jyoti Basu’s reluctance to provide city hawkers with kiosks, the po-
lice chief, Mr. Tushar Talukdar, recently held a meeting with representatives of hawkers’
unions to work out a way of implementing the scheme.” Although the state government
initially “decided to provide” kiosks to hawkers, they “dropped the proposal following ob-
jections by Mr. Basu.” who saw the “haphazard parking” of kiosks contributing to traffic
congestion. Apparently, Mr. Basu had urged the transport department to “introduce the
scheme in an experimental basis.”27 On 23rd March 1995, the transport minister of West
Bengal, Mr. Shyamal Chakrabarty, and the Chief Whip (mukhyo shachetak) of the Left
Front, and Mr. Laxmi Dey (also a CPI(M) Member of West Bengal Legislative Assem-
bly), gave conflicting statement about hawkers. The transport minister stressed that some
streets have to be completely freed of hawkers, and claimed that there has been a discus-
sion about this with the unions. While the Chief Whip maintained that hawkers cannot be
evicted from the streets because of economic reasons and Calcutta will move forward by
including everyone.28
The hawkers of the Gariahat Boulevard replete with electricity connections and reg-
istered telephone booths, which hads developed and expanded since the 1950s, confronted
a precarious future. At the end of 1994 rumors about a flyover were circulating, Sanjay
Chaudhuri recalled. However these decisions were secret, “no one tells you about such
plans (egulo to bola hoy na) because if the word gets out we will start demonstrating with
the help of some political parties (agey thekey kono ekta party niye andolon shuru korey
debo), and ‘there will be movements and all that’ as it is about livelihoods (ruti rujir bya-
27See (Telegraph 1995).
28See (Bartaman 1995c).
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par).”29 In fact, by March of 1995 the press reported that the entire boulevard hawkers
between the stretch of road connecting Golepark and Gariahat Junction will be “broken
down by the first week of April.” There were two reasons for this decision reached at a
“high level” meeting by the Mayor’s office: the reduction of congestion, and cleaning of
underground sewage arteries on which supposedly the boulevard sat. The ranked offi-
cer who provided the details of this decision maintained that although there were more
than hundred illegal hawkers, only sixty-seven who have legal standing will be rehabili-
tated in the nearby Gariahat Corporation Market. The rest will be evicted to broaden the
street.30 Within a week the hawkers of the boulevard corner, appealed to the Mayor, and
urged the office to rehabilitate them before breaking down their businesses. They reiter-
ated that they have been doing business there for four decades under the legal rights at-
tributed/conferred by Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy,31 in 1956.32 Things started heating up in
the Autumn of 1995 when The Municipal commissioner, Mr. Asim Burman, opined that
there are legal obstacles in providing license to hawkers, for which the CMC has asked ad-
vice from the state government. In late September, CITU affiliated Calcutta Street Hawk-
ers Union led a rally joined by thousands of hawkers demanding their licenses as agreed
previously. Chairman of the union Mohammed Nizamuddin claimed that there was an
agreement with the state government in 1988 that hawkers will be allowed in all but six-
teen streets of Calcutta. There was a call to organize all the left unions after the Durga
Puja. But the commissioner cited the Justice Chandrachud decision of 1985, which ac-
cording to him has forbidden the provision of license to street vendors.33 There was no
mention of the other Supreme Court verdicts of the late 80s (like Sodan Singh) that have
struck down outright banishment of hawkers from city spaces, albeit with a caveat that it
29Sanjay Chaudhuri (Ex Gariahat Boulevard Vendor) interview by author, January 18 2009
30See (Bartaman 1995c).
31The Chief Minister of West Bengal from 1950-1962.
32See (Bartaman 1995b).
33See (AajKaal 1995).
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could be controlled by the state.
4.3.1 Turning Right While Signaling Left
Times were changing for the ruling left front at the national, state, and local levels. Al-
though the left coalition headed by the CPM has consistently won state elections since
1967 and was still in power in 1991, it had started to see its electoral downswing. Com-
pared to the 1987 assembly elections, the Left Front lost 6 seats and about 4% of votes
polled. In the 1991 national elections, the left parties saw their combined votes reduce by
3% although they managed to hold on to their seats. The decay has started at the urban
level at a faster rate. At the municipality level, the CPM saw its seats reduce from 74 in
1990 to 56 in 1995. All its allies (CPI, RSP, and AIFB) also lost several seats. Opponent
Congress increased its presence from 37 in 1990 to 66 in 1995.34
As the national and state elections of 1996 loomed large, the left leadership had to
do something drastic to gain the faltering support of the new Bengali middle class now
being able to readily compare their hackneyed existence in a dusty congested city to the
cabled images of the shine and neatness of global metropolises circulating all day. By the
end of 1995, it was clear that the left front leadership was clearly divided on the issue. A
leading Bengali daily, reported that in a recent CMC meeting on “eviction” (uchhed) of
hawkers for “tidying up” (porichhonno) the city the members of the Congress party have
recommended the use of “spot fines.” But the Mayor in Council, Mr. Kanti Ganguly from
CPM, had rejected this plan for “socio-political” (shamajik-rajnaitik) reasons. The CM
Basu, however, had serious problems about “unwanted encroachment” (bedokhol) of Cal-
cutta streets. The CMC had organized a Mayor’s convention (mahanagorik convention) on
cleaning Calcutta, where the CM of West Bengal warned those who encroach on footpaths
by faking livelihood problems, and said “it cannot go on like this” (eibhabey to choltey
34Data From Election Commission of India
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parey na). The reporter also pointed in utmost detail the reality of city streets around the
CMC headquarters itself that completely opposite of Mr. Kanti Ganguly’s vision about a
cleanliness campaign at the “ground breaking” (shara jagano) convention.35
Just north of the corporation building, on the footpaths of S.N. Banerjee Road, -
hawkers, from banana peels to fruits, cut fruits, and cooked food partially covered
by baskets. To the south meat shops and heaps of oranges. To the west, it is impos-
sible to be on a footpath because of illegal parking of luxury buses, and fecal mat-
ter. At least three man-holes (sic) don’t have lids. The worst situation is around
Hogg Street. Along the railings of the footpath vagabonds congregate and chat.
(bhoboghureder adda), a burst is flooding the wall and the footpath. Its literally the
nature of hell. (akkhorik orthey noroker poribesh).
Thus, we slowly begin to see the localized expression of the national neoliberal moment.
The lived city becomes incorrigible and intolerable in the face of a growing need to look
like a growing global city by measuring up to a certain form of aesthetic and hence politi-
cal order of making a livelihood. Compared to a utopic vision of a neat and clean, smooth
and speedy, urban growth, the city by the mid-nineties started to seem like “hell.” The
aggravation resulting from this putative backwardness was directed towards members of
Market Society. By December of 1995, following a common and time tested move in In-
dian democratic politics, one arm of the state started blaming the other. Although the
communist CM has repeatedly and publicly expressed his wish for total eviction of street
vendors, the Mayor started blaming the police for not being active in their eviction based
on a list that was provided to them. The police denied having any such list. In fact, the
police commissioner, Mr. Tushar Talukdar, claimed that he has repeatedly complained
to the CM about a non-cooperative CMC. On the matter of kiosks, the version of the
mayor’s office now was that there was no law that will support their implementation.36
Consequently, unions affiliated to ruling left front parties organized a massive rally protest-
ing harassment by police. Hawkers vociferously demmanded licenses and rehabilitation.
35See (Anandabazar Patrika 1995a).
36See (Bartaman 1995a).
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The criticisms of the government policies pointed that a news report in the mainstream
press noted “if there were no red flags on the stage, one couldn’t realize that this is a gath-
ering of leftist trade unions.” 37
One cannot but pause to note what this says about the dissolution of ideological pol-
itics of the left and right slowly being replaced by a growth politics in the 90s India. The
left front government which was associated with the relentless usage of its popular catch-
phrase “government of the deprived” or more literally “government of/for the people who
have nothing” (shorboharar sarkar) was now overtly anti-hawker, with the CM walking
on a path of minimum compromise. The left union leaders (notwithstanding the steady
source of funding from Market Society) who were criticizing such anti-hawker policies on
ideological grounds, flummoxed the members of press. It seems awkward to the press that
left unions with their red flags, are trenchantly criticizing their own affiliated parties and
their leader ship for making a right turn on hawkers while signaling left. An underlying
pattern in democratic politics in general (and Indian politics in particular) is that there
is an expectation of an automatic pattern of consent based on party lines, where elected
officials avoid direct criticism of the policies formulated by party leadership. As “the econ-
omy” replaces the divine in serving as the locus of legitimate power, it is only a corollary
that the fixation on economic growth will be a central part of democratic politics in capi-
talism. The politics of GDP growth ensuing from P3 serves as a moral imperative, where
achievement of economic growth serves as a final marker of legitimacy among the member
of the civil society in 90s Calcutta. A pro-growth approach subsumes ideological moorings,
one does follow the party line, but the party line itself is betrothed to the growth imper-
ative which must be represented to its citizens in a way that looks and feels like growth.
Thus economic growth, (and its attendant concepts like efficiency, productivity, and envi-
ronment) becomes the (a)moral/(a)political compass that will guide policy in a post ide-
37See (Jugantar 1995).
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ological Bengal. Yet, economic growth of bounded collectivities is an abstract and rela-
tive concept. After all much of the data on economic activity and hence its growth fails
to include the vast amount of economic activity and economic growth in the unorganized
sector: the actually existing economic life of people, or already existing profit generating
market forms that people operate in to reproduce their lives by employ themselves. The
politics of economic growth attempts to transform the existing economic life in S2 to con-
firm to a certain measurable and visual order. One can’t however see and touch economic
growth, hence the real-life manifestation of this walk on the high growth path could be
only felt and lived if the city looks and walks a certain way that conforms to the visual or-
der of neatness, propriety, and speed. Let me put it in the language of Basudeb Barman,38
from his essay titled Let business be where it should, not on roads.
All hawkers (encroachers to be exact) should be removed from the streets of Cal-
cutta. . . Every day the speed of vehicles will be hampered. . . Because of traffic jam
men have wasted their valuable time, and many man hours have been lost. Some say
loss adds up to 4 Crores daily, but I am sure it is more than that, whether men go
by foot, or by cars, or roads, obstacles cause irritation as one fails to keep time ev-
erywhere. It hampers productivity very adversely and this causes mental unrest and
irritation. . . This kind of forceful occupation and illegal conducting of business by
hindering public progress can never be supported. If there is anyone who supports
this, that person is supporting something unethical. This does not mean of course,
that one should starve to death.
Short of starvation, politics is only a mundane yet constant act of tinkering of gov-
ernance to achieve economic growth which has taken the mantle of divinely ordained le-
gitimacy now to be showcased by a neat and clean city. It could as well be argued as a
continuation of Vice Chancellor’s logic of cost based analysis, that if every Calcuttan went
to work on time in an efficient manner the amount of money saved and growth achieved
could even outweigh the cost of starvation. It is within this political environment of growth
and renewal, which (Roy 2003, p.11) describes as an attempt to “recover a gentleman’s
38Introduced in the text as “Vice Chancellor, Kalyani University-very old resident of Calcutta”. See
(Barman 1997a, p.22-23).
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Calcutta,” that the issue of hawkers will unfold as 1996 unfolded towards Operation Sun-
shine.
4.4 Electoral Ebbs
In mid 1996mid-1996 the state legislative results came in and the leading CPM saw its
control of Bidhan Sabha seats slip by an astronomical 42 seats (189 in 1991 to 157 in 1996).
Its allies (CPI, RSP, AIFB) together lost 9 seats. In the national elections the CPM and
CPI dragged down the left front by 7 seats, with CPM being the biggest loser of 5 seats,
mainly from the urban areas of West Bengal.39 More relevant to our hawkers, the previ-
ous transport minister Mr. Shyamal Chakrabarty was defeated in his constituency. Mr.
Subhash Chakrabarty became the new transport minister, who felt a special and imme-
diate need for speed. The CPI and the AIFB affiliated unions warned about “rivers of
blood” (roktogonga) if hawkers were forcefully evicted.40 News started floating out on the
next day that a high level (uchhoporjayer) “task force” has been created by the CM him-
self, that, alongside Transport Minister (Subhash Chakrabarty) and Police Minister (Bud-
dhadeb Bhattacharya), will also include the Mayor, Mr. Prasanta Chatterjee. An official
in the department of urban development mentioned that since the CM would be travel-
ling from 18th September overseas to attract foreign investments into the city, a “line of
action” must be approved by him before he leaves.41 The “most influential” party of the
ruling left front CPM, had publicly “vowed” to clear the city of hawkers.42 In fact, the
CM himself communicated forcefully that Subhash Chakrabarty want’s to bring speed to
the city, and in this regard there is no point with discussing with the hawkers unions. He
maintained that after discussion among the left front leadership the decision will be com-
39Data collected from Election Commission of India
40See (Bartaman 1996a).
41See (Shongbaad Pratidin 1996).
42See (Asian Age 1996).
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municated to the unions.43 This was indeed a complete reversal of the negotiated terms
reached a year ago, as the Mayor Prasanta Chatterjee himself after winning the elections
of 1995, said “we are not saying hawkers will be evicted. Hawkers will stay. But they must
follow rules.44 By mid-September of 1996 it was decided that even the Gariahat Boule-
vard hawkers will be removed. When I interviewed the veteran hawkers of the Gariahat
Boulevard and hawker leaders I got several reasonings behind the sudden change in pol-
icy regarding hawkers. On September 3rd 1996, seven central trade unions and 30 local
trade unions came together to form the Hawker Sangram Committee (HSC). Whereas,
as late as May of 1996, the idea of the kiosk based hawking on six streets was finalized
based on previous meetings with the police and erstwhile transport minister Mr. Shya-
mal Chakrabarty a sudden change in policy by the new transport minister, Mr. Subhash
Chakrabarty, compelled the unions to unite under one organization. The official reasoning
provided by the HSC was that the official line of increasing the acceleration of traffic was
just a ruse, and that “the real reason was to create conditions for getting loan from the
world back which put eviction of hawkers as one of the conditionalities.”45 Both Pradip
Roy and Sanjay Chaudhuri equivocally stressed that the flyover, that was to replace their
market space, was a condition for foreign loans. More importantly they stressed that Mr.
Jyoti Basu was keen on getting FDI, and the following year British PM Mr. John Major
with a “400 crore loan” proposal was supposed to visit the city with a business delegation
to gauge investment worthiness. The CM was impatiently keen to present a clean city de-
void of hawkers showcasing the pristine colonial grandeur of the city to the British delega-
tion.46 All the hawkers in the Gariahat Boulevard felt completely blind-sided and amazed
by a sudden decision in late 1996 that not only the footpath hawkers but they too have to
43See (Sonar Bangla 1996).
44See (Sonar Bangla 1995).
45See (Hawker Sangram Committee 2000).
46See (Ghulati 2000).
152
dismantle within weeks. In fact the state committee of the ruling CPM was itself fractured
on the issue, with Subhash Chakrabarty and Kanti Ganguly on one side and Buddhadeb
Bhattacharya and Prasanta Chatterjee on the other, - the latter faction being more prone
towards a less drastic approach, while the former, especially Subhash demonstrating an
unwavering resolve to evict, even if it caused him his political career.47 As far as Subhash
was concerned he was going to “show what he can do, without thinking about what oth-
ers are saying.”48 In less than a month however his stance softened, as he declared in a
rally organized by CITU that only hawkers who have set up permanent structures on the
pavement, making a lot of money will be evicted. The rally itself created a massive traf-
fic gridlock throughout the city.49 But all this was, in effect, merely tinkering at the edges
of a decision that ultimately attempted to get rid of all hawkers form the city limits. The
way was to first reduce their numbers and visibility and then in time eliminate their pres-
ence altogether. After all, (as the Telegraph observed back in June 1996) in spite of the
factions within the CPM comprising of Subhash and Buddhadeb camps, these left front
leaders were fundamentally the same: both trying to build a a progressive force in the
party that is ready to rid itself of old approaches that “are out of sync with the changed
socio-economic scenario.”50
On 21st November, the CMC gave hawkers three more days to leave and clear out
their belongings, not posing the obvious question where would these thousands of business-
men go? Is it possible for them to vanish from the streets on which they have entrenched
themselves for decades? The Ballygunj Hawkers Union immediately got an interim order
from the Calcutta High Court which allowed a stay of eviction for three weeks. Subhash in
a bizarre logic started insisting that this move was not anti-hawkers, claiming that he will
47See (Bangalok 1996).
48See (AajKaal 1996).
49See (Statesman 1996h).
50See (Telegraph 1996e).
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be benevolent towards those who will be evicted peacefully. A couple of days before the
actual operation, responding to Youth Congress leader Ms. Mamata Banerjee’s resonation
on the side of hawkers’ warnings of “bloodbath,” he quipped, “we will have no alternative
but to open blood donation camps.”51
4.5 Sunshine at Midnight
The actual operation started at the middle of the night on the 24th of November 1996,
at around midnight with “10,000 people, nearly 200 vehicles and 10 bulldozers.”. CPM
party cadres were employed from the suburbs to facilitate the operation. Even with the
talk of bloodshed the evictions were largely peaceful, except for an instance when a mob
set fire to a CMC truck carrying seized goods.52 Even CITU hawkers who are affiliated
to the ruling left were not spared, called it a “rape of democracy,” especially since they
paid subscriptions to the CPM and have populated their meetings and rallies. The ram-
page unleashed by CMC officials and party cadres was so indiscriminate that some shops
with papers and not situated on the pavements were also pulled down. Regardless of this
chaos, however, some hawkers did brisk business on whatever they could salvage from the
debris that the CMC failed to carry way.53 The political opposition to the left front was
quick to exploit this discontent. Within a couple of days the Indian National Trade Union
Congress(INTUC)54 and HSC, the umbrella union formed in September 1996 proposed
a complete shutdown (bandh) of the city. Ms. Mamata Banerjee, then a rising firebrand
youth congress leader (who will break away from the Congress Party to form her own Tri-
namul Congress (TMC) and deny the left front the state assembly in the 2011 elections),
went into a direct confrontation with the left front leadership, and was supported by the
51See (Statesman 1996e).
52See (Statesman 1996g).
53See (Statesman 1996c).
54A national trade union affiliated to the Congress party.
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INTUC state president Mr. Subrata Mukherjee. Ms. Mamata Banerjee alleged that the
eviction was carried out to satisfy the World Bank stipulation for infrastructural projects,
and vowed to petition to the World Bank: “with photographs and video cassettes of the
inhuman eviction drive.” She also threatened to bring out mass demonstrations when the
World Bankers will visit the city.55 The other parties in the left front coalition, namely the
Forward Block, and CPI also strongly criticized the CPM leadership and asked their re-
spective unions to organize protest rallies. But this was ultimately the fight over process
and not content, as Subhash noted shortly after the operation responding to the criticisms
from his own ruling front members, -“they have criticized the way the action was taken,
not the action. The mode of action differs from one person to another. The way I take
action is different from others.” For the critics of OS he had a solution “to put hawkers
in front of their houses” so that “they will realize where the shoe pinches.”56 After all, he
was indeed echoing the sentiment of the civil society of gentlemanly Calcutta rejuvenated
by the vision of transforming urban space into its updated pro- growth version, -a vision
that melds the strange opposites of nostalgic yearning for open spaces of colonial palatial
grandeur along with the futuristic impulse of high speed global city. As a piece in a re-
spectable English newspaper put it “the humanitarian view of depriving numerous people
of the means of earning an honest livelihood is up against the urgent need to prevent the
total collapse of a city dreaming of acquiring the status of a mega-city” but in a way that
dreams never should conform to reality, “it is better late than never” to tackle the “per-
manent liability” of hawkers.57
As things often transpire much of the time in Indian politics, matters of livelihood
translates to damage and annihilation of state property by angry protestors, and this was
no exception. Hawkers, now under the expressed support of Mamata Banerjee burned
55See (Statesman 1996d).
56See (Statesman 1996f).
57See (Statesman 1996f).
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their share of state buses, CMC vehicles, threw petrol bombs at policemen, in spite of po-
lice intelligence that things will go over peacefully.58 As city wide unrest and speculations
followed so did surprise eviction drives orchestrated all through the city. The Telegraph
commented “The government’s cat and mouse eviction game, meant to hoodwink not only
hawkers but also politicians opposed to the cleanup drive, has apparently succeeded.”. It
was clear within the week, that the leaders of all ends of the political spectrum were con-
vinced that Calcutta cannot afford to have hawkers selling stuff on the streets, or as a re-
port put it “gift-wrapping Calcutta in the next four years” was absolutely necessary. Sub-
hash was praised for his “courage and political guile,” for this “singularly great” achieve-
ment against “successful businessmen without any legal status, posing as marginal citi-
zens.”59 Instead of licensing and regulation, the new negotiated position veered toward
promises of rehabilitation for those who are willingly dismantling their businesses. This
was to be doubled up with an awareness campaign against hawkers along with formation
of vigilante squads by NGOs for which the government was willing to provide “financial
and other assistance.”60 CPM threatened its cadres of disciplinary action for going against
the party line and ordered its subsidiaries to “whip up support for eviction.”61
The CM himself announced that hawkers will be rehabilitated, where the State Gov-
ernment will acquire 900 thousand square feet of land to be doled out at 60 square per
hawker.62 Subhash trying to douse the fire in his ruling house of Left Front, following FB’s
General Secretary Mr. Ashok Ghosh’s comment that Mr. Jyoti Basu’s reign was “any-
thing short of jungle raj,” announced the plan of organizing “entertainment programs” the
following year to raise money for Hawkers rehabilitation. This sort of ad-hoc gestures, per-
haps as intended, created confusion and division among the hawkers themselves, as many
58See (Statesman 1996a).
59See (Telegraph 1996b).
60See (Statesman 1996b).
61See (Telegraph 1996a).
62See (Statesman 1996i).
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Ballygunge Hawkers’ Union members (who had earlier led a petition to then high court
to obtain a stay order) started dismantling their businesses in south Kolkata in the hope
of rehabilitation while their colleagues “jeered them for being taken in by liars.” About a
third of more than a thousand hawkers in the area started to move out in the following
weeks.63
Pradip Roy in Gariahat Boulevard vividly recalled that the middle part of the Boule-
vard was dismantled by the hawkers themselves, creating a rift. Under the constant warn-
ings of eviction, hostile media coverage, and the verbal assurances of leaders that rehabil-
itation will be forthcoming if they dismantle voluntarily, some people started to take the
gamble, - dismantling and recovering some money from the scrap instead of getting bull-
dozed. But rehabilitation was a ruse to get the hawkers out of the street by creating a rift
among the Hawkers unions over the lure of a rehabilitation package. What Ananya Roy
describes as the “new geography of communism” was indeed a policy mechanism for the
leaders of the ruling party to dole out “selective” rehabilitation for hawkers of their affil-
iated unions, so that ruling left can further their “massive electoral possibility into small
bands of personal followers.”64
But as we can see such methods were not systematic, neither did they yield desired
results. On November 19th the HSC proposed multistoried structures belonging to differ-
ent unions as a mode of rehabilitation, to but this was rejected. Bulu Poddar in 1996 and
Zuver Ansari in 1997, both members of the CITU (affiliated to CPM) led Hawkers’ Union,
committed suicide.65 As we can see the crux of this new communism, the main pivot point
was a discursive shift towards embracing the growth politics of the neoliberal era. That
hawkers are a problem, and are impediments to Calcutta’s “take off,” were in principle
agreed to by all parties, even as I have shown, their own union leaders. The motive was
63See (Telegraph 1996c).
64See (Roy 2003, p.175).
65See (Hawker Sangram Committee 2000).
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to ultimately marginalize and eliminate street vending (along with hand carts, street typ-
ists, hand rickshaws) to institute the visual markers that will demonstrate a pro-growth
city ready to emulate the look of other global cities. J.P. Chowdhury66 after lauding the
masterminds of the operation Subhash Chakrabarty and Kanti Ganguly puts it straight-
forwardly,67
Though it is true, a large number of people who used to earn money by hawking will
be unemployed because of displacement, they have to suffer for the time being for
the sake of the city as well as the state. Traffic movement is the pulse of a metropoli-
tan city. If the vehicular speed is not increased then there is no chance of develop-
ment. . . I think Calcuttans should stand by beside the government and cooperate.
4.6 Rehabilitating Sunshine
Our Gariahat boulevard hawkers, were also promised rehabilitation by the masterminds
themselves. But as Pradip pointed out the tenure of the boulevard hawkers, in hindsight,
was always fragile under the force of “foreign money” (bairer taka) (from Japan in this
case) that was going to come in. The government after all was entering into a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) with Japanese Companies for six flyovers worth Rs. 380
Crores. According to the Boulevard hawkers, one of the conditionalities of the loan was
to get rid of hawkers. This was too attractive a proposition to demonstrate growth in
Calcutta compared to a thriving market that has developed since the sixties. There were
verbal assurances that they will be provided with rehabilitation in the nearby Gariahat
Market within a month. After dismantling their shops some hawkers started selling in
those vacant spaces, but the next day rubbish was dumped on the vacant spot. Their cus-
tomers, had “a lot of sympathy” (bishal sympathy) for them, after all they have set up a
lot of “good will” with customers, and their businesses were thriving. Now here comes the
66Introduced in the text as an “Eminent industrialist, former Sheriff of Calcutta and Chairperson of
Confederation of Engineering Industry”
67See (Barman 1997b, p.53).
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rehabilitation of the boulevard hawkers who were, as per the narrative I got from other
unions were the more privileged ones with strong connections with the echelons of power,
and were considered first in line for such accommodations. They were allotted a space in
nearby Gariahat Corporation Market in stalls that the corporation couldn’t sell after float-
ing several tenders over years, because in terms of location it was not suitable for business,
as it was above the fish market. Of the roughly 242 businesses, “even if we consider that
a half were supposed to rehabilitated”, they had to share a total of 15 to 20 stalls, with 4
sellers crammed in each stall. Some stall owners simply stored their commodities in those
stalls which were devoid of any electrical connections, and some people like Pradip went
on for three more years with a diving book business. By 1999 when the basement of the
Gariahat Market was developed for the resettlement based on lotteries, only 10% of the
businesses survived. “The rest were lost (hariye gechhey).” Sanjay whose well known fab-
ric and printing business was dismantled in two parts, a 20 sq. ft. above the fish market
and another similar sized stall in the basement area. On an average the allotment was 30
sq. feet at a cost of Rs.700 per square feet. He continued nevertheless for two more years,
“because it was either that or suicide”. There was almost no business during evenings,
which was the busiest time when they were in the boulevard. Sanjay simply couldn’t con-
tinue, and slowly had to fire all his employees, who were “in an even worse economic con-
dition than me”. Some hawkers started going in debt, and then sold their spaces and cut
the loss. Now some of them are working in sweet shops, some are sick and dead. They
were helpless (oshohay obostha) because they couldn’t get any other job, so the rehabili-
tation was indeed a farce. Pradip summed the rehabilitation with the example of trans-
planting a fish (jiol maachh) from one water body to the other: “the fish will die if it is
not introduced to its new surroundings within a timely fashion.” As Sanjay put it, in spite
of paying for corporation and income taxes, utility (phone and electricity) connections,
and in spite of all these negotiations with the Mayor himself, it was an sudden and out-
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right “backtracking” by the government. Some of the footpath hawkers in Gariahat, who
were ultimately allocated spaces outside the arteries of foot traffic in enclosed fields called
“hawker fairs,” (hawkers melas) also found their businesses flagging, and either sold off
their businesses and went back to vending on the streets.68 The left front was accused of
showing favoritism to hawkers affiliated to its unions, but even then the rehabilitation was
sporadic and incomplete often facing hostilities from businesses who were there earlier. In
short, as far as the state government was concerned it was against entering into any form
of negotiation regarding rehabilitation with the hawkers unions.69
The following few years were tumultuous for the street vendors in Calcutta. Numer-
ous protests, rallies, deputations and roadblocks were organized throughout Calcutta in
the face of ever more draconian laws instituted by the state, most notably the CMC 2nd
Amendment Bill dated in late 1997, which instituted strict fines and jail time for any en-
croachment, by hawkers, stall holder, and other organizations, and recognized them as
non-bailable offense.70 All this created days after days of traffic jams, which became worse
during the rainy season. Instead of accelerated traffic and happy walkers it seemed Cal-
cutta was now coming to a standstill. Then World Bank representatives who visited the
city in June, 1997, reported a vernacular daily, were surprised to see the beautiful foot-
paths of Gariahat. They couldn’t hide their satisfaction to the Mayor Prasanta Chatterjee
and Municipal Commissioner Asim Barman.71 But around the same time, one of the mas-
terminds of OS, Kanti Ganguly complained that, in the 21 forbidden streets, the hawkers
were coming back on the footpaths with the help of the police and the corporation em-
ployees who were making money on the side. During the second anniversary of the OS,
HSC provided a firmly worded deputation to the British High Commission stating that
68See (Shongbaad Pratidin 1998).
69See (Anandabazar Patrika 1998b).
70The Calcutta Gazette No. WB. (Part IV)/97/SAR-35.
71See (Anandabazar Patrika 1998a).
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“to satisfy your wish” for “global supremacy of your government” by creating “markets for
MNCs” our spineless national governments in Center and State are following a policy to
evict Hawkers”.72
4.6.1 Bringing the Hawkers Back In
The cat and mouse game of sporadic eviction and relentless protests continued without
abatement. The Statesman reported in large bold letters “Sunshine fades”. In the 21 streets
which were a part of the OS hawkers had returned “making brisk business”. And so in a
way are their hounders.” The only “concession” to the government order that the hawk-
ers have appeared to make is that permanent structures has been “replaced by polythene
sheets and baskets”. The police was still collecting money and harassing the hawkers.
One Jitendranath Das who had been selling kitchenware in the Hatibagan area for the
past 25 years said the bribe was 50 rupees per hawker. In the Brabourne Road area the
“constable-in-charge” was taking Rs.100 to “not bother you for the whole day”.The per-
manent hawking centers that were to be panacea for the problem was “still a dream”. The
hawker fairs were a massive failure as the hawkers refused to “budge from their old po-
sitions.” They maintained that these spaces were “away from where city life is busiest”
and hence “pointless.” 955 out of the 1385 hawkers from the Gariahat area who were pro-
vided space (in the outer eastern fringes of the city beside a 4 lane highway called East-
ern Metropolitan Bypass) didn’t come to the fair. 350 of the Ultadanga hawkers came
back within a week of their rehabilitation, and 800 “bundled off” to Tala Park returned
the same day, as the space allotted to them were “grazing grounds” and “a criminal den”.
Some hawkers claimed that they had already paid the government installments towards
setting up the stalls in one of these fairs but the “project hasn’t even begun”.73
72Letter Dated January 9. 1998 from HSC to British High Commission
73See (Statesman 1998).
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A year later, the hawkers were till on the footpaths. The 19 crore of rehabilitation
money seemed to have evaporated in five measly, incomplete projects, which were highly
unsuccessful. The Galiff street market with 840 stalls, for example that was built with
90 lakh rupees to rehabilitate the Hatibagan hawkers were lying empty. When I was do-
ing my fieldwork, I went there one Sunday which coincided with the weekly animal mar-
ket, and after some inquiry failed to get a real answer as to who is staying in those stalls.
Mostly it had been taken up by poor daily laborers and people living by the informal set-
tlements in that area. In the end of 1999, it was clear that “the rehabilitation process was
in deep waters” (othoi joley).74
On the 3rd Anniversayanniversary of OS, the HSC organized a huge rally where the
secretary Mr. Shaktiman Ghosh said “ we haven’t lost this fight. . . they evicted us in the
darkness of the night we will fight in the light of day.” This time they were joined by other
social organizations protesting against government evictions. There were tableaux remem-
bering the 100 hawkers that have died since OS. They vowed to fight until there is a proper
rehabilitation of all hawkers.75 Subsequently the CMC declared that it cannot keep up
with the eviction process “due to lack of manpower and cooperation of the Calcutta po-
lice”, yet the according to the Calcutta Police “the police was always ready to assist the
civic body in its anti-hawker drive”.76 Kanti Ganguly, who stood defeated in the Lok Sabha
Election, started blaming the situation on Ms. Mamata Bannerjee and her newly found
TMC party, claiming that she was putting hawkers back on the streets.77 The ultimate
result of OS and other such eviction drives in Indian cities was to congeal the solidarity
among hawkers leading to a movement at the national level. At the turn of the millen-
nium a the resistance of street vendors across the country was coalescing into a concerted
74See (Bartaman 1996b).
75See (AajKaal 1999b).
76See (Roy 1999).
77See (Telegraph 1996d).
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effort for legality, tenure, and rehabilitation. The ultimate and perhaps unintentional con-
sequences of OS and other such eviction drives in India (and in cities around the world)
was propitiate a solidarity among hawkers at the national and international levels bound
with other similar movements representing state and corporate led evictions for example
Narmada Bachao.78. A couple of months before I arrived to do my field work in Calcutta,
a small timeline published in the Telegraph, titled Pedestrians lose right to pavements
summed up the contemporary situation more cogently than any amount of analysis can
accomplish.
1996: The Calcutta Municipal Corporation launches Operation Sunshine, the first
sustained campaign to clear some of the city’s crowded pavements of hawkers.
2006: The sun goes down on Operation Sunshine with the Calcutta Municipal Cor-
poration deciding to allow hawkers on all pavements, subject to amended rules.
2009: Hawkers are not only back for good, they are here to rule.
4.6.2 An Informal Irony
Going through years’ worth of newspaper clippings I also found an interesting incident
about “successful” rehabilitation that needs special mention, as it ends with a whiff of
irony. The Telegraph carried a front page story in 2008, about a 100 hawkers who were
in the Gariahat Boulevard and Golepark area that were entrepreneurial enough to rehabil-
itate on their own. They moved into “eight-cottah plot of land at Hindustan Park” where
they “built themselves a market complex called Shatadeep.” The report called these “100
hawker-turned-traders”, “unsung heroes of Operation Sunshine”, -an example of self suffi-
ciency “without getting in the way of pedestrians”. That “hawkers-turned-traders” com-
plex “at the end of a narrow lane, got to smooth start”. But Bikash Bhattacharya of CPM
took tenure as Mayor in 2005 in an electoral victory that was seen as a leftist “capture” of
78See (AajKaal 1999a).
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Calcutta- “the prized CMC from the National Trinamul Congress(NTC).79 Since the Oper-
ation Sunshine, Mamata Banerjee of the NTC had been an active supporter of the Hawker
Sangram Committee, showing up in “hungry processions” (bhukha micchil), sometimes
selling wares in the streets along with the hawkers. Mayor Bikash was not to repeat the
mistake of his leftist predecessors. —As he was “making legitimate space for them on the
pavements of Calcutta, hawkers today have little to fear”.80 As a result, the article from
2008, continued, ”The hawker horror at Gariahat is back with a bang as pavements are
taken over by a double row of structures that sell everything from pin to porcelain forcing
pedestrians onto the congested carriageway near the Gariahat four-point crossing.” Now
our older “hawkers-turned-traders” of Gariahat and Golepark, who eked out a rehabilita-
tion at Satadeep complex were now irked by hawkers who were trading in front of their
narrow lane, and as it turns out, has been moving the Calcutta High Court since 2004
to “evict vendors squatting at their door.”81 During the 2000s as the hawkers’ rehabili-
tation and rights was slowly turning into a politically salient national issue, a new force of
chain/corporate retail, or more formally the industrialization of the second space of capi-
tal, occupied the focus of the hawkers’ movement and took the center-stage in the politi-
cal economy of street vending in Calcutta. For example consider this excerpt from a news
which made headlines in all vernacular papers and ws prominently reported by prominent
national outlets.82
Nearly three decades ago, they appropriated the city’s footpaths from pedestrians.
Small shopkeepers saw red as they blocked shop-windows and lured customers away.
79When “a local television news channel asked the Communist Party of India (Marxist) State secretary
and Polit Bureau member Anil Biswas what he felt after the ‘capture’ of Kolkata. Biswas replied: ”It is
the people of Kolkata who have captured us.” See (Chattopadhay 2005).
80See (Telegraph 2008b).
81We find out that “A case was filed at Calcutta High Court in 2004 under the division bench of Ma-
haraj Sinha against one Bijoy Saha of BS Sales Counter. Saha had put up shop right in front of the plot
where Shatadeep was being built. He had promised to move out once the complex came up. However,
later he stayed put refusing to budge and Shatadeep hawkers had to move court. The case till date has
been heard only twice.” See (Telegraph 2008b).
82See (Times of India 2008 (Accessed Jan 11 2012 )).
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An attempt was made to rein them in a decade ago. But it proved shortlived. Em-
boldened, they encroached upon roads as well. On Thursday, they went a step fur-
ther and stopped a bona fide store from opening shutters. The reason: it would do
to them what they had done to thousands of stores for decades. Hawker Raj was
redefined on Friday morning when members of the Gariahat Indira Hawkers Union
(GIHU) prevented RPG group vice-chairman Sanjiv Goenka from inaugurating the
second-largest Spencers store in the city on Rashbehari Avenue. The union, set up in
the wake of Operation Sunshine in 1996 when hawkers were evicted from Gariahat,
Esplanade and Hatibagan crossings, laid siege to the store’s gates around 10.30 am
and prevented anyone from entering or exiting the premises.
Formalization of spaces of selling along with precarious informalized wage labor in
those spaces selling, will be the new force of growth oriented neoliberal politics that will
shape and be shaped by informal retail.
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Chapter 5
Rights or Rightlessness?
5.1 Hawkery in the New Millenium
The radical eviction drives of the 1990s, like the OS in Calcutta, which tried to root out
hawkers from public urban spaces could be understood as a structural break in two senses.
a) Such sweeping eviction drives were a result of a significant break in thinking about
the city and its citizens. As shown above, with liberalization, displaying growth became
the divine ordinance of legitimate rule. A jump from a so-called Hindu growth rate to a
Rajan rate of 10% was accompanied by the civil society discourses of forgetting, which,
although present before the 90s, now started to display acute anxiety about the very pres-
ence of hawkers. The common sense that emanated from this neoliberal pro-growth pol-
itics was that the hawkers are inimical to economic growth and expansion, even though
hawkers were generating substantive profits and employment. The imagination of the grow-
ing, global, and entrepreneurial Calcutta could not include millions of people turning prof-
itable enterprises.
b) Such policy by the state towards forced elimination effective rehabilitation also re-
sulted in a notable change in force and tenor of hawkers’ movements. As shown before, in
166
Calcutta, such a decision was a complete reversal of agreements reached in previous ne-
gotiations by hawkers and the state. In fact, these cleansing methods had quite the oppo-
site unintended consequences. Instead of a gradual dissipation and disorganization among
hawkers, it renewed a sense of resolve, collaboration, and retaliation among street vendors,
both locally and nationally.
It is important to note that, OS and the subsequently increased solidarity among
hawkers unions was by no means a sporadic event, only reserved for postcolonial poli-
tics. In November 1995, an inaugural conference in Bellagio, Italy marked the first Inter-
national Alliance of Street Vendors. Attended by representatives of 11 cities from all five
continents, their international declaration demanded national policies for street vending.1
The National Association of Street Vendors of India (NASVI) was formed in 1998 and reg-
istered in 2003 “as an organization working for the protection of the livelihood rights of
thousands of street vendors across the country.” On their webpage they highlight their col-
lective “struggle for macro-level changes which had become imminent to support the liveli-
hood of around 10 million vendors which stand severely threatened due to outdated laws
and changing policies, practices, and attitudes of the powers that be.”2 In 2007 NASVI
produced the first-ever report on street vending in seven Indian cities under the director-
ship of Dr. Sharit Bhowmik. The report noted that the legality of hawkers in Calcutta
ruled according to the draconian 1997 amendment to the CMC Act which made hawking
a non-bailable offense. The report also noted ”fortunately for street vendors” the imple-
mentation of these amended provisions were successfully thwarted “mainly due to the re-
sistance put up by the Hawker Sangram Committee.”3 A “twin logic of circulation and
sanitization,” as Ritajyoti Bandyopadhyay puts it cogently, that rationalized the force of
evictions without any proper form of rehabilitation, led to the emergence of Hawker San-
1See (Sinha & Roever 2011, p.2-3).
2See http://nasvinet.org/newsite/about-nasvi/
3See (Bhowmik 2001).
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gram Committee as a formidably strong “federation” of Hawkers composed of more than
20 hawkers unions not affiliated to CITU.4 When I reached Calcutta for field research, it
was evident that it was impossible to research Kolkata hawkers without the active help,
support, and detailed archival material (petitions, documents, letters, reports, news clip-
pings, and time-lines) maintained by the HSC. I agree with (Bandyopadhyay 2016, p.701-
703) that “since 1996, the Hawker Sangram Committee has been the largest and the most
powerful federation of hawker associations/unions in Calcutta.” Establishing connections
and rapport with the leadership of HSC through the recommendation of other benevolent
researchers like Ritajyoti was perhaps the only tractable way to embark on systematic re-
search within time and resource constraints. After the chaos of Operation Sunshine, when
the hawkers came back in 1997, HSC was a major player in the resettlement of hawkers
in the footpaths. Ritajyoti claims that in the post OS environment, HSC and the state
“have come to constitute each other” as it has become the most visible, active, and pow-
erful organization representing the hawkers in Calcutta. According to this account (based
on interviews with General Secretary Shaktiman Ghosh), in the decades following OS the
state seemed to have outsourced its role of governing the informal street retail to HSC,
which underwrites informal credits, negotiates payments to the police, and controls entry
and exit of hawkers.5 There is ample evidence from news sources to support this claim.
For example, in 2006, a corporation drive selectively evicted hawkers from various parts
of Calcutta. However, by 2009 more hawkers have returned those spaces. One Nirmal Pa-
tra, who sells ready-made garments, said “we had to shell out a lot of money to reserve
the right to sell our wares. We had to satisfy a section of hawker union leaders as well. We
give a portion of our to some police officers as well.” The actual numbers came down to
“Rs. 50,000-75,000 which is reportedly divided 50-50 by police and union leaders” and an
4See (Bandyopadhyay 2016).
5See (Bandyopadhyay 2009).
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extra Rs. 20,000 annual ”protection money” is regularly collected via handbills.6 Accord-
ing to a 2009 news report, however, this control of HSC over the informal vending in Cal-
cutta does not seem to be as straightforward as it might appear on face value. In an arti-
cle titled, “Hawkers to have ID cards soon”7 Shaktiman Ghosh reportedly (and echoing his
erstwhile political adversaries) said, “despite orders from the mayor to demolish illegal and
permanent structures set up by hawkers, little seems to have been done by the city police.
There was a nexus between the police and some hawkers backed by some political parties.”
The account of HSC as the primary negotiator (an institution that serves as a transmis-
sion mechanism between the hawkers and the state, a final arbiter if you will) shaping the
particularities of everyday street vending is also a contingent truth: always structured by
the politics of markets and imperatives of making a livelihood. In other words, the author-
ity of HSC in Calcutta, although ubiquitous, is always under pressure from people willing
to make a living by street vending and willing to pay for it. HSC, in turn, has to take the
same position as the state. It has to police the number of hawkers and assist the state in
evicting those not filtered through the union’s institutional process. It is essential to also
situate HSC within the broader theoretical context of neoliberal politics. A core princi-
ple of neoliberalism (as I mention in chapter 2) is that the TSP should reduce spending
by withdrawing from welfare and redistribution functions and must bring in more than
it spends (P2). This retrenchment in welfare expenditures is accomplished by outsourc-
ing the welfare and distribution function to organizations like HSC, which operate both
as a union and an NGO. The field of social welfare itself becomes a market where various
NGOs vie for grants, donations, and political legitimacy to sustain themselves and repre-
sent their clientèle.
My fieldwork also revealed that in the decade following OS such a managerial role
6See (Times of India 2009 (Accessed Jan 11 2015 )).
7See (Statesman 2009).
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was also accompanied by a concomitant and significant ideational shift that drew HSC
into a broader ambit of struggle that defined the focus of hawkers’ movement in the post
OS era. It is important to note during the first decade of the 21st century a new conflict
was looming on the horizon. As India Inc. (a term that will be used to refer to NSEs in
the neoliberal era), poised to become a competitive global entity fully integrated into the
global flow of capital and commodities, the conflict between formal and informal retail
over the control of S2 became increasingly politically relevant and prominent). In this con-
cluding chapter I will chart the course of this transformation of the social movements of
the street vendors from the turn of this century and comment on its implications for un-
derstanding the political economy of informal retail. Studying the main contours of the
street vendors movements in the new millennium will also allow me to analyze how the
right to the city is modulated and managed in the neoliberal era. This chapter thus allows
us to understand the crucial link between the neoliberal management of the economy and
the formal/informal divide in the S2, by analyzing the policies and discourses concerning
right (and rightlessness) in informal street retail.
5.2 Ideational Role of HSC
When I asked Shaktiman Ghosh, still the General Secretary of HSC in 2010, to recount
the events surrounding the inception and establishment of the union, he stressed the adamant
stance (oudhotyo) of Subhash Chakrabarty (when he became the transport minister in
1996) and his blatant disregard of the previous order of negotiations. Soon after winning
the elections Subhash started to talk about “encroachment and traffic speed,” occasion-
ally holding citizens meeting to create public support. In one encounter with Shaktiman
Ghosh, Subhash bragged he would blow up the hawkers like the disciples of Balak Brah-
machari (Balak Bramhachari-r moto uriye debo) and tear up any order from the Supreme
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Court.8 According to Shaktiman when the Transport Minister’s threat seemed more and
more credible and his rhetoric was getting increasingly bellicose9 36 unions were identi-
fied. Under the chairmanship of an independent (supported by Congress) councilor called
K.P.Ghosh these conglomeration of unions formed the HSC during a Meeting in Bharat
Sabha Hall in August 1996.10 Massive rallies and all party meetings (CPM was absent in
these meetings), and signature campaigns were held all through November. It is during
this time that Mamata Banerjee who was about to break away from Congress and form
her own All India Trinamool Congress (AITMC), became an active sympathizer. Shakti-
man Ghosh especially stressed the massive all-party meeting on the 19th December. It was
held in front of the governor’s house and Mamata Banerjee joined. There were even un-
official promises from the chief minister that hawkers can unofficially stay for a month.
However, the police harassment continued. Ghosh recalls a turning point in his think-
ing when a major skirmish ensued in the Hatibagan Syambazar area as a women pushed
back against police harassment, protesting that she wants to buy cheap products from the
street. It was from here on that his philosophical disposition about street vending started
to changed. When the public was resisting, saying ‘eta amar bajar ’ (this is my market),
Shaktiman realized
They were not just poor; they are an asset. Their presence enables poor, middle
classes, and unorganized workers to live in the city. They are here because they can
offer commodities at low prices that the big shops cannot afford. They are here be-
cause they are offering a price that is 25% less than that of big shops, but if they are
not there, the big shops will sell way more than what they are selling now because
it will increase their monopoly. We understood the turnover generated by hawkers
and the contribution to the urban economy. There was a radical change in thinking
about hawkers.
8When Subhash was accusing hawkers of forced occupation (jobordokholkari) Shaktiman Ghosh told
me he reminded Subhash that many leaders of the left ruling class migrated from Bangladesh and force-
fully occupied land, and later through land tenure (patta) build three-storied houses.
9Subhash famously said he would resign if there is a single hawker in Calcutta after December 31st
1996.
10Shaktiman Ghosh (General Secretary Hawker Sangram Committee) interview by author February 11
2010.
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So, it is then that HSC started collecting data on hawkers. They decided to ”call dif-
ferent experts,” ”gather economists,” and ”talk to university students.” Shaktiman said
that the leadership started to see the broader economic relations that the hawkers support
and sustain, especially interlinkages with S1. Echoing the Supreme Courts verdicts Shakti-
man said, HSC started to make a case that this was a “poor economy” (gorib arthaniti).
“It was a small economy, but the subject is vast (chhoto orthoniti kintu bishoyta onek
boro)” he said. According to Shaktiman Ghosh the HSC started to describe this as a pave-
ment economy or low circuit economy (bhoomitor orthoniti) of small retail (khuchro byab-
sha). It is the “pavements’ own economy,” and “we understood, that it is a natural market
of the pavement itself (footpather nijossho bajar) that cannot exist separately. Nowadays
we do not say we are poor. We say under-serviced and self-organized, we have understood
that the state should support this natural market instead of cutting it.”
From my interview with Shaktiman Ghosh, it was clear that the opposition to the
state policies in this post OS period was starting to be formulated in terms that chastised
the state for not protecting “natural” (competitive) markets. The ideological undercur-
rent that informed the sustained protests, against eviction related policies during and after
OS, marked a shift from thinking about hawkers as a liability to understanding them as
competitive and entrepreneurial agents. The main point of attack was that the state was
violating one of the core principles of neoliberalism (P1) by not protecting, supporting,
and encouraging the vast range of competitive businesses that allow a price range that is
affordable to a large section of society. HSC linked up with other organizations like the
Tata Institute of Social Science (TISS), Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA),
and individuals like Medha Patekar of “Narmado Bachao” fame. The HSC leadership re-
alized that “this is not about cleaning streets or speed of cars but the first blow from the
larger process of globalization led by World Bank and DFID because John Major was com-
ing and the state needs money from them.” HSC kept on the movement by organizing
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workshops and conferences along with sustained protests and civil disobedience. “I was
arrested 23 times” boasted Shaktiman, and “the story of rehabilitation was a total fake so
we boycotted the rehabilitation altogether.” The hawkers who left for the various spots of
rehabilitation especially in the Gariahat area during and after OS, left others to fight on
the streets of Gariahat in the three years following OS. According to Shaktiman Ghosh,
many of them who left couldn’t make a single sell in six months (chhoi mashey bouni ko-
rtey pareni). By 1999 the “rehabilitated” hawkers wanted to be back on the streets but
by that time HSC affiliated hawkers have consolidated their spaces in the Gariahat area.
Some of the hawkers (with the mediation of Mamata Banerjee) were allowed to come back
to the pavements. Towards the turn of the century, HSC had consolidated significant sup-
port and power over the tenor of hawkers movement which allowed it to expand its sphere
of activism.
(Bandyopadhyay 2016) and (Bandyopadhyay 2011) have well documented HSC’s role
as an archiver and a negotiator. Here I want to stress HSC’s concomitant role in creating
and organizing a counter-hegemonic alliance while reshaping its own disposition towards
the question of hawkers. My research suggests that the role of HSC as an archivist and
statistician is intermingled with its new role as a knowledge producer against new forces
of corporate retail. By 2000, HSC wanted to give this movement an “All India Shape”11
and held a three-day workshop between 7th and 9th January, in Loreto College. A wide
range of interested parties from all over India, including intellectuals (buddhijibi), mem-
bers of parliament, and the mayor himself attended the workshop. Prominent members
of the CPM party and chief editors of important newspapers also joined the workshop.
”This is the first time the idea of national policy was proposed,” Shaktiman exclaimed. In
2001, the central government called a meeting in Vigyan Bhavan in Delhi, and the HSC
sent a delegation of 14 people. An 18 member Taskforce (of which Shaktiman Ghosh was
11Shaktiman Ghosh
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a member) was created and they worked for four years and produced a policy paper in
2004 called National Policy on Urban Street Vendors. Along with the Article (19)’s right
to livelihood the policy explicitly derives force from the directive principles Articles 39 (a)
and (b) of the Indian Constitution that mandates the state to direct policy so that “(a)
the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood”
and ”(b) the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so dis-
tributed as best to serve the common good.”12
In 2004, however, the LF lost the CMC elections. Trinamool Congress, (TMC or AITMC)
Mamata Banerjee’s splinter party from Congress, had won. Subrata Mukherjee, who was
the prominent member of the INTUC and had supported the hawkers during the OS, be-
came the mayor. Moreover, there was hope among the hawkers that perhaps there will
be a solution at last. As Shaktiman Ghosh recalled, the new Mayor also fell back into the
same tune that Subhash had orchestrated before, and to the disappointment of hawkers,
the new city administration was in bitterly opposed (tibro birodh) to them. ”At the end,
there was no difference between the previous and the present administration.” Subrata
Mukherjee also ordered the eviction of all hawkers between Victoria house and Victoria
Memorial. During the time of his work in the Taskforce, Shaktiman claims, he understood
that
The attack (akromon) [on hawkers] was not about a particular state, but it is an in-
ternational plot (antorjatic chakranto). It is a fight to capture markets (khola bajar
dokholer lorai) in countries like ours (amader moto desher). The idea of develop-
ment/progress (unnoyon) is a fragment of that fight [for existing markets]. Although
this ‘unnoyon’ is only for a select few, a result of this thinking was the need to re-
make and beautify (notun korey shajabey) the big cities in each state, to attract big-
ger capital (aro boro punji). So the widening of streets, making flyovers, constructing
massive malls and huge skyscrapers, were ultimately backed by the forces of World
Bank, ADB, DFID, Japan Corporation and above all WTO (shobar uporey WTO).
We started to protest regularly in front of embassies, and every year since 1997 we
have held massive processions marking Operation Sunshine as a ‘Black day’ (kala
dibosh).
12See (Government of India 2004, p.1).
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To counter against the “attack from above” (upor thekey akromon rukhtey) in 2002,
HSC also organized a large (bishal) South and South East Asia conference of Hawkers be-
tween May 24-26, with the renowned Bengali novelist Mahasweta Devi as its chairman.
There was a Calcutta and International declaration that 26th May will be International
Hawkers day. Over the few years since the conference, according to Shaktiman Ghosh,
HSC slowly started to increase in members as it was a “multiparty platform.” He espe-
cially stressed the unified nature of the platform HSC had been able to provide to unions
and people of different partisan leanings.
In 2009 the Government of India (GOI) Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Al-
leviation published another National Policy on Urban Street Vendors. The “Overarching
Objective” of (Government of India 2009, p.5) was
To provide for and promote a supportive environment for the vast mass of urban
street vendors to carry out their vocation while at the same time ensuring that their
vending activities do not lead to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in public
places and streets.
Alluding to the Indian Constitution and the 1989 Sodan Singh case, (Government of
India 2009, p.2) also explicitly maintained that
To be able to practice any profession or to carry any occupation, trade or business
is a fundamental right of every citizen in our country. A person who wants to buy
some items in wholesale and sell the same in retail by hawking is actually exercising
such a right. Thus it will be desirable, other things being equal, that such a right is
not circumscribed unless reasonable restrictions are warranted in public interest. At
the same time, it will be impracticable that every hawker be provided a permanent
site because most cities/towns suffer from severe constraints on land for commercial
vending. However, it should be possible to demarcate vending zones and vendors’
markets where peripatetic and mobile vendors can sell their wares within certain
time restrictions and subject to regulatory stipulations
On 4th August 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh urged (in writing) the chief
ministers all states to implement the Model Street Vendors (Protection and Livelihood and
Regulation of Street Vending) Bill 2009 drafted following the 2009 policy document. “I
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would earnestly seek your personal intervention,” the letter went, “to enact legislation to
enable street vendors to ply their trade without harassment.”13 In late 2009 a letter on
HSC letterhead to the Mayor Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya was still demanding the mere
issuance of identity cards in Gariahat and Rashbehari Avenue areas.14 In 2010 it seemed
that the hawkers’ struggle had come a long way from the mid-nineties fears of violent evic-
tion. When I was doing fieldwork in Calcutta in 2010, the 2009 policy still didn’t have any
legal force. In fact, one of its specific objectives was its implementation.15 It was not until
2014 that the Street Vendors Act (SVA-2014) passed among much gimmickry surround-
ing the Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s origins as a tea seller.16 During my tenure at the
field, I learned that HSC had expanded its boundaries of organizational capabilities to rep-
resent victims of slum eviction from the different parts of Calcutta: especially concerning
their future rehabilitation under the national project called Basic Services for the Urban
Poor (BSUP). These activist forms of organizing were part of a larger resistance against
the ADB funded Kolkata Environmental Improvement Project (KEIP) that involved large-
scale evictions of the urban working poor from the banks of a defunct and clogged internal
waterway locally known as Old Ganga (Adi Ganga in vernacular). From my fieldwork I
also gathered that the primary focus of street vendors’ politics by 2010 was not just the
sustained efforts to provide the 2009 Street Vendors Policy a legal force but more impor-
tantly to resist the sizable corporate multi-brand and wholesale retail chains like Spencers,
Reliance Fresh, Big Bazaar, and Metro Cash and Carry that were entering S2.
Based on the news reports and documents generated during this time it can be ar-
gued that the consolidation of unions into a somewhat unified national force was also a
response to the increasing perception of an equally unified global force of big capital that
13Copy of Letter to All Chief Ministers of States/UTs, PMO, New Delhi, 4th August 2009. Available
from author
14Letter from HSC to Mayor of Kolkata, Dated:November 30, 2009. Available from author.
15See (Government of India 2009, p.5-6), specifically objective 3.2a.
16See (Bandyopadhyay 2016, p.678).
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was destined to enter the retail sector as a formidable competitor. From an erstwhile con-
flict that focused on the hawkers’ presence in the face of city level evictions, the struggle
now morphed into a more significant/high stakes tussle between formal and informal re-
tail. I understand this as a conflict between two oppositional forces: a) industrialization of
S2 through the formalization of the spaces of selling and b) the organizations of already
existing nonindustrial (informal) market networks that structure S2. Concomitantly, two
continuing struggles mark the political economy of retail in contemporary India. First is
the struggle to implement the SVA-2014 in cities and towns. Here the unions often find
themselves taking the position of the state in thwarting ‘unwanted hawkers’ and control-
ling the bureaucracy of pavement access. Second is the struggle between these forces of or-
ganized corporate retail and small unorganized retail. Here the hawker associations along
with other civil society groups resist the big (chain) retail, not only by rowdy demonstra-
tions in front of the formal outlets but also by building a counter-hegemonic force through
the dissemination of information and critical literature.
In this light it is important to notice the dual role of HSC as an everyday negotiator
and a knowledge producer, providing the empirical and ideological basis for further strug-
gles at the local and national level against international and national forces of big capital.
The understanding that Shaktiman and others held, about the nature of their struggle in
the 2000s, however conspiratorial, was still not wholly devoid of truth concerning neolib-
eral thinking. The high growth imperative of P3 entailed courting big capital (foreign and
national) to invest in the city. The courtship will not be successful, or so the logic went
if the city was not made to look investment-worthy. For the city to live up to that stan-
dard, some people will have to stop living and being in the city. However, one can ana-
lyze the predicament of the street vendors in another way. A high growth display could be
easily posted by corporatizing retail, by allowing massive investments by organized retail
chains. After all, the hawkers can generate growth and employ millions of people directly
177
and indirectly, but they cannot plop down a multi-million dollar investment, which is more
conducive to a high growth rate. Hawkers have tarpaulin sheets and bamboo structures.
They have federations like HSC. But this pales in comparison to massive air conditioned
warehouses, machinery to handle large inventories, host of lawyers to play at the edges of
legality, ability to sustain losses for years, and the ability to spend millions in advertis-
ing. Surely the latter will produce lots of growth in GDP terms. The street vendors and
an overwhelming part of the retail trade in India are part of the existing global capitalist
market system. It is a part of the lived economies of millions of people dependent on their
networks of suppliers, artisans, credit, trust, locational advantage, and most importantly,
demand from end consumers. Even though informal retail is a competitive market system
(falling within the fundamental definition of many sellers and many buyers) this capitalist
gain oriented market competition, (which Hayek, Lionel Robbins, and others thought to be
the touchstone of civilization, and which Shaktiman explained as “the natural market”),
must be systematically dismantled in the long run in favor oligopolistic and monopolis-
tic behavior. Neoliberal politics is bound to violate its central principle of market memo-
rial paradoxically. Instead of authoritarianism by the god of free competition neoliberal
thinkers argued the state should institute and subject themselves to, we will now have
neoliberal authoritarianism against the competition. As will become more evident in the
following sections, hawkers and HSC (in Calcutta) are drawn into this struggle front and
center.
5.3 Informal Vs. Formal Retail
According to the AT Kearney’s Global Retail Development Index (GRDI) of 2017, which
is closely watched by multinational retailers, India is the most attractive retail destination
in the world, overtaking China. Big capital’s outlook on S2, is summarized by (Kearney
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2016, p.4-5)
The conditions for retailers in India are favorable and will continue to provide strong
fundamentals. The GDP is forecast to grow 7.4 percent in 2017 and 7.6 percent in
2018, which is helping boost the middle class and increase consumer spending be-
yond the essentials. These trends are expected to help organized retail double in
size by 2020. Meanwhile, the government is taking steps to eliminate the federal and
state rules that curtail retail development, and new regulations are being developed
to attract investment and increase consumption. The enthusiasm around the ini-
tial public offering of DMart, one of India’s most profitable food and grocery chains,
shows that modern retailers are well positioned for profitable growth. This environ-
ment has propelled India to the top spot in the GRDI.
(Bandyopadhyay 2016, p.715) describes the political economy of street vending in the
neoliberal era with the phrase ‘institutionalized informality,’ “a process- indeed a transi-
tion from mobilization to institutionalization.” The transition entails
small-scale mobilizations over the decades morph into larger regional-national and
international constellations through the organization of the bureaucracy, archive, a
regular cadre base, division of labour, professionalization, differentiation among the
stakeholders, and the vital capacity of the organization to socially reproduce this
asymmetric structure.
(Bandyopadhyay 2016) shows these hawker organizations, while making strong de-
mands on the state to create and standardize regulations and tenure of hawkers (and other
informal sector workers), behave like quasi-states endowed with the power of self-regulation.
This regulative role of the hawker federations, now blessed with state sanction, carves out
the institutionalized informal, the formal-informal one might say. The management of ex-
isting informal labor force engaged in street vending is geared towards insulating privileged
hawkers from the population-in-waiting or informal-informal if you will. The author opines
that
Although it is difficult to make a clear separation between the owner of capital—the
employer—and the labourer in the informal economy, our evidence shows that at
least in the case of street vendors in India, the organizations represent the former
segment.
I believe this is a very productive argument and an appropriate evaluation of the po-
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litical economy of street vending during the last decade. I will return to this issue of rights
and rightlessness to selling in the following section. Here, I evaluate this “institutional-
ized informality,” within the framework of “institutionalized formalization” of S2 via re-
tail chains. I say this because it is important to note that “institutionalized formalization”
of spaces of selling do not entail formalization of employment. The terms of contractual
or sub-contractual wage labor within formal spaces of selling remains overwhelmingly in-
formal. Seen in this way, formalization of S2 through investment in organized retail also
institutionalizes, if not institutes, informality in employment.
By 2008 the conflict between hawkers and big retail chains was playing out in all its
South Asian glory. Rama Prasad Goenka (RPG) Group and Reliance Industries were at-
tempting to extend their retail arms in Calcutta markets with chains named Spencer’s
and Reliance Fresh. In early July 2008, hundreds of agitated hawkers descended in south
Calcutta to disrupt and ultimately shut down the inauguration of a 36000 square feet
Spencer’s on Rashbehari Avenue. The hawkers set ablaze Spencer’s advertisements and
discount coupons. Some broke a couple of light bulbs and wrenched out a metal num-
ber from the address embossed on a gate.17 Sanjiv Goenka, the Vice Chairman of the
RPG group, who was supposed to inaugurate, left Calcutta without arriving at the scene.
CITU, the union affiliated to CPM, however, was not present in the agitation. It was even
more awkward for CPM (the ruling left front’s leading partner) because AIFB and RSP
broke with the ruling government’s position and joined the hawkers. AIFB’s state secre-
tary Ashik Ghose openly acknowledges support for hawkers because “big corporate enti-
ties” will be detrimental to the livelihoods of “thousands of small traders and hawkers.”18
Shaktiman Ghosh, of HSC, who was also joined by the independent local councilor of
the 85th ward, Mr. Debashish Kumar, told the press that they had the support of 6000
17See (Telegraph 2008a).
18See (Business Standard 2008).
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members and other hawkers’ unions (except CITU).19 The logic of such agitation was sim-
ple. As Ghosh, who emerged in the press as the leader of the agitation, plainly said “We
are threatened by players such as Spencer’s and Reliance which, if allowed to operate,
would eventually drive us from the market,” and laid down the rules for the peaceful coex-
istence of hawkers and corporate retail. The rules prevented Spencer’s from selling “fruits,
vegetables, food articles and cheap garments.” Spencer’s vice president of marketing, one
S.S. Shekhawat said, “the agitation and the blockade were based on misinformation and
vested interest.”20 However, no one was arrested because the RPG group did not launch a
complaint with local police, perhaps because it was made clear by Shaktiman Ghosh “we
will not allow this to happen and we will keep on protesting every time they try and open
this store.” Mr. Goenka instead chose to assuage fears, insisting to the press that since
“organized retail only forms 3-4 percent of the total food and grocery retail opportunities
in India, this is not a threat to traditional trade.”21 To him it was a matter of misunder-
standing, arguing that Spencer’s will only cater to richer customers, and sell products that
are higher priced and qualitatively different from those of hawkers.22 The press inquired,
“many small brick and mortar Spencer’s stores have been operating in Calcutta, but why
is it that the hawkers chose to resist this and not the others?” Ghosh replied that those
places where the small format Spencers were operating were not serviced by hawkers, as is
the case with Gariahat area. Moreover, he alluded to the meetings regarding the national
policy of street vendors, where, he claimed, a decision was reached to avoid constructing
malls within 2km of areas where hawkers sell their wares.23 Subhash Chakrabarty, still
19See (Anandabazar Patrika 2008a).
20See (Economic Times 2008).
21See (Telegraph 2008a).
22”We have to make them undertand that we don’t sell the same products, we don’t share the same
customers, and we don’t compete withg them in the same price points. We will sell products made in UK,
Thailand, China and so on. How can these products compete with what they are selling?” asserted Mr.
Goenka. See (Hindustan Times 2008b).
23See (Anandabazar Patrika 2008a).
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the Transport and Sports Minister in 2008, fumed, blaming “rich hawker leaders” for the
ruckus. “They are instigating poor people to carry on their dirty politics,” he told the
press, and with his characteristic bellicosity, insisted that Spencer’s hypermarket must
open there, and no “Haridas Pal”24 hawker leader can obstruct it.25
Mayor Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya (also a CPM member) promptly held a meeting
which was attended by Shaktiman Ghosh, Vice President of Spencer’s Eastern Region,
Prabin Dalal, the local councilor Debashish Kumar, among others. The negotiations ended
in an 8-point condition for operating Spencer’s shopping mall in Gariahat. The conditions
provided by the hawkers included quantitative and price restrictions on sales.26 The hawk-
ers also demanded restrictions on wuality and types of good Spencer’s could sell.27 In the
meeting Debashish Kumar also demanded the mall should hire youth from that area.28
Who will enforce these conditions? HSC was ready for a “stringent vigil.” The mayor com-
mented that “you cannot have a headmaster or monitor for everything.”29 The hawkers in
that area became agitated when a reporter raised the Sepencer’s issue. One told a reporter
that “the entire city is filling up with malls as CPM is indulging/encouraging these big
foreign and national businesses which will result in a complete annihilation of our trade.”30
On Monday evening, with the Mayor’s mediation, the store opened without much fanfare.
The mayor and the hawkers unions including the central trade unions like CITU, AITUC,
claimed Spencer’s has accepted their conditions, while the Spencer’s told the press that
they were not obeying any such rules. VP Pravin Dalal said that the reason Spencer’s can-
24This is a somewhat casteist comment where Haridas Pal is a commonly used phrase to mean an in-
consequential commoner.
25See (Anandabazar Patrika 2008b).
26Spencer’s cannot sell garments that are below Rs. 300. Spices sold to a customer must be above 500
grams. The minimum weight of potatoes and onions sold to a customer have to be above 6kg. Prices of all
commodities that can be sold in Spencer’s have to exceed the prices charged by hawkers by at least Re. 1.
27The hawker demanded that sale of handerkchiefs, socks, and underwear are to be prohibited. Un-
branded staples like wheat and rice should be sold as well.
28See (AajKaal 2008).
29See (Hindustan Times 2008a).
30See (Dainik Statesman 2008).
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not abide by such conditions is because it will sell superior products and are not in com-
petition with the hawkers in any way.31 Interestingly enough, the chairman of the West
Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing Board claimed that although the malls sell 4 to
5% of fresh food produced in West Bengal, these stores have still failed to obtain a clear-
ance from his department. Controversies continued over the following weeks as the HSC
complained that the store was flouting the guidelines and threatened renewed agitation.
On Wednesday 9th July 2008, another meeting was held with the concerned parties at the
Mayor’s office. The meeting failed to reach any concrete long-term solution other than,
the somewhat unenforceable, micromanagement of quantity restrictions where the hawk-
ers reduced the restriction on poppy seeds from 500 to 250 grams.32 By the middle of July
2008 things seemed to have petered out as the VP of RPG Sanjiv Goenka himself insisted
that even though guidelines were affecting sales and the store was registering losses on cer-
tain items Spencer’s will still abide by those rules only for the mega-store on Rashbehari
Avenue. “As we go forward” Goenka commented, “hawkers will realize that what we sell
is completely different from the products that they offer. Products like American Apples
and Canadian grapes are hardly sold by them.”33 Sudipto Mitra, the organizing secretary
of the National Hawker’s Federation, told the press that the hawkers’ intended to make
the company suffer losses in certain sectors like fresh vegetables and that the hawkers will
be happy if the store refrains from selling groceries altogether. In case Spencer’s fails to
follow the hawkers demands, Sudipto Mitra said, “we will again start agitation...to set an
example for every retail major through this incident.” 34 The incident made it to the na-
tional news outlets where Shaktiman Ghosh told The Hindu that “other stores in the area
will also be targeted and gradually the movement would be taken to the other parts of the
31See (Shongbaad Pratidin 2008).
32See (Hindustan Times 2008c).
33Goenka also said that from now on stores will open without an fanfare. See (Statesman 2008) and
(Indian Express 2008).
34See (Indian Express 2008).
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country where street hawkers and round-the-corner mom-and-pop stores were suffering
due to entry of big retail.” The spokesperson from Spencer’s complained about “restrictive
trade practices” and said that the Rashbehari Store were forced to stop carrying fruits and
vegetables.35
5.4 Pushback Against Corporate Retail
These conflicts between hawkers and large retail must be situated within a broader intel-
lectual debate about the vagaries and benefits of large-scale retail chains, on which both
parties were basing their arguments. Indian Council of Research on International Eco-
nomic Relations (ICRIER), a private think tank/research group released a report on the
retail sector in India “based on the largest ever survey of unorganized retailers (the so-
called “mom and pop stores”), consumers, farmers, intermediaries, manufacturers, and or-
ganized retailers.”36 At the very outset the study claims that,
The total retail business in India will grow at 13 per cent annually from US$ 322
billion in 2006-07 to US$ 590 billion in 2011-12. The unorganized retail sector is ex-
pected to grow at approximately 10 per cent per annum with sales rising from US$
309 billion in 2006-07 to US$ 496 billion. Organized retail, which constituted a low
four per cent of total retail in 2006-07, is estimated to grow at 45-50 per cent per
annum and attain a 16 per cent share of total retail by 2011-12. In short, both unor-
ganized and organized retail are bound not only to coexist but also achieve rapid and
sustained growth in the coming years. This is clearly not a case of a zero sum game
as both organized and unorganized retail will see a massive scaling up of their activ-
ities. In fact, the retail sector, left entirely in the unorganized and informal segment
of the economy, could well emerge as a major bottleneck to raising productivity in
both agriculture and industry. One of the rather surprising findings of the study is
that low-income consumers save more than others through shopping at organized re-
tail outlets. This is a result of targeted discount shopping. It is also seen that farm-
ers gain considerably from direct sales to organized retailers, with significant price
and profit advantages as compared with selling either to intermediaries or to govern-
ment regulated markets.
35See (Hindu 2008).
36See (Joseph 2008, p.1-5).
184
India only had 4% organized retail, compared to 80 percent and above in the US, UK,
and France. Given that “home markets were crowded” the report stressed the need for
“modern retailers from the developed world” to enter “new markets”. But what about the
regulatory framework for large retailers in the developing world? The report seems to con-
tradict its own advocacy masked as neutrality when (Joseph 2008, p.5) says that
It is interesting to note that regulatory restrictions on the growth in modern retail
is more stringent in developed rather than in developing countries. For example, in
most West European countries, setting up of hypermarkets has become very difficult
since the late 1990s and early 2000s as governments became alive to the demands
of traditional small retailers and non-mobile consumers in these countries. Merger
and acquisition plans are now looked at more critically by the national and Euro-
pean competition authorities. While in most countries opening hours are liberalized
including holiday trading, the very small number of countries where opening on Sun-
days are prohibited include developed countries such as Germany and Austria.
It begs the question then, why the governments in places like Calcutta might not learn
from the West and become “alive to the demands of traditional small retailers and non-
mobile consumers.” Why would the government not be responsive to small retailers if ac-
cording to the report itself organized retail “may affect employment in unorganized retail
and the trade intermediaries associated with traditional supply channels.” The report goes
on to reconcile this adverse effect on already existing markets by providing a typical con-
sequentialist argument based on dubious claims about jobs gained and jobs lost. Arguing
that the employment generation in organized retail will be enough to offset the loss in em-
ployment in traditional retail, (Joseph 2008, p.21) goes on to say,
Finally, but most importantly, the employment generated by organized retail is build-
ing a quality labour class that is gaining vocational training in skilled and unskilled
jobs at the graduate and tenth class level. To meet the growing demand of trained
professionals in the retail industry, several management and training institutes con-
forming to the international standards of certification have been launched across the
country. Foreseeing the demand for trained staff, leading organized retailers are cre-
ating their captive human resources pool through internal training and programmes
and tie-ups with retail management schools. The case studies represented here di-
rectly accounted for employment of nearly 28,320 people in 2006-07.
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The report rests on a set of assumptions that are hard to defend if anyone has studied
with minimum detail unorganized retail, and particularly street vending. The arguments
rest on a common assumption that jobs in the unorganized sector are not building a “qual-
ity labor class”. For example, we are to assume that the cornucopia of food that is cooked
(and eaten) on the streets of Calcutta every day from early morning to midnight, is not re-
flective of a skilled labor force, or perhaps we are to assume that untrained and unprofes-
sional street vendors are handling hundreds of thousands of lunch and snack orders every
day. Why just food? Garment hawkers in Gariahat for example, are continually updated
about the latest fashions and designs, informing their small producers-suppliers about
hanging trends. Yet, according to the reports broad assumption, they too are waiting to
become “quality labor class.” The second assumption is its automatic division between
modern and traditional retail. Although traditional retail is squarely situated within con-
temporary modern capitalism, only the corporatized retail form can be deemed as mod-
ern. For some reason modernity in this argument cannot extend to the visible spaces of
selling; it cannot extend to hawkers who are selling movies and songs from around the
world, or small shops repairing cell phones, watches and cigarette lighters of any shape
and form. ICRIER cannot evaluate the dynamism of these sellers, (their presence and re-
silience in modernity, their ability to source millions of commodities from producers and
intermediaries via a system based on price signals) as a living example of modernity. In-
stead, the report coaxes the reader to gloss over this reality to espouse or assimilate into
the hypermodern gloss of RPG’s 36000sq. ft. retail. It is interesting to note, and easy to
miss the contradiction between the statements of Goenka et al, and ICRIER. According to
ICRIER, “One of the rather surprising findings of the study is that low-income consumers
save more than others through shopping at organized retail outlets,” while Goenka main-
tained that they were in the business of Canadian grapes and such. It is a conundrum how
“low-income consumers” can benefit from stores that are putatively targeting high income
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earners.
The internal inconsistencies of the report, the ideologically inflected assumptions shrouded
in the language of empirical neurality, or the simple fact that 28000 jobs will not even
round up to one percent of total number of people that millions of unorganized retail en-
terprises employ down the supply chain, doesn’t thwart (Joseph 2008, p.26) to provide un-
substantiated claim that,
while the jobs that organized retail displaces are the low-end, low-quality, under-
productive ones, the new jobs created are the high quality, productive ones. It also
generates a number of jobs for unskilled labour for the tasks of sorting, grading, la-
belling, etc.
If we contrast this automatic beauty of high quality labor ushered in by organized
retail with the actual conditions of labor in societies organized around corporate retail, we
can find conditions of slavery, destitution, and trauma.37
In 2010, I went to the biggest Spencer’s store in Calcutta (inside the South City Mall)
and tried to inquire about the nature of employment and conditions of work on the shop
floor, so that it was possible to compare it with the nature of employment in unorganized
retail. Firstly, it was impossible to get an interview with any of the workers. I was repeat-
edly asked to meet the manager who told me no one will talk to me. I did manage to get
a contact from one of the employees who said her friend would be able to talk to me as he
had worked in retail and now works for an organized retail coffee chain called Café Cof-
fee Day. I sat down to talk with Sumanta, after his six-day work week on a chilly winter
evening in November 2009.38 He fits squarely in the category of graduates that are to be
inducted into the “quality labor force” that ICRIER claimed retail will generate. He had
passed High School and wanted to study geography but couldn’t get through the college
of his choice. He got a three year non-honors degree in English (“Pass course in English”
37See (McClelland 2012).
38Sumanta (Ex corporate retail worker) interview by author February 15 2010.
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in local parlance) from a college where he didn’t want to study. When he was about to
graduate, he got a text on his phone that promised him free three month training in hos-
pitality, Customer Relations Management (or CRS as he liked to call it) and Information
Technology. He and his peers thus found out about Dr. Reddy’s Foundation (referred to
as DRF by Sumanta) that trains and prepares youth completely free of cost for corpo-
rate job market. When I pressed Sumanta about the details of these courses, he said “the
training taught us how to talk because the job sector is very bad, so they gave us knowl-
edge about how to talk.” For example, “you have to welcome the guests in and seat them,
and then serve the older people first and then the women in the group. You should always
serve the host last.” Towards the end of three months DRF arranged interviews with dif-
ferent companies. He was able to get a job in a corporate retail outlet called Big Bazaar.
He wasn’t however employed by Big Bazaar, rather it was a sub-contractual arrangement
between Big Bazaar, labor contractor and DRF. He had to work eleven hours a day (from
9am to 8pm) for Rs. 150, and three meals. This was a short-term employment contract
where they had to push certain cleaning products to consumers for a month. He left af-
ter two weeks as the travel was tedious and his father was not happy with him coming
home after midnight. Dr. Reddy’s NGO on the other end will pressure them regularly
to go to different interviews as they had to show a 99 percent success rate. They called
him incessantly and admonished him for not wanting to work. He worked for some time
in a KFC, but then KFC changed the terms of his contract and forced him to work out-
doors. Finally, it was Pizza Hut. Here also he worked as a sub-contractual labor which
paid monthly salary of Rs. 3500. According to the contract Rs. 200 was to be deducted
from the monthly salary for the uniform that they had to wear. Everyone had to work
11 hours a day for six days a week. Pizza Hut conducted a two-day interview which in-
cluded learning the history of Pizza Hut. As a part of the interview process, they also had
to go to other famous non-chain restaurants called Siraj in Park Circus (famous for its
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Biriyani) and comment on their hospitality or the lack thereof. The interviewer from Pizza
Hut pointed out that they were not greeted in these restaurants. There was an exam after
two days on the history of Pizza Hut, and he passed. It turns out after all those history
and hospitality lessons his job skill was to stand in front of an industrial mixer watching
the dough churn. This boredom was broken by something nefarious. Sumanta remem-
bered, “Sometimes a fair complexioned man (forsha moton lok) used to come. He will
suddenly smack a guy with a belt. The other workers will laugh. If you pleaded him to
stop, he would ask for Rs.10 to stop the beating.” He worked there for 3 days. He wasn’t
paid in either KFC or Pizza Hut. In Big Bazaar, he was paid cash in an envelope. He said
he is happier in his present work in Café Coffee Day because the manager is much better.
The workday is eleven hours, and the salary is Rs. 2200. If they meet a sales target set for
their franchise, they get a couple hundred more. “The job market is quite bad,” Sumanta
said, “even worker in a small shop (chhoto dokaner kormochari) gets more money than
this.” “This is not a career plan” he added, “I want to get a Master’s degree from a Pri-
vate institution and teach in a school.”
The skilled jobs in retail which are supposed to replace the unskilled ones from the
unorganized sector even under a closer inspection turned out to be a dream rather than a
reality. None of these jobs had any sense of tenure, security, or contributions to retirement
funds and so on. The employment conditions and arrangements were doubtlessly informal
and sometimes abusive. The market society of the hawker now seem to be replaced by the
market society of the retail worker, with the only difference being that the hawker, how-
ever nominally, makes a profit from the business and may not work if he doesn’t want to,
while the retail worker collects wages and has to work 11 hours a day to keep his job on a
day to day basis. Corporate retail formalizing the spaces of selling but at the same time
informalizes the modes of employment. Organized sector employees remain a part of the
market society.
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It is not just the hawkers that were against the corporatization of retail. Several civil
society groups also published reports and opinion pieces against the entry of big retail in
India. As the ICRIER report was picked up by The Economist, which wholeheartedly
embraced its findings and touted the superiority of organized retail,39 “Vyapar Rozgar
Bachao Andolan: A Movement for Retail Democracy” published a “Critique of ICRIER
Retail Report.” In 2008, (India FDI Watch 2008) criticised the ICRIER report for “ques-
tionable data” which was “hardly representative of “40 million retailers (including 10 mil-
lion street vendors) and 250 million farmers and farm laborers and tens of millions of small
producers and intermediaries.40 A more pointed critique of the report was that it “fails
to learn from Worldwide experience.” The (India FDI Watch 2008, p.4)lists out the high
closure rates of small businesses in the US and other Latin American countries where cor-
porate retail had made significant inroads.
For example the [ICRIER] report cites the experience of South East Asian Countries
sucha as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, all of which eagerly liberalized their re-
tail sectors in the 1990s, only to then impose comprehensive reguilatory mechanisms
once they realized the impact on employment
The intellectual pushback against corporate retail reminds us that the politics of com-
parison works both ways. As one can compare wealth of developed and developing coun-
tries, or mimic the visuals of global city to advocate particular policies (like cleansing the
city of hawkers, or corporatization of retail), one is also open to refer to the vagaries of
such policies that have already been experienced in the developed world. Most of the anti-
corporate-retail activists repeatedly point to the destruction of small business in the places
where corporate retail had taken hold. “Thousand of local businesses have closed on the
US because of Walmart.” was the quote that Sudipta Mitra of HSC pointed to me to while
holding up the interview of Dharmendra Sharma of Indian FDI Watch. HSC has accu-
39See (Economist 2008).
40Also see (Shaha & Shinde 2013).
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mulated and saved dozens of such articles and interviews to make the case against cor-
porate retail. It often uses these to convince members of the civil society to garner sup-
port against corporate retail and organize protests to shut down large retail outlets. Con-
trary to the claim regarding the overpowering and flattening forces of multinational cor-
porations, the political economy of selling in India points to an ongoing and unresolved
conflict, where actors in informal retail, namely the street vendors and small shop own-
ers, have been able to organize and politically thwart, if not impede, the advancement of
corporate retail. This has been accomplished by institutions like HSC, FDIWatch, and Na-
tional Hawker Federation, not just by organizing protests on the street, but by generating
literature and ideas that seek to disprove the claims made by those in favor of formaliza-
tion of retail. It’s a counterhegemonic alliance that seeks to resist as well as educate to
garner mass support and sympathy. Now that we have an idea about the nature of strug-
gle over S2 and the modes of resistance mounted by hawkers’ unions at the local and na-
tional level, against big retail chains, we are able to analyze the right of street vendors in
the context of these forces of corporatization. In the following section, I will analyze the
ways in which the discourses of rights are used by hawkers’ unions and the state to safe-
guard their interests, especially in light of the street vendors bill. I will also comment on
the implication of such rights in regards to the political economy of selling in urban spaces
like Calcutta.
5.5 Right and Rightlessness
The Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014
(SVA-2014) was a culmination of the several policy documents produced through the de-
liberation of hawkers’ union leaders and elected representatives. It follows the National
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Policy of Urban Street vendors of 2009, with certain exceptions.41 The Act applied to the
whole of India except Jammu and Kashmir and lands under the control of Indian Rail-
ways. The act defined a street vendor as
a person engaged in vending of articles, goods, wares, food items or merchandise of
everyday use or offering services to the general public, in a street, lane, sidewalk,
footpath, pavement, public park or any other public place or private area, from a
temporary built up structure or by moving from place to place and includes hawker,
peddler, squatter and all other synonymous terms which may be local or region spe-
cific; and the words “street vending” with their grammatical variations and cognate
expressions, shall be construed accordingly
SVA-2014 creates a legal entity called the Town Vending Committee (TVC) with lo-
calized authority to regulate informal street retail. The chairperson of each TVC (to be set
up “in each local authority” by “appropriate government”) will be the Municipal Commis-
sioner. The TVC will be composed of interested parties representing
the local authority, medical officer of the local authority, the planning authority, traf-
fic police, police, association of street vendors, market associations, traders associ-
ations, non-governmental organisations, community based organisations, resident
welfare associations, banks and such other interests as it deems proper.
According to the conditions of membership, at least 40 percent of the members should
represent street vendors as elected “street vendors themselves.” A third of this 40 per-
cent must be allotted to women street vendors, and adequate representation should be
reserved for “Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, minori-
ties, and persons with disabilities from amongst the members representing street vendors.”
Additionally 10% of the TVC must be composed of “members nominated to represent the
non-governmental organisations and the community based organisations.” The TVC will
create and enforce the strict demarcation of the urban space into “vending zones” 42 and
41For example, Section 4.4. of the 2009 Policy document urges Municipal Authorities “to provide basic
civil facilities in Vending Zones/Vendors’ Markets” like solid waste disposal, drinking water, aesthetic de-
sign for pushcarts, public toilets, protective cover for commodities, storage facilities including cold storage,
parking areas, and even creches and restroom for women vendors. The Act doesn’t provide any legal force
behind this suggestion.
42“Vending zone” means an area or a place or a location designated as such by the local authority, on
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non-vending zones. Within each vending zone, the number of legal hawkers must be “sub-
ject to a norm conforming to two and half per cent of the population of the ward or zone
or town or city as the case may be, in accordance with the plan for street vending and the
holding capacity of the vending zones.” Enforcing this norm will require enumeration in
regular intervals and hence the TVC will “conduct a survey of all existing street vendors,
within the area under its jurisdiction, and subsequent survey shall be carried out at least
once in every five years” but “no street vendor shall be evicted or, as the case may be, re-
located till the survey has been completed.” After the identification phase, “every street
vendor”43 will be issued a certificate of vending by the TVC which will contain appro-
priate time and space restrictions. The act also extends the definition of street vendors
to include all persons (“whether or not included in the survey”) who were provided with
some form of license or permission prior to the first survey, and the TVC will allow them
to operate for “the period for which he has been issued such certificate of vending.” To ob-
tain this non-transferable vending certificate issued for a fee, the would be vendors have to
“give an undertaking” that a) the vendors themselves or their family members will carry
on the business and b) they have no other way to earn a livelihood. In case of death, the
right will pass on first to the spouse and then to the “dependent child of the street ven-
dor.” Such a certificate for the temporary and renewable rights to sell comes with corre-
sponding obligation on the part of the vendors, the violation of which will lead to a pro-
cess of suspension by due process. The following are the rights and obligations as delin-
eated in the act.
• Street vendors will have the right to carry on their trade without hindrance only in
the recommendations of the Town Vending Committee, for the specific use by street vendors for street
vending and includes footpath, side walk, pavement, embankment, portions of a street, waiting area for
public or any such place considered suitable for vending activities and providing services to the general
public.
43“Who has completed the age of fourteen years or such age as may be prescribed by the appropriate
Government”
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specified vending zones in accordance to the terms and condition mentioned in their
certificate. However on TVC’s recommendation the local authority might forbid con-
vert vending zones into no vending zones “for any public purpose.” The street ven-
dors with certificates will be “entitled” to relocation to other vending zones.
• Where vendors use a space based on time share each vendor must “remove his wares
everyday at the end of the time sharing period allowed to him.”
• Street vendors must “maintain cleanliness and public hygiene” not only in the zone
of operation but also “the adjoining areas.” It is also the duty of street vendors to
“maintain civic amenity and public property in the vending zone in good condition.”
• Maintenance charges will be levied on the street vendors for the civic amenities pro-
vided in the vending zones
• The vendors are insulated from police intervention into their businesses if and only if
the vendor “carries on the street vending activities in accordance with the terms and
conditions of his certificate of vending.”
• These certificates of vending, however, are “not to be construed as conferring own-
ership rights, etc.” This act mentions specifically that it doesn’t confer “any tempo-
rary, permanent, or perpetual right of carrying out vending activities in the vending
zones allotted to him or in respect of any place on which he carries on such vending
activity.”
David Harvey writes “To claim the right to the city. . . is to claim some kind of shap-
ing power over the processes of urbanization, over the ways in which our cities are made
and re-made and to do so in a fundamental and radical way.” While elaborating on the
nature and content of right to shape the urban landscape (Harvey 2008) explains
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The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources:
it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common
rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon
the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The free-
dom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most
precious yet most neglected of our human rights.
5.6 Conclusion
Based on this characterization, the SVA-2014 could be interpreted as a transformative
moment in neoliberal era where millions of street vendors seek to harness their collective
power to transform and reshape the process of urbanization in 21st century South Asian
cities. The act negotiates with the apparent incommensurability of individual liberty to
walk or own property to create a countervailing space of collective liberty where the hawk-
ers’ right to sell takes precedence.44 It was after all, seen as a victory among the national
level hawker federations, namely National Alliance of Street Vendors of India (NASVI)
and National Hawker Federation.45 It could also be seen as a political victory based on
a recognition that fundamental human right must include the right to livelihood, now no
less validated through legislation, by the largest capitalist democracy in the world.46 Here
the right to livelihood also involves the victory of the collective right to city spaces as it
is exercised by a legally recognized professional class called street vendors. Based on the
provisions of this act the street vendors will be able to carve out harassment free zones
(hawking zones) within the city. This act can also be seen a victory of individual rights,
not just one’s right to sell within hawking zones, but also the individual consumer’s right
to buy cheaper products. (Bandyopadhyay 2016, p.708) however is rightly more cautious:
Certainly, the Street Vendors Act promises some amount of certainty to the tenuous
44It is also important to note that such legislation at the federal level is absent in the US, even though
congress has the right to regulate interstate commerce.
45See (Bandyopadhyay 2016, p.679-680).
46Notably right to livelihood is not a fundamental right in the US constitution.
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existence of one segment of the lower rung of the petty bourgeoisie in the Indian ur-
ban scene, ironically through spatial zoning. . . Although it is difficult to make a clear
separation between the owner of capital —the employer— and the labourer in the
informal economy, our evidence shows that at least in the case of street vendors in
India, the organizations represent the former segment.
I find the phrase “a transition from mobilization to institutionalization” to describe 21st
century hawker politics particularly useful. The outfits like HSC, NASVI, and National
Hawker Federation now take the position of the quasi state, with its own bureaucracy,
archival power, counterhegemonic knowledge, and a legal mandate to shape and police
the cities vending and vendor-free zones. The figure of the hawker leader as a mobilizer
of the right to sell on the streets now morphs into a benign institutionalized bureaucratic
enforcer, who sustains a formal-informal space where the hawkers operate under the ros-
ter of listed obligations and penalty and walkers suspend their walk to engage in shopping.
In its conceptual formation it is much like the Export Processing Zones or Safe Economic
Zones where labor laws of the land are suspended for the sake of growth-oriented exports.
These economic zones are formal spaces of informal labor, similar to hyper markets like
Spencers or Big Bazaar, where formal spaces seek out disposable, informal employment.
Leaders of hawkers’ organizations likewise create a zone for themselves while conceding
the vast expanse of the city as the normative hawker free space. The vending zones are
informal or at best semi-formal spaces: remember at any moment the zone can be disman-
tled for public purpose and the right to the space should “not to be construed as confer-
ring ownership rights, etc.” This is not Goenka’s 36000 sq. ft property. It is a semi-formal
space of selling with informal labor arrangements that has some formal recognition. As
Ritajyoti points out, the 40% representation of hawkers in the TVC that primarily will
regulate street vending seems like a spoof of the catchword “participatory democracy”.
In essence, the institution of rights simultaneously institutes a strict rightlessness, by ad-
mitting some it produces the long-term possibility of strictly excluding others, by control-
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ling the number of hawkers. Now instead of the state or city government coming after the
hawkers the TVC will assume power with minority representation from hawkers. Having
assumed the mantle of self-policing, now the unions, instead of advocacy for people sell-
ing on city streets, will have to extricate hawkers who do not or cannot provide proper
certification and proof. This is where we find a tentative resolution to the contradiction
of neoliberal governance. The political backlash from outright eviction to promote rapid
economic growth, is now averted by the provision of rights. By controlling the hawker pop-
ulation to 2.5% and hence reducing competition in favor of monopolistic retail, the surplus
labor is now channeled to corporate retail. Since the hawkers are to be tied to zones and
their tenure is subject to renewal based on quintennial surveys, the fight against corporate
retail will also be muted, as the hawkers will lose the legal ability to fight corporate retail
establishments adjacent to their zones. Moreover, the neoliberal state, instead of staying
clear of intervention in markets, now gets more involved in the administration of hawker
markets, down to the block or district level. What about the implementation of this act?
Note that, the act delegates responsibility to the local government and hence is not really
a central rule of any sort. What if a state government doesn’t implement the act at all? I
end with some reports form a renowned Calcutta daily published in December 2017.47
The eviction drive against hawkers in Salt Lake may be a one-off because Bengal
appears in no hurry to implement the central street vendors act that recommends
hawking and non-hawking zones in every city and town. The state government was
supposed to notify a set of rules based on the Street Vendors (Protection of Liveli-
hood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, within a year of it coming into
force. More than three years later, the draft of the rules is still lying with the gov-
ernment’s legal cell. In August, Calcutta High Court had given the government 12
weeks to form a town vending committee to regulate roadside hawking in the city.
””This is our ultimate order. If the committee is not constituted in 12 weeks, the
court will have to take coercive steps,” the court said in response to a petition filed
by advocate Debasish Banerjee. The continued delay in regulation has allowed hawk-
ers to snatch the last remaining pavements from pedestrians. Metro had reported
on Tuesday how a piece of a pavement can be bought in Gariahat for a price higher
47See (Basu & Roy 2017).
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than that of commercial real estate. The stakes are similar in the other illegal hawk-
ing zones like New Market, Chowringhee, Burrabazar and Hatibagan. Hawkers pay
their union a fee both for space and immunity from police action.
Finally from 14th August 2018, we have48
The hawker eviction drive resumed in Salt Lake on Monday but the encroachers re-
turned after a few hours, playing a cat-and-mouse game with the authorities. Two
eviction teams reached sectors I and II to drive away hawkers, who moved their push
carts and cyclerickshaw-vans into lanes and bylanes to avoid the inspectors. ”The
hawkers have changed their tactics and are now simply moving away as soon as they
get whiff of an eviction team approaching. It’s almost like chasing them around the
blocks. One day we evict them and confiscate their stock and the next day they
turn up at a new spot,” an official of the Bidhannagar Municipal Corporation said.
”Nowadays we bring less stock and keep most of it packed so that we can wrap up
within minutes if we hear of an eviction drive. We have stopped using stalls made
out of bamboo poles and tarpaulin or plastic sheets as they cannot be dismantled
quickly,” said Ranjan Bera, who runs a tea stall on the road leading to DL block.The
hawkers have started staying away from pavements along the main thoroughfares,
including First Avenue, Second Avenue, Third Avenue and the Broadway that cuts
across the township. Instead, they have set up stalls along sidewalks and even roads
inside the blocks.
Shaktiman Ghosh has now traveled to “more foreign countries than PM Narendra
Modi and have spoken at several world organizations, including the United Nations.” He
“leads 1192 hawkers unions” from around the world under an umbrella called “Interna-
tional Federation of Hawker and Urban Poor.” But as it turns out, the hawker leader is
not happy with the Indian hawkers now because he thinks “most hawkers here are indisci-
plined.”49 The movement that started by organizing against state eviction is now charged
to impose discipline and punishment on the hawkers. From the position of an oppositional
movement against neoliberal policies of exclusion it has transformed into propositional en-
tity of instituting discipline. The resolution of the hawker problem through nationally rec-
ognized rights in practice essentially remains to be implemented, but in effect it erodes the
rights of the urban poor to sell and creates a situation where over the longer term their
48See (Sengupta 2018).
49See (Pramanik 2017 (Accessed September 21, 2017 )).
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number will be reduced in favor more oligopolistic competition in S2.
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2014. “Statistics on the informal economy: Definitions, regional estimates and chal-
lenges.” Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO)
Working Paper (Statistics) 2.
Venkattesh, Sudhir Alladi. 2008. “Off the Books: The Underground Economy of the Urban
Poor.”.
Verma, Rubina, Rahul Giri et al. 2017. Informality in Indian Manufacturing. In 2017
Meeting Papers. Number 1566 in “Meeting Papers” Society for Economic Dynamics.
Vikraman, Shaji. 2017. “In fact: How govts pledged gold to pull economy back from the
brink.” The Indian Express April 5.
URL: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-fact-how-govts-pledged-gold-to-
pull-economy-back-from-the-brink/
Walter, Ryan. 2013. A critical history of the economy: On the birth of the national and
international economies. Routledge.
Weingast, Barry R. 2016. “The Medieval Expansion of Long-Distance Trade: Adam Smith
on the Town’s Escape from the Violent and Low-Growth Feudal Equilibrium.” Stand-
ford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No.492 pp. 1–30.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2789131
Yusuff, Olabisi Sherifat. 2011. “A theoretical analysis of the concept of informal econ-
omy and informality in developing countries.” European Journal of Social Sciences
20(4):624–636.
Zachariah, Benjamin. 2005. Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History c. 1930-
50. Oxford University Press.
226
                                                                     VITA 
 
Anirban Acharya 
312 Deforest Road 
Syracuse, NY, 13214 
Telephone: 315-430-0942 
Email: anirban.acharya@gmail.com 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University;                        
Syracuse, New York.  
 
Ph.D, Political Science  
 
Dissertation Title: “Right to Sell: Politics of Informal Retail in the Neoliberal era.” 
 
M.A., Political Science (2007) 
 
 
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR); Mumbai, India  
M.Phil., Economics (2004)  
 
M. Phil thesis “Two Voting Algorithms”. The thesis proposed, constructed and simulated two electoral 
processes of voting and government formation. Both the algorithms were developed to describe and 
emulate electoral behavior of switching voters and parties that form coalitions within a multidimensional 
policy/ideological space. 
 
Jadavpur University; Kolkata, India 
M.A., Economics (2000)              
Subfields: Development Economics, Environmental Economics, Econometrics 
 
B.A., Economics (1998)   
HONOR AND AWARDS 
LeMoyne College 
Scholar-Athlete and Faculty Recognition Breakfast                                                            2016, 2018   
Ignatian Mission Award                                                                                                     2017     
 
Syracuse University 
Bharati Memorial South Asia Research Grant                               2009 
Roscoe Martin Research Grant                                                                                            2009 
Teaching Associate in the Future Professoriate Project, Syracuse University                        2007 
Maxwell School Dean’s Summer Research Grant                                                                 2006 & 2007 
Political Science Department Summer Research Grant                                                        2005   
 
 
TEACHING 
 
Department of Political Science, Le Moyne College, Syracuse NY                                          2010-2018 
Professor of Practice in Political Science (Present) 
Visiting Assistant Instructor (2015 Fall -2018 Spring) 
Adjunct Instructor (2010-2015 Spring) 
 
Undergraduate Courses: International Politics, Research Methods, Understanding Modern Terrorism, 
Globalization, International Political Economy, American Politics, U.S Foreign Policy, American Presidency, 
Environmental Politics, International Law, Introduction to Macroeconomics, Introduction to 
Microeconomics.   
 
 
 
 
Department of Political Science, Syracuse University                                                          2004-2015 
Teaching Assistant and Independent Instructor           
 
Undergraduate Courses: Introduction to Political Analysis, Political Argument and Reasoning, 
Quantitative Methods in Social Sciences, Ethics and International Relations, Comparative Politics of the 
Third World, Politics of Africa, Politics of the Environment, American Politics, Supreme Court in American 
Politics,    
Graduate Courses: Syracuse University 
Quantitative Skills in International Relations 
 
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research                                                                     2001-2004 
TA for Graduate Courses: Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Mathematics for Economists  
 
PUBLICATIONS: 
 
“Giving the Cold Shoulder? Politics of Neutrality in the Bandung Era” Cold War in South Asia, eds. Sandeep 
Banerjee, Subho Basu, Auritro Majumder (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).  
 
WORKS IN PROGRESS: 
 
“Neoliberalism and Machiavellian politics: “The rise of Mamata Banerjee In West Bengal 1998-2015.”             
Co-authored: Dr. Subho Basu, Department of History and Classical Studies, McGill University. 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
Department of Political Science, Syracuse University  
Research Assistant, Dr. Margarita Estebez-Abe (2012-2014)                                                     
 
Statistical Analysis of Gender and Labor Participation Dataset used: Luxemburg Income Study                                                                                             
 
Department of Political Science, Syracuse University 
Research Assistant, Dr. Jonathan Hanson (2011-2012) 
 
Creating and coding of original dataset regarding IMF lending to countries.           
 
Department of Political Science, Syracuse University 
Research Assistant, Dr. Christine Mahoney (2009-2010)                                             
 
a) Field Research in Sri Lanka regarding Conditions of Internally Displaced Persons and NGO activism   
b) Transcription of interviews, analyses of multi-country datasets with camp/country level variables.                                                     
              
Department of Sociology, Syracuse University            
Research Assistant, Prema Kurien (Summer 2010)                                                                                         
 
a) Literature review and position papers on Globalization, Religion  
and Ethnic Politics in USA with a special focus on Indian American groups. 
b) Conducting semi structured interviews with members and activists of various organizations. 
 
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research  
Research Assistant, Dr. Ashima Goyal (2002) 
Econometric Analysis of macroeconomic data. 
 
Department of Economics, Jadavpur University 
Project Assistant to Dr. Jayasree Roy [Funded by International Energy Agency, Paris] (2000-2001) 
            
Indicator Analysis and Preparation of Energy Balance for India.           
 
 
SERVICE: 
LeMoyne College 
 
Invited as Guest Speaker for The National Jesuit Student Leadership Conference, July 20th 2018. 
Title of Talk: Poverty  of Poltiics and Politics of Poverty.  
 
Moderator of the LeMoyne College Model United Nations Team.                                             2013-Present 
 
Collaborated with local social entrepreneurs to organize and conduct culinary workshops  
where all proceeds were donated to charities connected to LeMoyne College                                  
including the Matt Shaw fund.                                                                                                   2017, 2018 
                                                           
Invited to Panel Discussion “Right to Learn” Open Access Week in Le Moyne Colelge                  2017                  
 
Poetry Hour with the HEOP/AHANA students during Summer in LeMoyne College                     2014-2018  
                                                          
Independent Study with student on the Ethics of Drones, Presented on Scholars day                  2016 
 
Collaborating with Department of Music and local musicians to create a music project on New American 
Jazz. (Forthcoming) September 26th 2018                                                                                                                             
 
SELECT CONFERENCES AND TALKS 
 
American Political Science Association Conference                                                                               2018     
Poster “Can the Subaltern Sell? Politics of Street Vending in Kolkata 1990-2010” 
  
Social Science Research Seminar (LeMoyne College)                                                                             2017    
Lecture: “Politics of Informal Retail in the Neoliberal Era”                                                        
 
South Asia Conference in Wisconsin Madison,                                                                                     2012 
Paper: “Street Vending in Present day Kolkata” 
 
Central New York Council for Social Studies                                                                                        2010 
Paper: India and the Future of Democracy and Capitalism)  
 
Political Science Research Workshop, Syracuse University, USA                                 2009  
Paper: The Political Economy of State Planning, The Urban Sector  
and Unorganized Workers in India during Liberalization) 
 
Annual Lecture Series: Hoogly Mohsin College                                                                                     2004 
Lecture: Importance of Game Theory in International Relations 
 
Specializations and Area of Interests in Teaching and Research : 
 
o Comparative Politics 
o International Relations 
o Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods 
o International Political Economy 
o Applied Political Theory 
o Political Economy of the Developing World 
o Microeconomic Theory 
o Macroeconomic Theory 
o Applied Game Theory 
FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS: 
Native Fluency in English, Bengali, and Hindi. Conversationally fluent in Urdu.  
TECHNICAL SKILLS 
Software R, SPSS, STATA, SAS. Latex2e. Programming language: Visual Basic. 
 
REFERENCES 
 Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Doctoral Dissertation Advisor 
Professor, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University.  
100 Eggers Hall  
Syracuse, NY 13224 
           Email: mboroujerdi@maxwell.syr.edu 
 
 Dr. Subho Basu, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Member 
Associate Professor, Department of History and Classical Studies,  
McGill University.  
Room 606, Leacock Building, 855 Sherbrooke Street West Montreal,  
Quebec H3A 2T7  
E-mail: subho.basu@mcgill.ca 
 
 Dr. Margarita Estevez-Abe, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Member  
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University.  
100 Eggers Hall  
Syracuse, NY 13224 
Email: mestev02@maxwell.syr.edu 
 
 Dr. Glyn Morgan, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Member  
Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University 
100 Eggers Hall 
Syracuse, NY 13224 
           Email: dgmorgan@maxwell.syr.edu 
        
 Dr. Sandeep Banerjee, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Member 
Assistant Professor in Literature 
McGill University 
Room 367 Arts Building, 853 Sherbrooke Street West Montreal,  
Quebec H3A OG5  
Email: sandeep.banerjee@mcgill.ca  
    
 
 
 
